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INTRODUCTION	AND	OVERVIEW	
The FDA ensures that prescription drugs in America are generally “safe and effective” 
for the uses for which they are prescribed. Given the inherent tradeoff between rigorously vetting 
drugs and delaying alternative treatments for patients, however, there are areas in which 
prescription risks are left unregulated or are unable to be precisely quantified. In these areas 
where drug risks can be heterogeneous, physicians’ ability to assess, and the market’s ability to 
price, risk is particularly important. This dissertation focuses on the legal framework surrounding 
consumer drug choice.  
Chapter 1 begins by measuring consumers’ preferences with respect to ambiguity in the 
risk that a drug is safe or ineffective in the presence of framing effects. It uses an incentivized 
experiment on Vanderbilt undergraduates to understand consumers’ preferences if they were 
given explicit information about drug risks. These deviations from ambiguity neutrality depend 
on context: the Chapter finds that framing effects result in ambiguity-seeking behavior in the 
“loss domain” and ambiguity-averse behavior in the “gains domain.” The results suggest that 
alleviating some ambiguity through uniform recommendations or physician intermediaries might 
actually lead to patients choosing better treatment options.  
Chapter 2 empirically examines the consumption of narrow therapeutic index (NTI) 
drugs, an area in which there was a perceived but unregulated risk. The Chapter tests whether 
third-party payers contributions are consistent with patients’ preferences against risky drugs, 
particularly drugs in which switching is costly. The results support this idea, as there is evidence 
of a price penalty for NTI status in all first- and third-party payers’ contributions. The gap 
between brand-name and generic drugs is also smaller for NTI drugs than for non-NTI drugs, 
consistent with costly switching. Finally, the Chapter examines consumption behavior and finds 
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evidence of version loyalty, consistent with costly switching. The Chapter concludes that third-
party payers might be adequate agents of patients in taking risk preferences into account in their 
pricing decisions even absent direct government regulation.  
Chapter 3 measures the effect of a False Claims Act settlement on relinquishment of 
inappropriate off-label uses. It finds a significant average drop in off-label prescriptions after an 
FCA suit is settled. It further utilizes a case study of neurontin to disentangle the response of 
different payers to both scientific and legal information shocks. It finds heterogeneity in relative 
relinquishment by payer and finds evidence consistent with the relinquishment being spurred by 
the litigation process.   
This dissertation seeks to understand the relationship between risk preferences and 
regulation in the context of pharmaceutical drugs. Chapter 1 discusses the underlying issue of 
ambiguity in pharmaceutical drug risks. Chapters 2 and 3 examine two contexts in which drug 
risks were uncertain or not well-quantified and discuss whether explicit regulation is necessary.  
Chapter 2 finds that the market seems sensitive to risk even in the absence of government 
regulation. Chapter 3 finds that the False Claims Act can provide industry signals as to the 
appropriateness of off-label uses but cautions that this function may be undermined by further 
expansion of the FCA. The results provide an insight into how the legal framework surrounding 
pharmaceutical regulation interacts with consumer risk preferences and where explicit regulation 
is necessary and where the market might be well-equipped to compensate risk.
  3 
CHAPTER 1 
VALUATIONS OF AMBIGUITY IN PRESCRIPTION DRUG RISKS: EVIDENCE BY FRAMING AND RISK 
TYPE 
I. Introduction 
Prescription drug use is a widespread phenomenon in the United States. Almost half of 
the population has used at least one prescription drug within the past 30 days.1 Prescription drug 
use is almost always associated with some level of risk. While the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) requires drugs to be both safe and effective (21 U.S.C. 355(j); Wittich et al. 2012), these 
drugs are not risk free. Some drug uses, however, have higher and more ambiguous risks than 
others. How consumers react to this ambiguity is important, as it potentially affects their 
decisions over uncertain treatments.  
One context in which risks are particularly ambiguous is in off-label uses of drugs. A 
drug is used “off-label” when it is prescribed for a disease, population, or dosage for which it is 
not approved (Wittich et al. 2012). For example, a drug approved for the control of seizures 
might be prescribed for the treatment of bipolar disorder. The FDA allows physicians broad 
discretion in how to prescribe a drug. Since companies do not have incentives to submit these 
uses for FDA approval, rigorous randomized double-blind controlled studies may be less likely 
to be available for off-label uses.  Instead, physicians may rely on pharmaceutical representatives 
and available scientific information to determine whether off-label prescriptions are appropriate. 
This results in risks that are less precisely defined and ambiguous.  
In this Chapter, I use an incentivized experiment to explore differences in ambiguity 
attitudes based on framing effects. A person’s attitudes toward ambiguity usually fall into one of 																																																								
1 The CDC reports 48.7% of people (men and women) from 2009–2012 have taken at least one 
prescription drug in the last 30 days (CDC 2014).  
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three categories: he may prefer ambiguity (“ambiguity-seeking”), avoid ambiguity (“ambiguity-
averse”), or be indifferent to ambiguity (“ambiguity-neutral”). Framing effects are important, 
given that consumers’ prior treatment experiences likely provide a reference point with respect to 
which current attitudes are formed. Additionally, the experiment measures differences in 
ambiguity attitudes between the risk that the drug is ineffective and the risk the drug is unsafe. A 
person’s attitudes toward ambiguity are difficult to empirically ascertain given asymmetric 
information on drug benefits; this experiment seeks to elicit these through an experiment where 
this information is explicit. Understanding these attitudes is important: if consumers are 
ambiguity-averse or ambiguity-seeking they may consume a suboptimal mix of drugs. If 
consumers are predictably influenced by ambiguity in particular frames or for particular risks, 
the government might be able to implement policies to reduce perceived ambiguity and help 
patients choose a treatment option that better maximizes their expected outcomes.   
II. Background 
This study seeks to incorporate the effect of ambiguity into consumer valuations of 
pharmaceutical risks.  Drug risks are inherently hard to state with certainty—even FDA-
approved drugs have additional risks that are discovered years after approval. Ambiguity is 
particularly relevant for off-label treatments. Off-label drug uses are uses for which a drug did 
not receive FDA approval. The risks of off-label treatments are not necessarily unknown, as 
there are studies available on the treatment’s safety and effectiveness. However, these studies are 
often case studies or small sample studies, which do not provide the same level of “certainty” as 
a double-blind controlled study. In a survey of off-label mentions, Radley et al. (2006) find that 
only 27% were supported by strong scientific evidence. In contrast, on-label uses have a better 
chance of identifying their risks, since double-blind controlled studies are often necessary for 
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FDA approval.2 This study examines the effect of ambiguity on perception of pharmaceutical 
risks, focusing on how the effect of ambiguity varies with framing and by type of risk.  
Framing is important in the medical context, particularly if patients exhibit reference 
dependence in their preferences and utilities. Consider two patients choosing between an 
approved treatment with a certain likelihood of success and an off-label treatment with an 
ambiguous likelihood of success: One patient was well-treated on their previous drug but no 
longer has access to it and is looking for a new treatment. The other patient had a bad experience 
with her previous drug and discontinued its use.  These patients, though facing similar problems, 
may respond differently to the ambiguously risky off-label treatment simply due to their past 
treatment experience.  
Similarly, the type of risk faced might affect reactions to ambiguity. This Chapter focuses 
on two types of risk: safety and ineffectiveness risks. For the purpose of this Chapter, a “safety 
risk” will be defined as the risk that the drug causes an adverse effect, and an “ineffectiveness 
risk” will be defined as the risk that a drug does not alleviate the symptoms of a patient’s disease. 
There are legitimate reasons for consumers to value safety and effectiveness differently. 
Consumers might prefer the ailment they have experienced (their disease’s symptom) to an 
ailment they have not experienced (a drug’s side effect). Similarly, consumers may prefer not to 
be actively involved in the harm, as discussed in the omission bias and related literature (e.g., 
Ritov and Baron 1990; Zeckhauser and Viscusi 1990; Connolly and Reb 20033).4 Consumers 
																																																								
2 Junod, Suzanne White (2014). FDA and Clinical Trials: A Short History, FOOD AND DRUG 
ADMINISTRATION, available at 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Overviews/ucm304485.htm#_edn52. 
3 In contrast, Connolly and Reb (2003) find little evidence of omission bias in vaccination 
decisions.  
4 Kees, Bone, Kozup, and Ellen (2008) find evidence of the omission bias in a study of black box 
warnings and risk presentation on prescription drug websites. Omission bias has also been 
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may prefer to let their disease worsen through inaction rather than affirmatively harm themselves 
with a drug, even though it has a chance of alleviating their symptoms.5  
Several studies have focused on ambiguity in medical decision-making contexts. Many 
concentrate on ambiguity in disease-specific contexts: Han et al. (2011) find evidence of both 
ambiguity-aversion and ambiguity-seeking in the context of individualized colorectal cancer risk, 
with participants less likely to experience ambiguity-aversion if they were optimistic or 
experienced visual communication of probabilities.6 Similarly, Han et al. (2007) study the effect 
of ambiguity perceptions in mammography recommendations and find that perceived ambiguity 
is associated with lower likelihood of receiving a mammography. Curley, Eraker, and Yates 
(1984) examine ambiguity-aversion in patients’ choice of treatment, finding that confidence and 
context were significant in whether a patient was ambiguity-averse. A similar literature exists for 
physicians’ choice of treatment (Curley, Young, and Yates 1989; Gerrity, DeVellis, and Earp 
1990). Viscusi (1999) asks judges whether they would choose to market a superior CAT scan 
drug with uncertain risk properties; he finds that the majority of judges chose the old drug with 
the known but higher risk. Additionally, he finds higher valuations of one’s own life are 
correlated with higher likelihoods of approving the uncertain risk drug.7   
																																																																																																																																																																																		
studied in the context of physicians decided treatment regimes. Through a series of vignettes, 
Aberegg, Haponik, and Terry (2005) find that pulmonary and critical care physicians exhibit 
omission bias.  
5 Zeckhauser and Viscusi (1990) note that the issue of omission might exist for two reasons: first, 
consumers might react adversely to the idea that the government is comfortable with risk to the 
public. Second, consequences of risks of commission can be more visible than risks of omissions. 
6 Han et al. (2009) do a similar analysis.  
7 While there has been work on ambiguity in medical decision making, another line of literature 
more rigorously characterizes ambiguity as a Bayesian learning process (Viscusi and Magat 
1992; Viscusi 1997). Similarly, previous literature discusses the effect of ambiguity on risk 
perceptions, including the effect of extreme estimates (Viscusi 1997), the range and mean of 
estimates (Viscusi and Chesson 1999), different sources of information (Viscusi 1997), and 
asymmetric risks (Viscusi, Magat, and Huber 1991b).  
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The effects of framing and safety/effectiveness on ambiguity have largely been studied 
separately. The effect of framing on ambiguity has often been studied outside the medical 
context. Einhorn and Hogarth (1985) acknowledge framing in their descriptive model, proposing 
that participants anchor on an initial estimate and then adjust in response to ambiguity. Using 
experiments, Kahn and Sarin (1988) find evidence of ambiguity-aversion in the gains domain 
and ambiguity-seeking in the loss domain at high mean probabilities; they find the reverse at low 
mean probabilities. Viscusi and Chesson (1999) also see evidence of this reversal and estimate 
the crossover point between high and low mean probabilities. Unlike previous studies, however, 
they use a Bayesian learning model as the underlying framework.  
The prior literature on safety and effectiveness has mostly focused on the relative values 
of safety and effectiveness in various disease-specific contexts (e.g., osteoporosis (de Bekker-
Grob et al. 2008), hip fracture (Telser and Zweifel 2002), and asthma (McTaggart-Cowan et al. 
2008)). These studies often produce mixed results as to whether patients value safety or 
effectiveness more. Johnson et al. (2007) find that patients with Crohn’s Disease were often 
willing to accept higher adverse event risks in exchange for improved efficacy. In contrast, a 
study of antiepilepsy drugs finds that patients were willing to pay less to reduce the chance of 
seizure symptoms than to avoid side effects such as feeling sick, skin rash, or hair loss (Lloyd, 
McIntosh, and Price 2005).  
Perhaps the most relevant prior study is Bier and Connell (1994), which examines 
ambiguity in the context of pharmaceutical consumption. Their experimental design does vary 
safety and ineffectiveness risks; however, the study focuses on the effect of optimism and 
message framing. Bier and Connell find that subjects were ambiguity-seeking in positive frames, 
especially for more optimistic subjects, and ambiguity neutral in negative frames. This runs 
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counter to previous framing research, which finds ambiguity-aversion in the gains frame (Kahn 
and Sarin 1988; Hogarth 1989). Bier and Connell, additionally, do not characterize ambiguity as 
a Bayesian learning process.  
This Chapter contributes to the literature by looking at framing and safety/effectiveness 
in conjunction. In order to do this, the study employs a model of Bayesian learning to examine 
the effect of framing on the perception of safety and ineffectiveness risks in the presence of 
ambiguity.  
III. Valuations of Ambiguity in Safety and Ineffectiveness 
This experiment8 examines the effect of ambiguity on the perception of the risk that a 
drug is ineffective or unsafe. The experiment studies ambiguity effects in consumer drug choice, 
using the pairwise comparison methodology established in Viscusi, Magat, and Huber (1991a); 
Viscusi (1997); and Viscusi and Chesson (1999). Consumers will choose between a drug with a 
certain risk and a drug with an ambiguous risk until they reach a point of indifference.  
A. Experimental Design and Hypotheses 
 Participants are faced with a pairwise choice between two drugs: One of the drugs has a 
known, certain probability of risk while the other has two different estimates of risk, resulting in 
an “ambiguous” risk. Participants gain and lose money based on the risks associated with the 
drug they choose.  Table	1 outlines the experimental design. 
Participants are assigned to Group 1 (Ineffectiveness) or Group 2 (Safety). Each group 
faces ambiguity in the risk of experiencing headaches: participants in the Ineffectiveness group 
experience the risk of headaches as a symptom of what the survey calls Disease A, while 
participants in the Safety group experience the risk of headaches as the side effect of the drug in 
																																																								
8 This experiment went through Vanderbilt University IRB approval (study  #150977). 
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question, called Xites. Both groups face a certain, stable risk of experiencing nausea: 
ineffectiveness experiences it as a Xites side effect and Safety as a Disease A symptom.  
Table 1 Experimental Design. 
 Group 1 (Ineffectiveness) Group 2 (Safety) 
Disease Symptoms Headaches Nausea 
Drug Side Effects Nausea Headaches 
 
 Drug C Drug D Drug C Drug D 
Risk that Drug Fails to 
Alleviate Symptoms 
Certain Ambiguous Certain, static  Certain, static  
Risk that Drug Causes a 
Side Effect 
Certain, static  Certain, static  Certain Ambiguous 
 
Participants in the Ineffectiveness group received the following instruction:  
You will be given an option of two drugs: one drug has a known probability of 
preventing your symptoms and the other has an ambiguous probability. Please make a 
decision between the two drugs in each round. After each round, based on the risks 
associated with the drug chosen, a health event will occur that will either earn or deduct 
money. We are interested in the point at which you are indifferent between the two drugs. 
 
You were diagnosed with Disease A, which causes you to experience intense headaches 
4-5 times a week. These headaches leave you sensitive to light and incapacitate you.  No 
over-the-counter medication alleviates your symptoms. Your current prescription 
medication for Disease A does not control your symptoms. Instead, it also produces 
intolerable side effects. For these reasons, your physician refuses to prescribe it anymore. 
Instead, he suggests that you switch to a new type of drug, Xites. 
 
There are many types of Xites drugs. While Xites can control Disease A, they are also 
associated with certain side effects. In particular, Xites can cause bouts of nausea. These 
bouts cause sensitivity to smell and often confine you to bed. Because of drug 
interactions, additional drugs cannot be taken to alleviate these adverse side effects. Over 
the next slides you will see a pair of Xites prescription drugs. You must choose one of the 
two drugs, or indicate that you are indifferent between the two. If you indicate that you 
are indifferent, one of the drugs will be randomly selected.   
 
Similarly, participants in the Safety group received the following instruction: 
 
You will be given an option of two drugs: one drug has a known probability of causing 
side effects and the other has an ambiguous probability. Please make a decision between 
the two drugs in each round. After each round, based on the risks associated with the drug 
chosen, a health event will occur that will either earn or deduct money. We are interested 
in the point at which you are indifferent between the two drugs. 
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You were diagnosed with Disease A, which causes you to experience bouts of nausea 4-5 
times a week. Each bout causes sensitivity to smell and often confines you to bed. No 
over-the-counter medication alleviates your symptoms. Your current prescription 
medication for Disease A does not control your symptoms. Instead, it also produces 
intolerable side effects. For these reasons, your physician refuses to prescribe it anymore. 
Instead, he suggests that you switch to a new type of drug, Xites. 
 
There are many types of Xites drugs. While Xites can control Disease A, they are also 
associated with certain side effects.  In particular, Xites can cause intense headaches. 
These headaches cause sensitivity to light and incapacitation. Because of drug 
interactions, additional drugs cannot be taken to alleviate these adverse side effects. Over 
the next slides you will see a pair of Xites prescription drugs. You must choose one of the 
two drugs, or indicate that you are indifferent between the two. If you indicate that you 
are indifferent, one of the drugs will be randomly selected. 
 
Headaches and nausea were chosen since they seem similar in severity, so as not to create 
a comparison effect between a minor symptom and a severe side effect (or vice versa). Using this 
design, I can compare the ambiguity effect for the same ailment (headaches) in different 
contexts.  
For each group, Drug C has a certain probability of incurring the side effect of headaches, 
while Drug D has two estimates. Low Risk corresponds to the low estimate of risk for Drug D, 
while High Risk corresponds to the high estimate of risk for Drug D. Depending on the 
participants’ choice, the computer will update the certain probabilities for the Drug C until an 
indifference point is reached between the two drugs. A sample screen that participants might see 
is included as Figure	1.  
The initial probability associated with Drug C is equal to either High Risk or Low Risk for 
Drug D. For example, for Drug D with ambiguous risk estimates 100/1000 and 300/1000, some 
participants initially faced a Drug C option with a certain probability of 100 out of 1000 (a 
circumstance noted by Ascending=1) while others faced a certain probability of 300 out of 1000 
(a circumstance noted by Ascending=0).  
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Figure 1. Sample Survey Screen 
 
 
  12 
Hypotheses. The experiment tests two hypotheses: The first involves framing effects with 
respect to a probability reference point. Previous literature suggests that participants will display 
ambiguity-averse behavior in gains and ambiguity-seeking behavior in losses, for sufficiently 
high mean probabilities (Kahn and Sarin 1988; Viscusi and Chesson 1999). Similarly, Viscusi, 
Magat, and Huber (1987) examine reference dependence in probabilities and find that the 
decrease in value generated by an increase in risk from a reference probability point is larger 
than the corresponding increase in value generated by a comparable decrease in risk.  increases 
in risks from a reference probability point were valued significantly greater than comparable 
decreases. This Chapter will discuss framing with respect to reference dependence.  
Hypothesis 1: Consumers facing an Ascending=1 will exhibit ambiguity-seeking 
behavior and those facing Ascending=0 will exhibit ambiguity-averse behavior. 
For this Chapter, the appropriate reference point is a participant’s initial certain 
probability (the probability associated with Drug C). When Ascending=1, participants are better 
off with the certain probability than with the gamble, forcing them to initially choose Drug C. 
With each period that they choose Drug C, the certain probability of harm increases and becomes 
decreasingly attractive. Situations in which Ascending=1 can thus be considered within a “loss 
domain.” Conversely, when Ascending=0, participants are better off with the gamble (Drug D), 
since their certain probability is equal to the gamble’s highest estimate of risk. Since a 
participant’s certain probability of harm decreases (becomes more attractive) for each round that 
they chose Drug D, this can be seen as a “gains” domain. If participants see Drug C’s certain 
probability as their reference point, prior literature would suggest that Ascending=0 would 
exhibit ambiguity-averse behavior, and Ascending=1 would exhibit ambiguity-seeking behavior.  
The described reference dependence has analogies to prospect theory. Prospect theory 
suggests that value is determined by changes in utility, rather than final level (Kahneman and 
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Tversky 1979). Prospect theory predicts that people are risk averse in gains but risk seeking in 
losses. Notably, Kahneman and Tversky explain prospect theory in the context of gambles over 
outcomes (risk aversion) instead of gambles over probabilities (ambiguity-aversion).  
Hypothesis 2: Consumers are relatively more ambiguity-averse with respect to 
Ineffectiveness than in Safety.   
The second hypothesis predicts that people will have different attitudes toward ambiguity 
in safety and ineffectiveness risks. There are a couple of reasons to think that people may have 
different perceptions of ambiguity in each context. First, a person might be more familiar with 
the symptom he already knows, such as the symptom of his disease, than the symptom he does 
not, such as a new side effect. Prior experience with the symptom of his disease might make the 
person find the risk of more symptoms more salient.  In contrast, a person might be more 
optimistic about their ability to “beat the odds” with an unfamiliar ailment. Second, the idea of 
loss aversion provides a possible explanation. Tversky and Kahneman (1991) describe a value 
function centered on an endowment point corresponding to a person’s original allocation of a 
good. Value decreases more due to losses from the endowment point than it increases due to 
equivalent gains. If the familiarity with his symptoms causes a person to form an endowment 
point around Ineffectiveness, such that he feels attached to the level of symptom management he 
currently has, loss aversion suggests that participants will be less willing to experience an 
increase in symptoms.9  
Methodology. As stated above, a participant faces a choice between a drug with a certain 
probability of harm and a drug with an ambiguous probability of harm. After each drug choice, 
																																																								
9 It is also conceivable that participants feel an endowment in being side effect free, which would 
imply more ambiguity-aversion in Safety than Ineffectiveness. The argument here is that prior 
experience with symptoms might make the endowment effect stronger for Ineffectiveness than 
Safety. 
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the computer reports which health outcome occurred based on the probabilities associated with 
the drug chosen. Participants were paid based on their performance in the experiment. Each 
participant began with $10 in his account. In any round that the harm does not occurs, 
participants earn money; when a harm occurs, a penalty is deducted. Five rounds were randomly 
chosen at the end of the experiment to be paid out (added and subtracted from their original 
account total). 10 This way, participants are incentivized to choose the drug that they feel 
minimizes their chance of an adverse health outcome. Since the rounds were randomly paid, 
there is little concern that participants would lose interest after they have hit their target award 
level, or become disheartened after their account level drops sufficiently low.  
Each risk is signified as in terms of the numerator x out of a population of 1000 people. 
This technique for portraying risk has been found to be more comprehensible than providing a 
decimal (Viscusi, Magat, and Huber 1991a; Coaster et al. 2011). The base of 1000 instead of 100 
was chosen in order to be able to portray probabilities such as .135 as whole number numerators, 
providing more diversity in probabilities displayed. For simplicity, since the denominator is 
always the same, I will only list the numerator. Additionally, when participants viewed the 
“ineffectiveness” risk, they actually saw that the drug alleviated a symptom for (1000-x) out of 
1000 people. Despite this, throughout the remainder of this analysis, these probabilities are 
analyzed as x/1000, for comparability with the safety risk. For example, even though a 
participant sees that a drug has a certain chance of alleviating symptoms for 700 out of 1000 
people, the analysis will see this as a 300 out of 1000 risk of being ineffective.11 Participants 
																																																								
10 These rounds were drawn with replacement, so there is a possibility that a round could be 
randomly selected twice. However, each round had an equal likelihood of this, so this should not 
affect expectations.  
11 This wording decision was made after a focus group test, in which participants said they 
thought the positive wording for ineffectiveness was more natural and not confusing. The 
probabilities are inverted for analysis so that both probabilities are risks of harm.  
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received (low, high) risk estimates of (100, 300), (120, 280), (100, 900), (250, 750), (10, 200), 
(52 158), (80, 100), (45, 135), (615, 735), and (405, 945).12 These were chosen as scaled-up 
version of some of the probabilities used in Viscusi (1997), along with a mean-preserving spread.  
The initial choice is a rationality check. For example, a participant might first face a 
choice between Drug C, which has a certain risk of being ineffective of 300, or Drug D, which 
has a risk of either 100 or 300. The dominant choice is to choose Drug D, since its high estimate 
of the risk is equal to the certain probability associated with Drug C (and its low estimate is 
lower than Drug C’s certain probability). If participants instead choose the strictly dominated 
option (in this example choosing Drug C), they receive a prompt asking them if they are sure 
about their decision. The rationality check continues throughout the experiment; a prompt will be 
triggered if the participant tries to find indifference between the certain risk and a risk above the 
higher risk estimate or below the lower risk estimate.13 Participants are able to choose a 
																																																								
12 For the first round, only two probability pairs were drawn for Ascending=0. This should not 
matter in aggregate for two reasons: The remaining probability pairs were eventually drawn with 
roughly equal probability in the subsequent rounds. The probability pairs drawn in the first round 
were also drawn in subsequent rounds, ensuring that the probability pair was not conflated with a 
particular round. Additionally, this error was symmetric across Ineffectiveness and Safety. In case 
this is a problem, however, the Appendix contains tables dropping the first round (only 
considering rounds in which all probability pairs are drawn with nonzero probability). 
Additionally, I run a robustness check in which regressions are weighted by the inverse 
frequency of risk pairs by Ascending.  
13 This rationality check goes on throughout the experiment, although sometimes it was only 
shown right after a strictly dominated choice was chosen. This seems to happen for (52, 158) 
because the rationality check is triggered when a certain choice is equal or less than the lower 
estimate or if the certain check is equal or greater than the upper bound. Based on the way z-tree 
processes decimals, when intervals involved decimals, equality was not achieved and the 
rationality check was not triggered until the next round. This should not be a problem, however, 
since this was only a learning device and no choice is restricted based on the rationality check. In 
case the decimal issue affected rounding such that participants did not see exact probabilities 
(e.g., they see 63 instead of 62.6), I do a robustness check in which I drop all observations facing 
(52, 158); the results remain qualitatively the same.  
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dominated option if they click through the prompt; the prompt merely alerts them to the 
possibility of a better choice.14  
Pie charts were added to visually signify the risk associated with each drug. In order to 
aid in making the harms salient, graphics were also added to the health outcomes. For example, 
if the health outcome was that the participant experienced headaches, they saw a stick figure with 
arrows radiating from its head. Additionally, the text was color-coded, such that the risks for 
ineffectiveness were in one color and risks for safety in another. When an outcome involved 
safety, the outcome was reported in its respective color. These measures were taken to ensure 
that participants link each risk to their outcomes and can differentiate between risks. 
The certain probability at which participants choose “I am indifferent” is considered the 
indifference point, or the Certainty Equivalent. However, sometimes participants switch from 
choosing Drug C to Drug D (or vice versa). Instead of just considering the midpoint of these 
probabilities as the indifference point, the program allows the participant to make one more 
choice between Drugs C and D, telescoping to find an indifference point before moving to new 
probabilities. Suppose a participant facing the gamble of (100, 300) and a certain risk of 280 
chooses the gamble. If next period she prefers the certain probability of 260 to the gamble, this 
counts as a switch. The program will then offer her a choice between the gamble of (100, 300) 
and 270. If she chooses the gamble, her Certainty Equivalent is 265.  
After making their drug choices, participants completed a demographic survey, including 
questions on previous prescription drug experience, health experience, risk attitudes, and 
cognitive reflective abilities.  
																																																								
14 The prevalence of violations of the rationality check is discussed on page 23.  
  17 
B. Data and Sample 
I ran this experiment on Vanderbilt University undergraduates over a period of five days.  
The experiment involved 175 participants, each completing 30 periods. Each drug choice a 
participant makes is considered a separate period—each participant completes 5 practice periods 
and 25 true periods. The practice periods are not considered in the analysis, resulting in 4,375 
observations for 175 participants. A round, in contrast, is defined by finding indifference 
between the Certainty Equivalent and the gamble. Participants may complete a different number 
of rounds depending on how many periods it takes to find indifference. The 4,375 periods 
resulted in 787 rounds (and in turn, 787 Certainty Equivalents).  
The variables gathered from the experiment are summarized in Table	2. Low Risk, High 
Risk, Certainty Equivalent, Safety, and Ascending are defined above. Cumulative Harm denotes 
the number of times a participant experiences a penalty during a round. Other variables from the 
survey include demographic attributes such as age (Age), sex (Male), reported race (Race), 
political affiliation (Republican, Democrat, Independent, or Other), and smoking status 
(Smoker).  
  18 
Table 2 Variable Definitions. 
Variable Definition 
Low Risk  The low estimate of risk for Drug D. 
High Risk The high estimate of risk for Drug D. 
Certainty Equivalent The certain probability in which participant is indifferent to gamble. 
Deviation (
!"#$%&'$( !"#$%&'()*!!"# !"#$!"#! !"#$!!"# !"#$ ) − 0.50.  
Reports deviation from ambiguity neutral decision.  
Safety Group experience ambiguity in risk that drug is unsafe (omitted is Ineffectiveness, the group experiencing ambiguity in the risk drug is ineffective). 
Cumulative Harm The number of times a participant experiences a penalty during a round.  
Ascending 
Participant experiences a certain probability equal to the Low Risk initially, and the 
gamble is strictly dominated. If Ascending=0, participant’s initial certain probability 
is equal to High Risk.  
Age Participant’s reported age. 
Experienced Participant reports experiencing headaches or nausea at some point, either past or present.  
Risk Averse In a choice of 14 horse races, after winning big in the 4
th round, participant chooses to 
take their winnings rather than continue playing. 
Race Reported race: options are white, African American, Asian, Hispanic, and other.  
Student Reports full-time student status.  
Male Reported sex as male. 
Political Reported political party: Options are Republican, Democrat, Independent, or other. 
Off Label Reported using a drug off-label. 
Prescription Use Reports using a prescription drug, either past or present. 
Smoker Reports smoking regularly or occasionally. 
Econ Reports undergraduate or graduate major in economics. 
Premed Reports major in premedical studies. 
CRT Answers all of the CRT questions correctly.  
 
If students reported using a prescription drug, either in the present or in the past, Prescription 
Use =1. This variable serves as a measure of familiarity with prescription drugs and, presumably, 
the risks associated with them. Similarly, Off Label =1 if students report knowing that they use 
an off-label treatment. Finally, Experienced=1 if students report experiencing headaches or 
nausea, either in the present or past. This is important, as students with experience with each 
ailment might take the probabilities more seriously. Students were questioned about their majors: 
I differentiate those choosing economics degrees (either undergraduate or graduate — Econ) or 
premed (Premed), as these majors might be more familiar dealing with probabilities or drug 
risks.  
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Part of the demographic survey included answering three questions from the Cognitive 
Reflection Test (Frederick 2005), which is designed to differentiate between intuitive System 1 
and methodical System 2 thinking. System 1 processes are spontaneous or intuitive responses, 
while System 2 processes require mental effort and “execution of learned rules.” If the 
participant answers all of the three questions correctly, CRT=1.  Finally, a measure of “risk 
aversion” is included; students are told that there is a series of 14 horse races and are told that 
they won big in the 4th race. They are asked whether they want to continue playing or leave with 
their earnings. If participants indicate that they would take their winnings, Risk Averse=1.15  
The demographics of the participants are summarized in Table	3.  Several significant 
facts stand out: The majority of participants are undergraduate freshmen, as the mean age is 
18.55. The sample is 72% male, which is higher than the underlying population. However, there 
does seem to be significant experience with prescription drugs, as around 70% report using a 
prescription drug in either the past or present. This may be a function of prevalence of birth 
control pills or ADHD medication. Finally, around 70% of the sample experienced headaches or 
nausea at some point. The sample is evenly split across political groups. Interestingly, around 
22% of the sample answered the three CRT questions correctly.  
 
 
																																																								
15 This measure was taken from Kam and Simas (2010). 
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Table 3 Demographic Information. 
Variable Mean 
Age 18.55 
Experienced 0.69 
Risk Averse 0.70 
Race  
White 0.61 
African American 0.06 
Asian 0.22 
Hispanic 0.07 
Other 0.04 
Male 0.72 
Political  
Republican 0.30 
Democrat 0.33 
Independent 0.29 
Other 0.08 
Off Label 0.13 
Prescription Use 0.68 
Smoker 0.18 
Econ 0.27 
Premed 0.22 
CRT 0.22 	
IV. Theoretical and Empirical Models  
This Chapter uses the above data to estimate the following model, established by Viscusi 
(1997) to understand Bayesian learning in the context of uncertainty. The model forms 
equivalence between risk perceptions and known probabilities. The risk perception R can be seen 
as follows:  
1   ! = !! + ! + !∗ ! + !! + ! + !∗ ! + !∗! + ! + !∗ !∗, 
a function of prior risk perceptions, q, and the two risk estimates, r and r*. The weights 
associated with each estimate are signified by ! and !∗, respectively. The experiment compares 
two drugs, one with a known risk, S, and one with an ambiguous risk. This ambiguous risk 
corresponds to some risk perception, R. As noted above, the computer continues to update S until 
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the participant is indifferent between the two drugs. At this indifference point, the following is 
true:  2   1− ! ×! !"#$%ℎ! + !×! !"#$%&'= 1− ! ×! !"#$%ℎ! +  !×! !"#$%&' , 
Viscusi (1997) uses this model to discuss the informational content of signals r, r*, as they come 
from different sources (either industry or government sources). Here, this experimental setup 
explores whether r and r* vary based on the type of risk (e.g., safety risk vs. ineffectiveness risk) 
or the context (in the loss domain or the gains domain) in which the participant experiences 
ambiguity. 
Since the experiment elicits the point at which a participant is indifferent between the 
uncertain and certain risks, this simplifies to  
3   ! = !! + ! + !∗ ! + !! + ! + !∗ ! + !∗! + ! + !∗ !∗ + !. 
Using the data described in Section (b), I try to estimate Equation (3). Since I do not 
observe each individual’s prior beliefs, I include person–fixed effects, which should capture 
invariant differences between participants regarding prior expectations of risk. I thus estimate the 
following fixed effects regression: 4   ! = !!! + !!!∗ + !! + !. 
Equation (4) is based on Equation (3), where !! = !!!!!!∗ ,  ! = !∗!!!!!∗ , and !! is the 
participant fixed effect. Here, r is the low estimate of risk while r* is the high estimate of risk. If !! + !! = 1,16 the following statements can be made: !! = !!  would suggest ambiguity neutral 
behavior; that is, participants put equal weight on the high and low estimates.  In contrast, if !! > !!, participants place greater weight on the low estimate in determining their indifference 																																																								
16 If !! + !! > 1 or !! + !! < 1, this analysis becomes more complicated.  
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point, suggesting ambiguity-seeking behavior. If !! < !!, participants place greater weight on 
the high estimate, suggesting ambiguity-averse behavior.  
Since individuals are assigned to Safety or Ineffectiveness alone, a fixed-effect regression 
cannot estimate this treatment effect.17 Thus, in conjunction, an OLS regression is run: 5   ! = !!! + !!!∗ + !"#$%!!!! + !!! + !, 
where X is a vector of demographic variables. X also includes variables such as including 
Prescription Use, Off-Label, CRT, and Experienced, Risk Averse, Smoker, Econ, and Premed. 
Errors are clustered by participant.  
Equations (4) and (5) are important in estimating !!!!!!∗ and !∗!!!!!∗. However, the 
interpretation of the variables in X for Equation (5) is not straightforward in this context. In order 
to understand what factors cause participants to move away from the ambiguity-neutral choice, I 
transform the observed Certainty Equivalent into a measure of deviations from the ambiguity-
neutral Certainty Equivalent. The OLS regression is as follows: 6  !"#$%&$'( = !!!"#$%& + !!! + ! , 
where Deviation is defined as !"#((!"#$%&'$( !"#$%&'()*!!"# !"#$!!"! !"#$!!"# !"#$ )− 0.50), as defined in Table	2. 
Since an ambiguity neutral participant would choose the mean of the two risk estimates, 
Deviation would then be 0. Deviation for an ambiguity-seeking or ambiguity-averse participant 
would be nonzero. Thus, factors that minimize deviations from ambiguity neutrality will have 
negative coefficients, while factors that promote a movement toward either ambiguity-seeking or 
ambiguity-aversion will have positive coefficients.  
																																																								
17 A random effects model is included in the Appendix, Table A-12. This controls for 
unobserved heterogeneity but does allow for estimation of a treatment effect.  As shown, the 
results are very similar to the OLS results in Table 7 
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V. Empirical Results 
A. Evaluating Weights on Risk Estimates 
Table 4 lists the results for Equation (4). There is weak evidence that participants are 
slightly ambiguity-averse in Ineffectiveness but not in Safety given the lower weight on Low 
Risk, relative to the weight on High Risk. Column (1) lists the weights corresponding to the low 
and high estimates of risk for all the observations, while Columns (2) and (3) list the weights for 
the Ineffectiveness and Safety groups, respectively.  The estimated coefficients seem almost 
identical for both groups, indicating that, on the whole, participants took the average of the two 
risk estimates. F-test statistics are provided in Table 4 and all other fixed-effects tables; these test 
whether the coefficient on High Risk is equal to that of Low Risk.  The F-tests indicate that the 
Low Risk coefficient is indistinguishable from the High Risk coefficient for Safety; however, the 
Low Risk coefficient is often significantly different than the coefficient on High Risk for the 
Ineffectiveness group. 18  This suggests that, on the whole, consumers are slightly ambiguity-
averse in Ineffectiveness, providing support for Hypothesis 1.  
Table 4. Fixed Effects Regression for Certainty Equivalents. 
 All Effectiveness Safety 
Low Risk 0.46*** 0.43*** 0.47*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) 
High Risk 0.53*** 0.57*** 0.50*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
    
Observations 787 372 415 
R-squared 0.85 0.89 0.81 
F-test Low Risk=High Risk (p-value) 1.39 (0.2397) 3.22 (0.0765) 0.14 (0.7085) 
Number of id 175 85 90 
Robust standard errors clustered by participant, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
																																																								
18 However, this is not a consistent result, as Table A-6 does not find the difference significant – 
neither does Column (8) of Table A-12. 
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The effects of framing are quite stark. Table 4 separates each of the groups by Ascending 
status. The first two columns involve rounds in which the certain risk initially equaled the low 
estimate of the ambiguous risk (Ascending=1). The last two columns, conversely, involve rounds 
in which the certain risk initially equaled the high estimate of the ambiguous risk (Ascending=0). 
There is a marked difference between the weights accorded to the low and high estimates in 
these two circumstances. When Ascending =1, both groups seem to be somewhat ambiguity-
seeking, placing more weight on the low estimate of risk than on the high. In contrast, Columns 
(3) and (4) show that the weights associated with Ascending=0 are consistent with ambiguity-
aversion. The low estimate is only weighted about 24%, as opposed to 76–77% for the high 
estimate.  
Table 5. Fixed Effects Regressions for Certainty Equivalents, by Order. 
 Ascending =1  Ascending = 0 
 Ineffectiveness  Safety  Ineffectiveness Safety  
Low Risk 0.59*** 0.76*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
High Risk 0.37*** 0.24*** 0.77*** 0.76*** 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
     
Observations 192 200 180 215 
R-squared 0.95 0.94 0.96 0.95 
F-test Low Risk=High Risk (p-value)  6.30 (0.0142) 37.67 (0.0000) 31.01 (0.0000) 39.07 (0.0000) 
Number of id 78 82 79 87 
Robust standard errors clustered by participant, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
In order to formally test the effect of Ascending, Table 6 includes Ascending as a main 
effect and as interaction terms with both Low Risk and High Risk.  
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Table 6. Fixed Effects Regressions for Certainty Equivalents. 
 Ineffectiveness Safety 
      
Low Risk 0.26*** 0.22*** 
 (0.06) (0.05) 
High Risk  0.77*** 0.79*** 
 (0.05) (0.04) 
Ascending*Low Risk  0.32*** 0.53*** 
 (0.09) (0.07) 
Ascending*High Risk  -0.39*** -0.54*** 
 (0.07) (0.05) 
Ascending  17.79 21.91** 
 (11.19) (9.52) 
Constant -22.35** -17.67** 
 (8.67) (8.82) 
   
Observations 372 415 
R-squared 0.95 0.94 
Number of id 85 90 
Robust standard errors clustered by participant, in parentheses. 
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
The interactions between Ascending and the two risk estimates are both significant and the 
resulting weights are very similar to those in Table 5. 
The interaction between Ascending and Safety/Ineffectiveness is also instructive. Recall 
that the point estimates in Table 5 Columns (1)–(2) seem to be consistent with stronger 
ambiguity-seeking for the Safety group than for the Ineffectiveness group, as Safety placed 76% 
weight on the low risk estimate, as opposed to 59% for Ineffectiveness. Whether or not this 
difference is actually significant is not tested in this table. There seems to be no significant 
difference between Safety and Ineffectiveness within Ascending=0, as the point estimates are 
almost identical.  
Since individuals are assigned to Safety or Ineffectiveness alone, a fixed effect regression 
cannot estimate the effect of Safety versus Ineffectiveness.19 Equation (5) addresses this by 																																																								
19 A random effects model is included in the Appendix, Table A-12. This controls for 
unobserved heterogeneity but does allow for estimation of a treatment effect.  As shown, the 
results are very similar to the OLS results in Table 7.  
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running an OLS regression, controlling for demographics that might influence an individual’s 
priors. This attempts to estimate Equation (3) while formally testing the effect of Safety versus 
Ineffectiveness. Table 7 lists the results for Equation (5). Column (1) lists the results for all 
rounds in which Ascending=1 while Column (2) lists the results for all rounds in which 
Ascending=0. Column (3) includes all observations.  
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Table 7. OLS Regressions for Certainty Equivalents. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Ascending =1 
(Loss Domain) 
Ascending =0 
(Gains Domain) 
Total 
Safety 15.89** 6.74 3.60 
 (7.64) (10.08) (9.86) 
Ascending   20.81** 
   (9.24) 
Low Risk 0.60*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
High Risk 0.37*** 0.76*** 0.76*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
Low Risk * Safety 0.12** -0.06 -0.06 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
High Risk * Safety -0.11** 0.02 0.03 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) 
Ascending * Safety   3.05 
   (12.03) 
Low Risk * Ascending   0.30*** 
   (0.07) 
High Risk * Ascending   -0.39*** 
   (0.06) 
Low Risk * Safety * Ascending   0.20** 
   (0.10) 
High Risk * Safety * Ascending   -0.14* 
   (0.08) 
Experience with Headaches or Nausea -0.45 18.72* 10.73* 
 (8.58) (9.81) (6.39) 
Risk Averse 8.80 12.51 10.90* 
 (8.05) (8.90) (6.07) 
Male 2.72 8.63 3.48 
 (7.98) (10.63) (5.93) 
Uses Drug Off-Label 15.65 -3.12 7.75 
 (10.81) (11.98) (8.11) 
Prescription Use 9.83 -11.19 -1.28 
 (9.64) (8.28) (5.80) 
Smoker 21.67*** -9.59 2.37 
 (7.34) (9.55) (6.35) 
Economics Major 8.53 -1.79 1.60 
 (9.42) (9.27) (6.44) 
Premed Major 19.68** -17.63* -0.88 
 (9.07) (9.65) (6.26) 
CRT 27.66*** -5.49 11.06* 
 (9.64) (8.86) (5.79) 
Observations 392 395 787 
R-squared 0.93 0.95 0.94 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by participant. Significance levels:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1. Other variables included but not reported are age, race, and political affiliation.   
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The results in Table 7 are very similar to those in Table 5. The weights reported in 
Columns (1)–(2) mirror those in Table 5. The interaction terms in Columns (1) and (2) test the 
significance of the difference between Safety and Ineffectiveness for Ascending=1 and 
Ascending=0, respectively. The interaction terms Low Risk * Safety and High Risk * Safety are 
significant for Ascending=1 but not for Column (2), indicating that the weights for Safety and 
Ineffectiveness are different in the loss domain but not the gains domain.  
Column (3) includes all observations and includes interaction effects to differentiate 
observations with Ascending=0 and Ascending=1. The resulting weights are similar to the prior 
estimates. Those with Ineffectiveness =1, Ascending=0 place 28% weight on the low weight and 
76% on the high weight. Those with Safety=1, Ascending=0 have roughly the same weight, as 
Low Risk * Safety and High Risk * Safety are insignificant. Those with Ineffectiveness =1,20 
Ascending=1 place 58% weight on the low estimate and 37% on the high estimate.21 Finally, 
those with Safety =1, Ascending =1 place 78% weight on the low estimate and 23% on the high 
estimate. These weights line up closely with those reported in Table 5; Table 6 formally 
determines that the difference between Safety and Ineffectiveness is insignificant for 
Ascending=0 but significant for Ascending=1.  
One possible concern is that participants were bored and just clicked through to get out of 
the rounds. This is unlikely to be an issue, given the incentive-compatibility device. In particular, 
there are only 47 occurrences of choosing indifference immediately and most participants who 
do this only do it a few times (9 did this one time, 4 did it twice, 5 do it 3 times, and 3 did this 5 
times).  However, if this is an issue, one way to deal with this is to drop strictly dominated 
choices: options in which 1) participants chose a gamble or were indifferent when the certainty 
																																																								
20 Ineffectiveness is the omitted category in Table 7. 
21 This weight is computed as (.28 + .30 = .58) and (.76 - .39 = .37).  
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probability was lower than (or equal to) the lower estimate, 2) participants chose the certain 
probability or were indifferent when the certain probability is higher than (or equal to) than the 
highest estimate, and 3) whenever the certain probability has been pushed higher than the higher 
estimate or below the lower estimate. In total, these errors constituted around 4% of the 
observations and 9.3% of the certainty equivalents. The results dropping these errors are reported 
in the Appendix22 and are largely similar to the original results, suggesting that this is not the 
driver of the results.  
Another possibility is that participants in Ascending=0 were just uncomfortable by being 
at the high estimate of the ambiguous risk. They may have chosen indifference as a way to 
escape the scenario. Similarly, it is possible that participants were impatient and chose 
indifference earlier than they rationally would to get to new probabilities (resulting in ambiguity-
seeking for Ascending=1 and ambiguity-aversion for Ascending=0). Again, the incentive-
compatible device does alleviate these concerns. Additionally, as a robustness check, I only 
consider Certainty Equivalents that are triggered when a participant switches from one drug to 
another, rather than explicitly choosing indifference. Participants switching between drugs seem 
less likely to be trying to escape a scenario, as it would be easier to directly choose “I am 
indifferent.” Only considering these choices in the fixed effects regressions produces 
qualitatively similar results, suggesting that these findings are not an artifact of trying to escape 
the scenario.  
Other notable results include the strong effect of CRT and Premed. However, as noted 
above, these variables are included more as controls and will be discussed more in-depth in the 
following section.  
																																																								
22 The tables include Table A-6–Table A-10. 
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B. Deviations from Neutrality 
As previously stated, Table 4–Table 723 were useful in deriving ! and !∗, corresponding to 
Equation (3). However, the interpretation of the effect of demographic variables on risk 
preferences is not straightforward in this context. The following section addresses this by 
focusing on the observed deviation from the ambiguity-neutral choice. Recall that Deviation is 
defined as !"#((!"#$%&'$( !"#$%&'()*!!"# !"#$!!"! !"#$!!"# !"#$ )− 0.50), such that either ambiguity-averse or 
ambiguity-seeking behavior would result in a nonzero Deviation. This analysis will not 
distinguish between ambiguity-seeking and ambiguity-averse behavior but will see them both as 
deviations from ambiguity-neutral behavior. In this specification, variables with negative 
coefficients tend to result in more ambiguity-neutral decisions while variables with positive 
coefficients result in more deviation. The results for Equation (6) are listed in Table 8.  
Interestingly, a wider range between the two risk estimates is negatively associated with 
deviations from the ambiguity neutral choice. This suggests that for a small enough range, 
participants might have seen the two estimates as essentially equal, displaying some 
nonlinearities in perceptions of risk. In contrast, higher mean values are positively associated 
with deviations. This means that when participants face higher risks of harm, they are more 
likely to exhibit deviations from ambiguity neutrality.  
  
																																																								
23 ! and !∗ are calculated in Table 7 using a linear combination of several interaction terms.  
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Table 8. Deviation from Ambiguity Neutralitya 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Ascending =1 
(Loss Domain) 
Ascending =0 
(Gains Domain) 
Total 
Safety 0.02 0.01 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Ascending   0.01 
   (0.01) 
Range/100 -0.01*** -0.00 -0.01** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Mean/100 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Experience with Headaches or Nausea 0.00 0.03 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Risk Averse -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Male -0.05** 0.02 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
Uses Drug Off-Label -0.05* 0.02 -0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Prescription Use -0.07** -0.03 -0.04** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Smoker -0.10*** -0.03 -0.06*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
Economics Major -0.05 0.00 -0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
Premed Major -0.06** -0.02 -0.04 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
CRT -0.10*** -0.06** -0.08*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
Constant 0.40 -0.05 0.17 
 (0.28) (0.23) (0.17) 
Observations 392 395 787 
R-squared 0.27 0.20 0.19 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by participant. Significance levels:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. Other variables included but not reported are age, sex, race, and political affiliation.  
aDeviation from Ambiguity Neutrality = ((Certainty Equivalent-Low Risk)/(High Risk-Low Risk))-.50.  
 
The results in Table 8 seem to bolster the idea that consumers can be rational if properly 
motivated. First, variables dealing with general experience with prescription drugs or medical 
risk led participants to choose a more ambiguity-neutral indifference point. Prescription Use was 
negative in all specifications, and significant in Ascending=1 and Total.  Similarly, Premed 
Major is negative when Ascending=1. Both of these situations might make participants more 
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comfortable assessing medical risk, either through personal experience or through their course of 
work.  
Second, factors associated with rationality are associated with a more ambiguity neutral 
indifference choice. While CRT does not measure rationality, it does measure the propensity of 
participants to engaged in System 2 thinking. As noted above, System 2 thinking requires mental 
effort while System 1 thinking uses intuitive responses. Participants utilizing System 1 thinking 
might have been strongly influenced by a high or low estimate while participants utilizing 
System 2 thinking might have thought through the expected value of the gamble. The results 
support this theory: CRT is negative and significant, strongly associated with moving toward 
ambiguity neutrality.  
These results are not without limitation. Since participants were faced with a chronic, 
non-life-threatening ailment, the results here may not generalize to a context in which there is a 
larger probability of death. However, the interest in this question was behavior in this mid-range 
of ailments. 
C. Discussion 
These findings suggest evidence consistent with the two hypotheses tested.  First, there is 
evidence that ambiguity preferences vary with risk framing. Second, for Ascending=1, there is a 
significant difference in ambiguity attitudes between Safety and Ineffectiveness. The implications 
of each of these results are discussed below.  
1. Risk Framing 
The results are consistent with the first hypothesis: the framing of the risks significantly 
affects preferences over ambiguity. Specifically, when participants face an increasingly better 
certain option (Ascending=0), they are more likely to be ambiguity-averse in the options that 
they choose. In contrast, when participants face a worsening certain option (Ascending=1), they 
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are more likely to be ambiguity-seeking. If a patient previously consumed a well-performing 
drug but is offered a choice between a gamble and a drug with a higher certain risk of harm, she 
can be seen as being in the “loss” domain.  Similarly, if a patient previously consumed a poorly 
performing drug and is offered a choice between a gamble and a drug with a lower certain risk of 
harm, she can be seen as being in the “gains” domain.   
Consumers exhibit deviations from ambiguity neutrality in both domains. These 
deviations counteract each other in the aggregate, as shown in Table 4, but once stratified by 
Ascending, the deviations become clear: those in the loss domain exhibit ambiguity-seeking 
behavior while those in the gains domain exhibit ambiguity-averse behavior. The switch between 
ambiguity-aversion and ambiguity-seeking is consistent with the theory for large probability 
risks developed in Viscusi and Chesson (1999) and the results found in prior literature.  
These findings have interesting implications for medical care. A patient’s previous 
experience of care may cause them to deviate from ambiguity neutrality in predictable ways. If a 
patient had a good experience with her previous treatment, she is more likely to choose an 
ambiguously risky drug over a drug with a certain risk higher than her original (but not as high as 
the expected value of the risky drug). In contrast, if a patient had a poor experience with a 
previous treatment, she is more likely to choose the drug with the certain risk over an 
ambiguously risky drug, even though the certain risk is not as low as the expected value of the 
ambiguously risky drug.  
The factors that temper these deviations from neutrality are important for policy 
purposes. First, familiarity with medical risks seems to result in more ambiguity neutral choices. 
Prescription Use is often significant in minimizing deviations, suggesting that true consumers 
might make more ambiguity-neutral decisions. Additionally, Premed is generally significant, 
indicating that personal or academic familiarity with drug risks help.  This may also reflect a 
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general belief in the efficacy of medical care. Second, factors associated with rational thinking 
predictably minimize deviations. Participants who correctly answered all three CRT questions 
were more likely to choose a more ambiguity-neutral option. This is intuitive, since the CRT 
questions were designed the idea of distinguishing between System 1 and System 2 thinking 
(Frederick 2005).  
It is possible that the reference-dependence effect is stronger in this context than in some 
real-life contexts, depending on whether consumers experience framing within the context of a 
single drug or across drugs. In the experiment, the “same drug” keeps updating its certain 
probabilities instead of patient choosing between two new drugs each round. This might be less 
applicable when consumers are moving from a good treatment to a worse (but separate) 
treatment (or vice versa). In contrast, these results might be more applicable when consumers 
experience framing in the context of a single drug. For example, a consumer may experience the 
loss domain if a drug that they are taking becomes less beneficial over time (e.g., due to patients 
building up a tolerance); a consumer may experience the gains domain if a drug becomes more 
beneficial over time (e.g., given adjustments to dosage). However, one can argue that consumers’ 
reference points are simply indexed to level of care and are not segmented by treatment regime, 
making these results applicable in both contexts.  
2. Safety vs. Ineffectiveness 
The secondary result is that there is weak evidence suggesting that patients are slightly 
ambiguity-averse in Ineffectiveness but not necessarily in Safety. Moreover, the interaction 
between Safety/Ineffectiveness and framing is very instructive. Participants were more 
ambiguity-seeking when faced with Safety than Ineffectiveness in situations where Ascending=1. 
In situations where Ascending=0, this difference is insignificant.  
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It is unclear why the difference between Safety and Ineffectiveness is insignificant when 
Ascending=0: First, this may be an issue of insignificant power such that a true difference is 
unable to be detected. Alternatively, it is possible that there is no actual difference between 
Safety and Ineffectiveness when Ascending=0. This might mean that the ambiguity-aversion 
triggered by the gains framework actually overwhelms any initial difference in ambiguity 
preferences between Safety and Ineffectiveness. Given the results, I cannot distinguish between 
these explanations.  
The results do suggest that when Ascending=1, in the loss domain, people are more 
ambiguity-seeking for Safety than for Ineffectiveness. This may suggest that facing Safety risks 
simply exaggerates responses to ambiguity triggered by the domain.24  The underlying theory is 
intuitive: safety effects involve new ailments that are not inherent to the disease previously 
experienced. These new ailments are possibly more uncertain, intensifying the reaction to 
ambiguity.  I do not, however, see the same reaction in the gains domain, as the Safety and 
Ineffectiveness weights are similar. Another explanation might be simply that the loss domain 
triggers ambiguity-seeking in both Safety and Ineffectiveness uniformly. Since participants in 
Ineffectiveness are initially slightly ambiguity-averse, the resulting effect is that they are less 
ambiguity-seeking than participants in Safety.  
In sum, the experiment provides support for the two stated hypotheses. As predicted by 
the second hypothesis, there is weak evidence that participants are more ambiguity-averse for 
ineffectiveness risks than safety risks. Consistent with the first hypothesis, there are predictable 																																																								
24 These results are consistent with some post-hoc evidence on the difference between safety and 
ineffectiveness. Even though Bier and Connell (1994) did not design their study to compare 
ambiguity across safety and ineffectiveness, they note that an informal post-hoc analysis found 
that their ambiguity-framing effects were found mostly in scenarios involving side effects. They 
later note that this might be confounded with the higher probabilities associated with side effects, 
and they later rule out the thought that ambiguity effects were dependent on the division between 
safety and ineffectiveness. 
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reactions to ambiguity based on framing effects: participants exhibited ambiguity-seeking 
behavior in a “loss” domain and ambiguity-averse behavior in the “gains” domain. Moreover, the 
interaction between these two effects is intriguing: the results suggest that participants are 
significantly more ambiguity-seeking for safety risks than ineffectiveness risks in the loss 
domain. 
VI. Conclusion 
The purpose of this study was to measure consumers' ambiguity attitudes for risks that a 
drug will be unsafe or ineffective in the presence of framing effects. The results confirm that 
sensitivity to ambiguity is affected by risk framing, with participants exhibiting ambiguity-
seeking behavior in the loss domain and ambiguity-averse behavior in the gains domain. 
Moreover, the results suggest that patients are more ambiguity-seeking for risks of safety than 
for risks of ineffectiveness in the loss domain.  
These results do have practical implications for FDA policy, particularly for the 
regulatory regime governing off-label treatments. As stated above, off-label uses seem to trigger 
more ambiguous risks than most on-label uses. The results of this study suggest that if this is 
true, the predicted behavior of patients facing ambiguously risky off-label treatments depend 
strongly on context. If the patient taking the off-label treatment in a loss domain frame of mind 
(e.g., if their previous medication or condition was good relative to the available “certain” 
treatments), they might generally be more ambiguity-seeking; in fact, they might be more 
ambiguity-seeking with respect to safety, relative to ineffectiveness. Put in terms of the original 
example, if the drug that controls a patient’s symptoms becomes unavailable and all other 
approved drugs have a relatively lower likelihood of being effective, the patient might be more 
likely to try an uncertain off-label treatment. The patient might be even more likely to try an 
uncertain off-label treatment if his previous drug produced very low side effects and all other 
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approved drugs have a relatively higher likelihood of producing side effects (as opposed to 
controlling symptoms). In contrast, if the patient is switching away from a drug he can no longer 
tolerate, he might favor approved treatments with marginally better results rather than pursuing 
ambiguous off-label treatments.  
If consumers are not ambiguity neutral, they run the danger of consuming a suboptimal 
mix of drugs. They may not take a treatment with preferable, but ambiguous risks or may take 
overly risky treatments. Given that the direction of this reaction depends strongly on context 
(e.g., the experience with prior treatment), and that prior treatment is not immediately visible, it 
is difficult to develop a uniform plan for debiasing. Given these results, there might be value in 
reducing perceived ambiguity.  
One solution might be to depend on physicians to synthesize ambiguous results and 
provide a medical recommendation to their patients. This would alleviate the bias as long as 
physicians are more ambiguity neutral in their recommendations to patients.25 However, it is 
unclear how much better physicians are at handling ambiguity, though the Premed results seem 
optimistic. Another possibility is that the government or a private organization could assign an 
ambiguity-neutral rating on types of treatments. For example, for an off-label treatment with a 
mix of small case studies and anecdotes, the organization could form an ambiguity-neutral 
estimate of the demonstrated safety or efficacy. Some drug compendia, like DRUGDEX, do 
provide a coarse tier of “strength of the evidence” for off-label uses. Expanding this and linking 
it to an impartial organization might be a step forward.  
Future work might concentrate on whether similar sensitivity toward ambiguity is 
observed when participants are making recommendations for someone else’s treatment. 
																																																								
25 Physicians summarizing results in a biased way would still reduce ambiguity, although it 
would introduce other distortions into the decision.  
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Additionally, it would be interesting to understand whether a “tier” synthesis of ambiguous 
results make consumers more ambiguity neutral. Either way, this experiment suggests that some 
intervention in synthesizing ambiguity on behalf of the consumer might improve patient care.  
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VIII. Appendix: 
A. Dropping the First Round 
Table A-1. Fixed Effects Regression for Certainty Equivalents. 
 All Ineffectiveness Safety 
        
Low Risk 0.43*** 0.42*** 0.43*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) 
High Risk 0.55*** 0.59*** 0.52*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
    
Observations 612 287 325 
R-squared 0.85 0.90 0.80 
F-test Low Risk=High Risk (p-value) 2.16 (0.1434) 3.89 (0.0520) 0.55 (0.4586) 
Number of id 175 85 90 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by individual *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Table A-2. Fixed Effects Regressions for Certainty Equivalents, by Order. 
 Ascending =1  Ascending = 0 
 Ineffectiveness Safety  Ineffectiveness Safety  
          
Low Risk 0.59*** 0.85*** 0.21*** 0.22*** 
 (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) 
High Risk 0.37*** 0.17*** 0.76*** 0.77*** 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) 
     
Observations 143 153 144 172 
R-squared 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.95 
F-test Low Risk=High Risk (p-value) 4.11 (0.0464) 64.22 (0.0000) 28.48 (0.0000) 39.73 (0.0000) 
Number of id 73 72 73 83 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by individual *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A-3. Fixed Effects Regression for Certainty Equivalents. 
 Ineffectiveness Safety 
      
Low Risk 0.26*** 0.20*** 
 (0.06) (0.05) 
High Risk  0.76*** 0.81*** 
 (0.05) (0.04) 
Ascending*Low Risk  0.32*** 0.60*** 
 (0.10) (0.07) 
Ascending*High Risk  -0.37*** -0.61*** 
 (0.08) (0.06) 
Ascending 2.19 15.92 
 (14.71) (10.76) 
Constant -13.95 -13.62 
 (10.29) (9.56) 
   
Observations 287 325 
R-squared 0.96 0.95 
Number of id 85 90 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by individual *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A-4. OLS Regressions for Certainty Equivalents. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Ascending =1 
(Loss Domain) 
Ascending =0 
(Gains Domain) 
Total 
Safety 22.86*** 7.98 1.40 
 (7.54) (10.00) (9.56) 
Ascending   8.88 
   (10.20) 
Low Risk 0.59*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) 
High Risk 0.38*** 0.75*** 0.75*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
Low Risk * Safety 0.15** -0.05 -0.06 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
High Risk * Safety -0.16*** 0.03 0.04 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
Ascending * Safety   15.06 
   (12.91) 
Low Risk * Ascending   0.30*** 
   (0.08) 
High Risk * Ascending   -0.36*** 
   (0.06) 
Low Risk * Safety * Ascending   0.23** 
   (0.10) 
High Risk * Safety * Ascending   -0.21** 
   (0.08) 
Experience with Headaches or Nausea 13.57 21.99* 21.50*** 
 (9.39) (11.62) (7.57) 
Risk Averse 14.03 17.12 18.14** 
 (9.32) (10.62) (7.08) 
Male 7.40 19.62* 11.75* 
 (8.03) (11.51) (6.52) 
Uses Drug Off-Label 6.36 4.84 5.06 
 (9.71) (13.87) (7.81) 
Prescription Use 6.13 -14.09 -5.55 
 (10.24) (9.81) (6.51) 
Smoker 18.79** -8.29 -1.86 
 (8.19) (12.04) (7.75) 
Economics Major 8.30 -12.66 -5.58 
 (10.52) (10.46) (7.37) 
Premed Major 19.40** -25.50** -4.79 
 (9.81) (11.38) (6.89) 
CRT 25.52** -5.42 8.18 
 (11.35) (10.92) (6.74) 
Constant 62.15 -86.08 2.65 
 (64.94) (97.22) (58.16) 
    
Observations 296 316 612 
R-squared 0.94 0.95 0.94 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by participant. Significance levels:  *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Other variables included but not reported are age, race, and political affiliation. 
  46 
 
Table A-5. Deviation from Ambiguity Neutrality. a 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Ascending =1 
(Loss Domain) 
Ascending =0 
(Gains Domain) 
Total 
Safety 0.03 0.03 0.03 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Ascending   0.01 
   (0.01) 
Range/100 -0.01*** -0.00 -0.01** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Mean/100 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Experience with Headaches or Nausea -0.01 0.03 0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Risk Averse -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
Male -0.06* 0.03 -0.00 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
Uses Drug Off-Label -0.06* 0.03 -0.01 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
Prescription Use -0.07** -0.03 -0.04 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
Smoker -0.12*** -0.03 -0.06** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
Economics Major -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
Premed Major -0.07** -0.04 -0.05** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
CRT -0.10*** -0.07** -0.08*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
Constant 0.48 0.08 0.23 
 (0.29) (0.21) (0.17) 
    
Observations 296 316 612 
R-squared 0.27 0.21 0.19 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by participant. Significance levels:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. Other variables included but not reported are age, race, and political affiliation.  
aDeviation from Ambiguity Neutrality =abs(((Certainty Equivalent-Low Risk)/(High Risk-Low Risk))-.50).  
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B. Dropping Errors 
 
Table A-6. Fixed Effects Regression for Certainty Equivalents. 
 All Ineffectiveness Safety 
        
Low Risk 0.50*** 0.45*** 0.54*** 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) 
High Risk 0.50*** 0.55*** 0.45*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
    
Observations 714 345 369 
R-squared 0.89 0.90 0.88 
F-test Low Risk=High Risk (p-value) 0.01 (0.9181) 1.12 (0.2922) 1.43 (0.2357) 
Number of id 174 84 90 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by individual *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Table A-7. Fixed Effects Regressions for Certainty Equivalents, by Order. 
 Ascending =1  Ascending = 0 
 Ineffectiveness Safety  Ineffectiveness Safety  
          
Low Risk 0.57*** 0.75*** 0.26*** 0.35*** 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) 
High Risk 0.38*** 0.26*** 0.75*** 0.67*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
     
Observations 176 177 169 192 
R-squared 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.97 
F-test Low Risk=High Risk (p-value) 6.35 (0.0138) 53.10 (0.0000) 27.34 (0.0000) 19.61 (0.0000) 
Number of id 77 82 78 84 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by individual *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A-8. Fixed Effects Regression for Certainty Equivalents. 
 Ineffectiveness Safety 
      
Low Risk 0.28*** 0.33*** 
 (0.06) (0.04) 
High Risk  0.74*** 0.69*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
Ascending*Low Risk  0.29*** 0.38*** 
 (0.07) (0.06) 
Ascending*High Risk  -0.36*** -0.42*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
Ascending 15.42 17.77* 
 (9.83) (9.86) 
Constant -17.73** -11.26 
 (8.57) (8.05) 
   
Observations 345 369 
R-squared 0.96 0.95 
Number of id 84 90 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by individual *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A-9. OLS Regressions for Certainty Equivalents. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Ascending =1 
(Loss Domain) 
Ascending =0 
(Gains Domain) 
Total 
Safety 13.84* 10.92 9.30 
 (7.96) (9.31) (9.10) 
Ascending   17.21** 
   (8.18) 
Low Risk 0.60*** 0.30*** 0.30*** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) 
High Risk 0.38*** 0.73*** 0.74*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
Low Risk * Safety 0.09* 0.03 0.03 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) 
High Risk * Safety -0.09** -0.05 -0.04 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
Ascending * Safety   -2.13 
   (11.03) 
Low Risk * Ascending   0.29*** 
   (0.07) 
High Risk * Ascending   -0.35*** 
   (0.05) 
Low Risk * Safety * Ascending   0.08 
   (0.09) 
High Risk * Safety * Ascending   -0.05 
   (0.07) 
Experience with Headaches or Nausea -10.50 22.15*** 7.75 
 (8.39) (8.43) (5.99) 
Risk Averse 11.61 9.18 11.39** 
 (7.21) (8.03) (5.66) 
Male 5.48 1.57 2.42 
 (8.00) (9.01) (5.41) 
Uses Drug Off-Label 12.17 -5.48 5.29 
 (10.19) (10.92) (7.32) 
Prescription Use 18.29* -3.78 5.39 
 (9.38) (7.23) (5.48) 
Smoker 17.44** -5.96 2.47 
 (7.07) (9.09) (5.83) 
Economics Major 3.98 -2.55 -0.76 
 (7.87) (7.97) (5.33) 
Premed Major 12.17 -6.74 -0.37 
 (8.20) (9.19) (5.90) 
CRT 21.85** -10.07 7.05 
 (9.20) (6.16) (4.85) 
Constant 10.02 89.90 39.25 
 (73.41) (76.49) (43.65) 
    
Observations 353 361 714 
R-squared 0.95 0.96 0.95 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by participant. Significance levels:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1. Other variables included but not reported are age, race, and political affiliation.  
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Table A-10. Deviation from Ambiguity Neutrality. a 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Ascending =1 
(Loss Domain) 
Ascending =0 
(Gains Domain) 
Total 
Safety 0.02 0.00 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Ascending   -0.00 
   (0.01) 
Range/100 -0.01** -0.01* -0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Mean/100 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Experience with Headaches or Nausea 0.03 0.03 0.03* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Risk Averse -0.03 -0.03 -0.03* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Male -0.05** -0.02 -0.03 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
Uses Drug Off-Label -0.01 0.03 0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
Prescription Use -0.06*** -0.01 -0.03* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Smoker -0.06** -0.01 -0.03 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
Economics Major -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Premed Major -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
CRT -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.07*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Constant 0.21 0.19 0.18 
 (0.29) (0.17) (0.18) 
    
Observations 353 361 714 
R-squared 0.28 0.20 0.21 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by participant. Significance levels:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. Other variables included but not reported are age, race, and political affiliation.  
aDeviation from Ambiguity Neutrality =abs(((Certainty Equivalent-Low Risk)/(High Risk-Low Risk))-.50).  
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C. Full Results 
Table A-11. Full Results for Table 8: Deviation from Ambiguity Neutrality. 
  (3) (1) (2) 
 Ascending =1 
(Loss Domain) 
Ascending =0 
(Gains Domain) 
Total 
Safety 0.02 0.01 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Ascending   0.01 
   (0.01) 
Range/100 -0.01*** -0.00 -0.01** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Mean/100 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Age -0.00 0.01 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Experience with Headaches or 
Nausea 
0.00 0.03 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Risk Averse -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Race    
    African American 0.17*** 0.05 0.12** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
     Asian 0.09*** 0.07** 0.08*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
     Hispanic -0.03 0.07 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
     Other 0.07 0.08* 0.06* 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) 
Male -0.05** 0.02 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
Political    
     Democrat -0.01 0.11*** 0.06** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
     Independent -0.03 -0.00 -0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
     Other 0.09** 0.03 0.06* 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) 
Uses Drug Off-Label -0.05* 0.02 -0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Uses Prescription Drug -0.07** -0.03 -0.04** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Smoker -0.10*** -0.03 -0.06*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
Economics Major -0.05 0.00 -0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
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Premed Major -0.06** -0.02 -0.04 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
CRT -0.10*** -0.06** -0.08*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
Constant 0.40 -0.05 0.17 
 (0.28) (0.23) (0.17) 
    
Observations 392 395 787 
R-squared 0.27 0.20 0.19 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by individual *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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D. Random Effects for the Full Sample 
Table A-12. Random Effects Regression for Certainty Equivalents. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Ascending=1 Ascending=0     
 Ineffectiveness Safety Ineffectiveness Safety Ineffectiveness Safety All All 
                  
Safety       4.88 11.26 
       (9.33) (8.05) 
Ascending     19.95** 22.73*** 19.99**  
     (8.92) (7.75) (8.88)  
Low Risk 0.58*** 0.73*** 0.27*** 0.23*** 0.28*** 0.23*** 0.28*** 0.44*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) 
High Risk 0.37*** 0.26*** 0.76*** 0.78*** 0.76*** 0.78*** 0.76*** 0.55*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Ascending*Low Risk     0.31*** 0.50*** 0.31***  
     (0.08) (0.06) (0.08)  
Ascending*High Risk     -0.39*** -0.53*** -0.39***  
     (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)  
Safety*Low Risk       -0.05 0.01 
       (0.07) (0.07) 
Safety*High Risk       0.02 -0.04 
       (0.06) (0.05) 
Ascending*Safety       2.73  
       (11.78)  
Ascending*Safety*Low Risk       0.19*  
       (0.10)  
Ascending*Safety*High Risk       -0.14*  
       (0.08)  
         
Observations 192 200 180 215 372 415 787 787 
Number of id 78 82 79 87 85 90 175 175 
Robust standard errors clustered by participant in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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CHAPTER 2 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF RISK PENALTIES FOR NTI DRUGS 
I. Introduction 
New drug advances can often outpace regulatory processes designed to control drug 
risks. The FDA sometimes allows a drug to go through an accelerated approval process for the 
sake of increasing access to the drug. These abbreviated processes might not fully reveal the risk 
that a drug is unsafe or ineffective, resulting in higher or more uncertain risks. In such situations, 
physicians’ ability to assess, and the market’s sensitivity to, risk is particularly important. 
In order to incentivize generic manufacturers to apply for approval, the FDA allows 
follow-on products to go through an abbreviated new drug approval (ANDA). 21 U.S.C. 355(j). 
These generic products face less stringent approval standards: manufacturers must only prove 
bioequivalence to a “reference-listed” drug rather than safety and effectiveness of their own 
drug. 26 Bioequivalence does not require exact replication of the reference-listed drug. Instead, 
healthy subjects receive the reference drug and the test drug and two one-sided tests are 
conducted, measuring if the test drug is significantly less bioavailable than the reference and vice 
versa.  Bioequivalence is satisfied if there is no more than a “difference of 20% in the area under 
the curve (AUC) and peak concentration ( Cmax) between the reference and test drugs” (Singh et 
al. 2014).  
Some are doubtful that this abbreviated approval process can adequately control risk, 
particularly for a certain group of drugs called narrow therapeutic index (NTI) drugs. The FDA’s 
proposed definition of NTI drugs are “those drugs where small differences in dose or blood 
																																																								
26 In contrast, reference drugs have to provide “ ‘substantial evidence’ that the drug ‘will have 
the effect it purports or is represented to have under the conditions of use prescribed, 
recommended, or suggested in the proposed labeling’ ” (Junod 2014). 
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concentration may lead to dose and blood concentration dependent, serious therapeutic failures 
or adverse drug reactions” (Yu 2011). Given the narrow range in which the drug provides 
therapeutic benefit and the allowed difference between products that are technically 
“bioequivalent,” changes from a brand-name to a generic or from a generic to another generic 
can result in adverse events.27 This perceived heterogeneity in risk was not previously regulated 
by the FDA, as the FDA treated all generic drugs as equivalent to brand-name drugs. However, 
the FDA has recently acknowledged the increased risk associated with NTI drugs. In 2010, the 
FDA Advisory Committee for Pharmaceutical Science proposed instituting stricter regulations 
for NTI bioequivalence (Yu 2011).  More recently, scientists at the FDA have published new 
bioequivalence limits for NTI drugs. (Yu et al. 2015).  
This Chapter discusses narrow therapeutic index drugs as an example in which there was 
a perceived, yet unregulated, risk. There are several similar issues spurred by medical 
innovations: critics have suggested that traditional generic approval processes may be 
insufficient to evaluate generic versions of nonbiological complex drugs (NBCD), making the 
risks associated with them more uncertain (Gottlieb 2014). The FDA recently tried to approve 
generic versions of nonbiological complex drugs but found it difficult to verify therapeutic 
equivalence. While the FDA approved a generic version of IV iron medication in 2011, in 2013 
it requested an independent study to verify that the generic version was safe and effective 
(Gottlieb 2014). Some criticized the FDA because the bioequivalence process was insufficient to 
guarantee safety and effectiveness upon approval and called for the FDA to develop a better 
approval process for that type of drug. Given that the FDA will continue to face issues in which 
																																																								
27 Crawford et al. (2006) briefly mention the additional risk from switching from one generic to 
another.  
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there is an unregulated but perceived risk, this Chapter examines NTI drugs as an example, as 
they elicit similar issues and have more data on market experience.  
This Chapter uses NTI drugs as a case study to examine whether, in the absence of 
regulation, the market is sensitive to this risk. Assuming that consumers are less willing to pay 
for riskier products, does this preference translate into a price penalty for riskier drugs? If so, 
abbreviated approval processes might provide broader access to drugs without imposing 
uncompensated risks. If instead the market is insensitive to this risk, the FDA might be justified 
in imposing stronger regulation. 
The Chapter observes a price penalty for NTI drugs. Consistent with consumer 
preferences when switching is costly, the Chapter also finds that the gap between brand-name 
and generic drugs is smaller for NTI drugs than for non-NTI drugs. Finally, this Chapter 
examines consumption behavior and finds that consumers make purchasing decisions that are 
consistent with awareness of this risk. The results of this Chapter have ramifications beyond the 
context of NTI drugs and might inform by analogy the appropriateness of requiring extra FDA 
regulation on generic versions of other types of products.  
The rest of the Chapter proceeds as follows: Section II explores the current literature on 
narrow therapeutic index substitution and Section III outlines the conceptual model underlying 
consumer choice. Section IV describes the data, and Section V discusses the results. Section VI 
concludes.  
II. Exploring the Perceived Risks of NTI Drugs 
The issue of narrow therapeutic index drugs is nested in a larger discussion about generic 
substitution. In general, generic versions of brand-name drugs are thought to be therapeutically 
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equivalent.28 Generic substitution is also often associated with increased cost savings. Fischer 
and Avorn (2003) estimate that more generic substitution could save Medicaid at least $229 
million. Similarly, Haas et al. (2005) use the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) to 
estimate that generic substitution would produce potential savings of $46 per adult below the age 
of 65 and $78 per adult above the age of 65. From a policy perspective, Shrank et al. (2010) find 
that the rates of generic substitution for states requiring patient consent for generic substitution 
were 25% lower than those not requiring patient consent; they note that increased substitution 
could lead to lower costs for state Medicaid programs. Despite the general consensus being that 
generic substitution should save money for patients and third-party payers, a few studies have 
suggested that this might not always hold true. In a recent meta-analysis, 64% of the economic 
comparisons reviewed found that generic substitution actually increased costs (Gothe et al. 
2015). Particularly, they conclude that generic substitution might not decrease costs for drug 
categories such as antiepileptics or immunosuppressants. In a review of studies on antiepileptic 
drugs, Duh et al. (2009) find similar results.  They note that many studies attribute this increase 
in costs to the need for other medical attention (such as higher rates of hospitalization and longer 
hospital stays) while taking generic versions of antiepileptic drugs.  
Even if generic substitution were financially preferable, patients have traditionally 
harbored distrust of generic drugs. There have been several studies outlining demographic and 
sociological reasons patients perceive generic drugs to be riskier than their brand-name 
counterparts. For example, Omojasola et al. (2012) find that minorities were more likely to think 
that generic drugs were associated with more side effects; relatedly, Shrank et al. (2007) finds 
that patients living in the poorest zip codes were less likely to initially receive generic drugs. 																																																								
28 For a history and review of bioequivalence standards, see Midha and McKay (2009). Other 
studies discussing bioequivalence includes Al-Jazairi et al. (2008). 
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Despite this distrust, particular features of the health care system can encourage generic 
substitution. In a meta-analysis conducted by Dunne and Dunne (2015), a key factor in accepting 
generic substitution is a patient’s trust in his physician. Additionally, factors such as formulary 
structure do affect drug choice. Huskamp et al. (2003) examine a change in formulary structure 
for two companies and find that enrollees do respond to financial incentives to choose certain 
drugs. Similarly, Shrank et al. (2007) find that while pharmacy benefit design and pharmacy type 
do not affect the likelihood of initiating generic medication, enrollment in tiered pharmacy 
benefit plans and use of mail-order pharmacies do increase this likelihood.  
The generic substitution of NTI drugs fits uneasily within this larger context. There are 
real concerns regarding the therapeutic equivalence of generic NTI drugs to their brand-name 
version. Much has been written regarding the clinical equivalence of generic and brand-name 
versions of NTI drugs. Kesselheim et al. (2008) review some of these studies for cardiovascular 
disease and do not find evidence that brand-name drugs are superior to their generic versions.  In 
contrast, Blix et al. (2010) find that NTI drugs are associated with more drug-related problems 
(e.g., non-optimal doses, drug interactions, and need for monitoring) than non-NTI drugs. Others 
have argued that more care should be taken with NTI drugs, such as prohibiting autosubstitution 
and adjusting bioequivalence standards (Hottinger and Liang 2012).29 Physicians' and patients' 
perspectives on generic substitution of NTI drugs seem similarly mixed. In a study of 
antiepileptic drugs, which are often considered NTI drugs, Berg et al. (2008) find that 66% of 
																																																								
29 There is a lot of research on the appropriateness of antiepileptic drugs, as many of the drugs 
within the class are associated with a narrower therapeutic index. For more information, see 
Heaney and Sander (2007). Similarly, the appropriateness of bioequivalents has been discussed 
with respect to antiepileptics (Heaney and Sander 2007) and drugs treating mental illness 
(Fairfax-Columbo and DeMatteo 2015).  
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physicians and 34% of patients surveyed felt that the occurrence of seizures was linked to 
generic substitution.30  
This Chapter is not concerned with the actual therapeutic equivalence of generic NTI 
drugs but rather with the perception of risk associated with NTI use. It is sufficient that either 
patients, or agents making decisions on behalf of patients, are uncertain of or negatively perceive 
the effects of substitution within NTI drugs. However, it is notable that although the FDA 
originally claimed that generic substitution of NTI drugs pose no additional risk, in 2010, the 
FDA Advisory Committee for Pharmaceutical Science decided that the current bioequivalence 
standards are not sufficiently strict for NTI drugs (Yu 2011). FDA scientists now suggest a 
“four-way, crossover, full-replicated study design” which will compare differences in means and 
within-subject variation, the latter of which had not been addressed previously.    
The prior literature on NTI drugs mostly concerns determinants of consuming generic 
versions. Chao et al. (2002) use 1996–1998 MEPS data to examine the likelihood of consuming 
generic NTI drugs and find that NTI drugs are more likely to be prescribed as brand-name drugs 
than non-NTI drugs. They then calculate comparable discount rates for NTI and non-NTI drugs 
and predict the savings possible if further generic substitution were implemented with NTI drugs. 
In particular, Chao et al. (2002) find that discount rates were positively associated with use of 
drugs, more for NTI drugs than non-NTI drugs. They find no difference in switch rates between 
NTI and non-NTI drugs. Similarly, Gagne et al. (2013) analyze predictors of choosing generic 
NTI drugs for elderly Medicare participants, focusing on demographics and prior generic use.  
																																																								
30 Bhosle et al. (2005) finds that patients filling prescriptions were unaware of the term “narrow 
therapeutic index” and found physicians’ assurances more reassuring than pharmacists’.  
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The price consequences of the lack of therapeutic equivalence have also been studied 
previously from a generic entry perspective. Nabin et al. (2012) develop a model attributing the 
“generic competition paradox,”31 the phenomenon in which brand-name companies raise their 
prices following generic entry, to lack of therapeutic equivalence. They estimate their model 
using Canadian data from 2000–2011 and find that drug classes with lower therapeutic 
equivalence (antiepileptics) were more likely to have higher post-patent prices than those with 
higher therapeutic equivalence (cardiovascular drugs).  
This Chapter contributes to this literature by looking at sensitivity to NTI risk in both 
price and consumption behavior. Unlike Nabin et al. (2012), this Chapter examines NTI drugs 
from a hedonic price perspective—it looks at the compensating differential for the additional risk 
in NTI drugs. Like Chao et al. (2002), it looks at the gap between brand and generic prices 
between NTI and non-NTI drugs; however, it additionally explores whether there is a risk 
penalty associated with NTI drugs, despite the multiple payers and divergent incentives prevalent 
in the drug market. Finally, it also looks at consumption behavior to see whether consumers 
behave in a way that minimizes their risk. The next section provides a simple model of the 
general drug choice decision within the current context.  
																																																								
31 The generic competition paradox is an empirical observation that has puzzled scholars. Some 
explanations for the increase in brand-name price following generic entry is market segmentation 
based on brand loyalty and insurance coverage. Nabin et al. (2012) instead attribute this to 
therapeutic inequivalence; consumers do not see generic versions as perfect substitutes and 
prefer the brand version. This concept is only tangentially related to this Chapter, as this Chapter 
focuses on consumer/agent valuations of a risky drug, not in estimating supply and demand 
functions. Additionally, while this Chapter does control for competition, this Chapter does not 
attempt to model behavior directly following initial generic entry. Finally, this Chapter allows 
for therapeutic inequivalence between generic versions of NTI drugs, while Nabin et al. (2012) 
seems to concentrate on the difference between brand-name and generic versions.  
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III. Model  
This Chapter examines whether the perceived higher risks associated with NTI drugs 
result in a price penalty for NTI drugs. In general, it is assumed that consumers are willing to pay 
less for riskier products. However, it is unclear whether this preference will result in a price 
penalty in the context of pharmaceutical drug consumption.  
Pharmaceutical drug consumption is a study in crossed incentives, asymmetric 
information, and limited attention. Expert physicians prescribe “appropriate” drugs to their 
uninformed patients. The patients experience any side effects or lack of efficacy associated with 
the drug. Third-party payers bear most of the financial burden; they use pharmacy benefit 
managers (PBMs) to negotiate drug prices with pharmaceutical manufacturers (Fox 2003)32 and 
cover much of the up-front costs. Consumers generally only see a fraction of the “price” of the 
drug. While patients do pay for drugs, this is generally through premiums for their insurance 
coverage, rather than a direct payment associated with a particular purchase.  
For these reasons, it is unclear whether the risks associated with NTI drugs will actually 
lead to price penalties. Specifically, third-party payers face the majority of the drug price but do 
not experience the adverse events of the drug. However, if third-party payers are cognizant of the 
risks and sensitive to the preferences of their consumers, 33 I expect third-party payers would 
demand a price penalty for risk. The study utilizes the following hedonic price model:  1 ln ! + 1 = !"!!!! +   !"#"$%!!!! +   !"#"$%&∗!"!!!! + !!! + !, 
																																																								
32 Insofar as prices are based on cross-subsidization of other drugs, I cannot see this. However, 
this only produces biased results if cross-subsidization occurs between NTI and non-NTI drugs.  
33 Fox (2003) describes how PBMs work and set formularies. Fox notes that PBMs may treat 
NTI drugs as having no generic equivalents, decide on a drug-by-drug basis, or treat NTI drugs 
similarly to non-NTI drugs. 
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where ! signifies the total cost of the drug or the portion of the cost that each third-party (or 
consumer) pays.34  The vector Z includes data on market characteristics that determine the price 
of a drug, such as drug age and competition. NTI is an indicator variable for narrow therapeutic 
index drugs, Generic is an indicator for generic status, and Generic*NTI signifies when the drug 
is a generic NTI drug.  
If consumers care about the extra risk associated with narrow therapeutic index drugs, I 
expect !! < 0. Here, the nature of the risk matters. There are two possible risks associated with 
NTI drugs, both stemming from the lack of substitutability between versions35 of NTI drugs. The 
first type of risk might be called a direct risk: consumers might have different therapeutic 
reactions to different versions of the same NTI drug. The expected harm associated with a new 
version of the same NTI drug is nonzero, even conditional on the patient’s experience of the 
current version. In a sense, the costs of switching are higher for NTI drugs. The second type of 
risk might be called an indirect risk: this is the risk arising from anticipated forced switching. A 
patient may perceive that he will eventually be forced to switch between versions of the NTI 
drug and thus face the  “direct risk” associated with switching between NTI versions. Forced 
switching may occur due to drug shortages or to certain manufacturers exiting the market. If 
consumers (or their physicians) are forward-looking enough to anticipate such switching, NTI 
drugs entail an inherent risk, making the category as a whole less desirable. Thus, the “indirect 																																																								
34 The results are robust to only considering any nonzero prices (and not limiting observations to 
those expecting to be covered by a particular payer) and using !"(!"#$%). These runs are listed in 
Table A-3 through Table A-6. 
35 For clarity, in this paper, a drug class (e.g., anticonvulsants) contains many substances (e.g., 
carbamazepine). Substance categories contain both generic and brand-name versions of the drug 
(e.g., both carbamazepine and tegretol belong to the substance category carbamazepine), such 
that they correspond to the nonproprietary name. Versions of the drug involve unique product 
codes within each drug category. Versions are an even smaller category than brand-name/generic, 
as there are multiple generic versions generally available.  For the sake of consistency, the drug 
hierarchy is as follows: drug class, substance, and drug version.  
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risk” is the anticipated future risk associated with choosing any NTI drug. Both the direct and 
indirect risks arise from underlying issues of substitution and are consistent with !! < 0. 
The interaction term Generic*NTI is of particular interest. If consumers view generic 
drugs as simply riskier than brand-name NTI drugs, !!< 0. If, instead, the main risk associated 
with NTI drugs arises from substituting between versions, I expect switching to be costly. With 
costly switching, consumers would require a larger price difference in order to switch NTI 
versions, resulting in !! > 0.  
To demonstrate this, consider the following example. Utility from consuming drug j can 
be formalized as  2  !!" = !!!! + !!(!! − !!)+!!′! + !!!!  + !!!! + !!   
where !! is a vector of characteristics for patient i, !! represents the patient’s nonmedical 
consumption, and !! is the price of drug j. Wj is a vector of drug version-specific variables, 36 
while Ij and Dj represent drug risks. Dj is the direct risk and Ij is the indirect risk. Particularly, Dj 
is the expected harm caused by version j. If version j causes an adverse event, Dj ≠ 0, and if it 
does not, Dj = 0. Since I and D are both risks and consumers generally prefer less risky drugs, !!, !! < 0. A consumer should consume drug k when  3  !!" > !!"  !"# !"" ! ≅ ! 
Then, from equation (2), a patient will choose drug k when  4  !! − !! !! + !! −!! ! + !! − !! !! + !! − !! !! > 0.  
It is helpful to contrast the choice between two non-NTI drug versions and the choice 
between two NTI drug versions. Suppose drug j is a generic version of a non-NTI drug and drug 
																																																								
36 If one of the versions of the drug is the brand version, !! can contain aspects like brand 
loyalty. 
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k is another generic version of the same non-NTI drug.  Since both drugs are generic versions, !! should equal !!.37 Similarly, since both drugs are non-NTI, !! = !! = 0, and  !! = !! = 0, a 
consumer will choose the cheaper version. 
Instead, suppose drug j is a generic version of an NTI drug and drug k is another generic 
version of the same NTI drug. Since both drugs are generic, !! should equal !!. Since both 
versions are within the NTI category, !! = !! ≠ 0; however, Dj does not necessarily equal Dk. If 
the consumer currently consumes drug j, she knows whether drug j results in an adverse reaction 
(Dj ≠ 0) or not (Dj = 0). She does not know how she will react to drug k (whether Dk = 0 or Dk ≠ 
0). Thus, in order to switch to drug k,  
(5) !! − !! !! > !! − !! !!. 
Since !! < 0, if Dj = 0, and Dk ≠ 0, a larger price gap is necessary to switch from drug j to k. The 
larger the expectation of experiencing adverse events from any given version, and the smaller the 
current chance of experiencing adverse events, the larger the “loyalty” to a particular generic 
NTI version. If this is true, I expect !! > 0. 
The Chapter explores whether the results predicted by this conceptual model are 
consistent with market data. There are many reasons why they may not be, including the issues 
of intervening actors and asymmetric information inherent in the pharmaceutical drug context.  
The following section introduces the data used to evaluate this question.  
IV. Data 
This Chapter uses data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) 2008–
2010.38 MEPS is published by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and surveys 
																																																								
37 !! does not need to equal !! for these results to hold. All that is necessary is that the 
relationship between Wj and Wk does not vary by NTI status.  
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families and individuals, their medical providers, and employers about medical expenditures. 
The Household Component of the MEPS is drawn from a nationally representative subsample of 
households participating in the prior year’s National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) and 
provides information on demographic characteristics, health conditions, insurance, medical 
expenditures, and sources of payment. Participants are interviewed over a span of two full 
calendar years. The prescription drug expenditure data from MEPS is the sum of actual payments 
by various sources, rather than “charges,” and does incorporate discounts.  
While MEPS lists numerous different payers, this analysis focuses on the following 
payers: private insurance, Medicare, self-payment, and total payment. 39 Because of the 
increasing gap between listed charges and actual payments, MEPS reports the payment by each 
payer rather than the charge by each. While these payments incorporate discounts received, they 
do not incorporate rebates received by Medicaid or other buyers. Since rebates are a large part of 
Medicaid’s pricing regime, I do not focus on the results for Medicaid payments, although they 
are listed for comparison. 
Since there is no uniform FDA definition of a narrow therapeutic index drug, this Chapter 
uses the definition used by the North Carolina Board of Pharmacy as of January 27, 2009, in 
keeping with prior literature (Gagne et al. 2013).40 The following NTI drugs are studied in this 
analysis: warfarin, theophylline, digoxin, carbamazepine, phenytoin, lithium, levothyroxine, 																																																																																																																																																																																		
38 The years 2008–2010 were chosen because Medicare Part D was implemented in 2006, 
making Medicare drug data likely to be a Part D plan. Additionally, in 2007, the rules used to 
identify outlier prices for prescription medication changed, allowing a larger range of drug prices.  
39 These are not the only payers reported by the MEPS, just the most interesting. MEPS includes 
Veterans Administration payments, workers’ compensation, state and local, Tricare, and a series 
of “other” payment categories (including a set of residual payment categories (“other public” and 
“other private”) meant to correct inconsistencies in the data). I do not consider these categories in 
the analysis except insofar as they contribute to the total sum of payments. 
40 The North Carolina Board of Pharmacy lists procainamide hydrochloride, but my data do not 
contain any observations involving this drug.  
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cyclosporine, tacrolimus, and ethosuximide. To preserve the proper comparison, this study 
retains all prescription drugs within the same Multum Therapeutic sub-class as each NTI drug.41 
MEPS data are merged with data from the FDA by National Drug Code (NDC), in order 
to incorporate market status of each drug (brand-name drug or generic drug).42 Using data from 
the NDC Database file,43 I match approval information to MEPS data using the NDC code.44  
Since price is sensitive to the number of competitors (Reiffen and Ward 2005; Frank and 
Salkever 1997), I include a measure of total competition. In order to get data on competition, I 
use information from the National Drug Code Directory. I look at unique observations of labelers 
and substance names and then count the number of labelers per substance name.  
Drug “age” also contributes to drug price, so I measure the age of the drug by subtracting 
the year that the manufacturer started marketing the drug from the year of its usage.45 For 
multiple entries on the same drug application, I use the earliest date to capture the date of the 
biggest innovation, not minor later adjustments.46 I similarly control for the age of the substance 
																																																								
41 The following Multum Lexicon Therapeutic sub-classes are retained: antiarrhythmic agents, 
anticonvulsants, anticoagulants, thyroid drugs, immunosuppressive agents, bronchodilators, and 
antipsychotics. Cyclosporine and tacrolimus are only considered as immunosuppressive agents. 
While cyclosporine and tacrolimus are used as an eye drop (ophthalmic preparations) and topical 
ointment (dermatological agents), respectively, I do not consider these drug classes, as the drugs 
are not consumed orally and the uses seem distinct from the rest of the classes. Adding these 
classes back in does not seem to make much difference, however.  
42 NDA authorized generics are coded as brand-name drugs, given that they are approved under 
an NDA. However, these account for only around 2% of the observations and recoding these as 
generics does not change the results. 
43 These data were downloaded in June 2015. 
44 The FDA NDC database can be found at 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/InformationOnDrugs/ucm142438.htm.  
45 The date that the marketing began came from the FDA NDC database. The results are robust 
to the inclusion of a squared age term as well, in case the effects are nonlinear. This variable is in 
terms of years.  
46 A small percentage (around 2–4 percent) of drugs have negative ages, implying that they were 
used before they were approved. Since this could be a function of a mistake in the NDC code or 
a part of an investigational drug, I drop these observations. 
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using the earliest marketing date listed for each substance (a category that encompasses multiple 
NDC codes, generic versions, and brand versions), to capture how novel the broad substance is.47  
The MEPS Prescription Medication (PM) files are linked to the MEPS Full Year 
Consolidated Data (FY) 48 file, in order to incorporate information on demographics, such as 
education, race, and age.49 Additionally, the FY file asks whether each person has a usual payer 
for prescription drugs and, if so, who the payer is. The following regressions on private insurance 
and Medicare contributions are run only on people asserting that they expect to be covered by a 
particular third-party-payer.50 MEPS also provides information on the amount paid by each 
payer, the quantity of each drug, and the strength of each drug. Diagnosis codes are also 
indicated by ICD-9 codes and grouped into 19 diagnosis groups.51  
																																																								
47 Each drug version is associated with an application number and a “substance” category.  The 
substance category encompasses multiple drug versions. Usually multiple application numbers 
are nested within one substance; in some cases very similar substances are associated with one 
application number. Since this is relatively rare and usually involves highly related substances, I 
see the “age of the substance” as a broader measure of how novel the substance is, separate from 
how long a particular drug version has been on the market.  
48 Each observation on the Prescription Medication (PM) file is matched to a Full Year 
Consolidated Data File (though not vice versa). Many observations in the PM file can match to a 
single FY observation, since each person may buy multiple prescription medications over a year. 
Not all observations from FY match, since not all surveyed purchased a prescription medication. 
These files are linked by a unique identifier, DUPERSID.  
49 Age is measured at the end of each recorded year. 
50 ERISA plans are either noted as “private insurance” or “other payment.” If an employer is 
associated with a private health plan, it is classified as a private payer. If the employer self-
insures, MEPS might consider this coverage “other.” However, if the self-insured plan is 
administered by a private insurance company, this might still be listed as “private insurance.” If 
one is concerned that classification of employers’ plans might skew the results, the Appendix has 
a list of tables that do not impose the expected coverage restriction (Table A-3 through Table A-6). 
Instead, any observation with non-zero payment for a payer is included. Thus, if a person does 
not expect private insurance payment but receives it for a given drug, that observation will be 
included in the private insurance price regressions. These results seem similar to the main results.  
51 Observations are additionally dropped if the following values are missing: NDC codes, drug 
quantity, race, and Hispanic status. Additionally, if the drug is not categorized as “NDA”, “NDA 
authorized Generic”, or “ANDA”, it is dropped. Drugs with quantities less than five are dropped 
as well. Finally, drugs are dropped if they are labeled “over-the-counter.” 
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All of the MEPS prices have been converted into 2010 prices.52 The prices are divided by 
reported quantity so that they are prices per unit.53 To ensure that prices are not skewed by 
inordinately small quantities (and to control for the possibility that they are systematically 
different or are promotional packages), I only include observations with quantities of 5 or 
more.54 All strengths are reported in terms of milligrams.55  
V. Results  
A. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 lists the mean price per unit based on NTI and generic status, as paid by each 
payer. These are the raw differences and do not control for other attributes that may affect price. 
Price per unit is clearly lower for generic drugs than for brand-name drugs. However, it also 
appears that NTI drugs are generally cheaper than non-NTI drugs. The first column lists the 
mean total price per unit. Brand-name NTI drugs have a mean price of $0.49 per unit while 
brand-name non-NTI drugs have a mean price of $5.99. In contrast, generic NTI drugs are priced 
at $0.28 while generic non-NTI drugs are $0.72.  
Table 1 also demonstrates that the differences between generic and brand-name prices are 
smaller for NTI drugs than for non-NTI drugs. For example, the average total price per unit gap 
																																																								
52 The CPI indices are from http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpid10av.pdf. 
53 The unit reported by MEPS varies. However, the main results are robust to using only drugs 
sold in capsules, caplets, or tablets, shown in Table A-1–Table A-2. This alleviates concerns that 
types of units (and the quantity reported in each) drive these results.  
54 The main results are robust to ignoring this exclusion.  
55 For data observations that report the strength in grams, I assume this is an error and impute the 
active ingredient unit reported by the FDA NDC data. However, the risk penalties are robust to 
the exclusion of this imputation.  
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between brand-name drugs and generic drugs is $0.21 for NTI drugs and $5.27 for non-NTI 
drugs.56  This pattern seems to hold for the other payers as well.  
Table 1. Payment Per Unit, by NTI and Generic/Brand-Name Statusa 
 Total Private Medicare Self Payment Self Payment Only Medicaid 
 Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. 
NTI Drug             
- Brand-Name 0.49 14,211 0.11 4,371  0.26 2,422  0.31 12,403  0.41 7,120 0.31 1,257 
- Generic  0.28 21,354 0.05 5,745  0.14 4,004  0.17 18,182  0.21 10,366 0.20 2,310 
Non-NTI 
Drug 
            
- Brand-Name 5.99 30,657 3.05 7,023  4.70 4,580  1.20 21,734 4.43 2,976 4.60 7,386 
- Generic 0.72 26,785 0.35 6,357  0.45 4,698  0.23 19,986 0.41 7,336 0.47 5,650 
a The above amounts are the means of payments for participants who report being covered by the 
relevant insurance. For self payment, the means are for those records reporting a non-zero self-
payment.  
 
B. Price Regression 
The following section builds upon the descriptive statistics by examining whether the 
inherent riskiness in NTI drugs results in a price penalty. Table 2 lists the price penalties 
associated with NTI drugs, using a price equation with fixed effects for each individual.57  Panel 
A lists results of price regressions while Panel B reports the results of ln(p+1) regressions. These 
regressions control for year, Multum therapeutic class, dosage form, pharmacy type, diagnosis 
code, substance age, drug age, competition, and dosage strength. Most variables included 
perform as expected. Drug Age, meant to capture the amount of time the particular drug has been 
on the market, has a negative and significant effect on price. Similarly, Competition is negative 
and significant. Drug Strength is generally positive, though sometimes insignificant. This is in 
line with expectations that stronger pills will be more expensive; however, there are situations in 
																																																								
56 These figures are derived by subtracting the generic NTI price from the brand NTI price (0.49-
0.28=0.21). A similar calculation is done for non-NTI drugs (5.99-0.72=5.27). 
57 I also run a weighted OLS regression, clustering by individual, which produce similar risk 
penalties. These results are available upon request.  
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which drug price is insensitive to the amount of the active ingredient, a phenomenon termed “flat 
pricing” discussed by Berndt (2002).  
Column (1) shows the price penalties associated with NTI status for the total per-unit 
drug price.  The NTI penalty is negative and significant at the one percent level, suggesting that 
there is a price penalty for NTI status for brand-name drugs.  Generic status is also associated 
with a decrease in price, which is expected. The coefficient on the interaction term between NTI 
status and generic status (NTI*Generic) is positive and significant. This confirms the pattern 
observed in Table 1: the gap between brand-name and generic prices is smaller for NTI drugs 
than non-NTI drugs. This result was previewed in the descriptive statistics but seems robust to 
the inclusion of other relevant factors such as drug age.  
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Table 2. Price Sensitivity by Payer, Fixed Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Total Payment Private Contribution Medicare Contribution Self Contribution Self Only Contribution Medicaid Contribution 
Panel A: Price Regressions 
NTI Status = 1 -5.744*** -3.716*** -3.442*** -0.648*** -3.199*** -2.750 
 
(0.964) (1.075) (0.662) (0.152) (0.690) (2.011) 
Generic Status = 1 -3.326*** -1.502*** -2.938*** -0.445*** -2.718*** -2.383*** 
 
(0.296) (0.338) (0.377) (0.063) (0.471) (0.483) 
NTI*Generic 3.593*** 1.821*** 3.073*** 0.349*** 2.622*** 2.327*** 
 
(0.412) (0.440) (0.426) (0.078) (0.520) (0.882) 
Drug Age -0.070*** -0.047*** -0.032*** -0.007** -0.017 -0.066** 
 
(0.015) (0.017) (0.011) (0.003) (0.013) (0.029) 
Competition -0.046*** -0.038*** -0.022** -0.004** -0.039*** -0.036*** 
 
(0.007) (0.010) (0.011) (0.002) (0.009) (0.012) 
Drug Strength/1000 -0.006 0.741*** 0.014*** 0.011 0.056*** -0.009 
 
(0.016) (0.008) (0.003) (0.013) (0.017) (0.024) 
R-squared 0.681 0.473 0.579 0.103 0.767 0.356 
Panel B: ln(p+1) Regressions 
NTI Status = 1 -0.788*** -0.525*** -0.678*** -0.144*** -0.694*** -0.204* 
 
(0.051) (0.089) (0.117) (0.022) (0.070) (0.121) 
Generic Status = 1 -0.681*** -0.379*** -0.672*** -0.148*** -0.638*** -0.420*** 
 
(0.033) (0.057) (0.076) (0.015) (0.066) (0.062) 
NTI*Generic 0.574*** 0.362*** 0.616*** 0.072*** 0.530*** 0.350*** 
 
(0.038) (0.066) (0.083) (0.017) (0.070) (0.085) 
Drug Age  -0.010*** -0.005*** -0.008*** -0.001** -0.004** -0.009*** 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
Competition -0.009*** -0.006*** -0.004** -0.002*** -0.011*** -0.007*** 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) 
Drug Strength/1000 0.003 0.065*** 0.004*** 0.001 0.011*** 0.002 
 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Observations 93,007 23,496 15,704 93,007 27,798 16,603 
R-squared 0.725 0.384 0.589 0.150 0.708 0.324 
Number of id 9,209 3,072 1,636 9,209 4,487 1,760 
Additional variables included but not reported are substance age, and indicators for Multum therapeutic classes, diagnosis code, mail pharmacies, missing 
strength, dosage form names, and year. Robust standard errors are reported. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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This positive interaction term is possibly due to the lack of substitutability between 
versions of NTI drugs, as predicted in Section III. Given how small changes in dosage can lead 
to adverse events in NTI drugs, switching between brand-name drugs and generic drugs or 
between generic versions has a higher likelihood of adverse events. Thus, switching is costly, 
and generic versions of NTI drugs are no longer perfect substitutes for one another.  
Given the current fractured system, in which different payers contribute to drug 
payments, I am interested whether third-party payers are sensitive to the NTI risk. Columns (2), 
(3), and (6) report the results for the price paid by private insurance, Medicare, and Medicaid, 
respectively. The same results observed in Column (1) are mirrored for private insurance 
contributions and Medicare contributions.58 While the results for Medicaid are similar as well, 
the NTI penalty is insignificant in most specifications. Again, this might be due to the 
unobserved error introduced by prevalent rebates.  
As noted above, columns (2), (3) and (6) only include people who report usually being 
covered by the relevant payer for prescription medication are included in these regressions. In 
case this restriction is unnecessarily stringent, Table A-3–Table A-6 in the Appendix include any 
observation with nonzero payment in each category. Thus, an observation will be included in the 
private contribution regression if private insurance contributes a nonzero amount, even if the 
person does not claim that private insurance is their expected payer. Since there are no zero 
prices in these regressions, Panel B of each runs ln(p) rather than ln(p+1). The results reported in 
these tables are qualitatively similar to the main results.59  
																																																								
58 The price penalties for Medicare contributions for generic NTI drugs seem smaller than private 
penalties. In Table A-1-Table A-2, the generic penalty is no longer negative for Medicare 
contributions.  
59 The only difference in these results is that log price results for private contribution lose 
significance in Table A-4, Table A-5, and Table A-6 and the interaction term is negative in Table A-
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Column (4) studies any contribution by the patient; this includes copayments with 
insurance as well as situations in which the patient bears the entire burden of the purchase. 
Column (4) reports smaller effects than other columns, largely because it includes all 
observations, many of which have zero contributions. This is because Column (4) groups 
copayments with self-payments only, and copayments might be different than the latter 
circumstances. Copayments are often uniform or vary by tier, and are largely determined by the 
third-party payer. To separate out this effect, Column (5) only studies observations in which 
there is no other contributor other than the patient and where there are nonzero payments by the 
patient; this captures the burden on the consumer when they are the only payer for the drug. 
These results are qualitatively similar to those Columns (1), (2), and (3).  
Column (6) lists the results for Medicaid reimbursements: these are qualitatively similar 
to those of the other payers, though the NTI penalty is often smaller.60  Again, these results 
should be interpreted cautiously, as Medicaid incorporates a lot of rebates that are unobserved in 
my data. In terms of relative sensitivity, it seems like payments from patients who receive no 
other compensation and Medicare contributions have the largest NTI penalty for brand-name 
drugs. However, it is not clear if this difference is significant.  
As noted above, the MEPS data do not take into account rebates. Insofar as rebates are a 
big part of drug pricing, experts say that they can apply to brand-name drugs, often those with 
one or more close substitutes.61 I cannot observe rebates; however, I attempt to predict how 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
5, and Table A-6  (interaction term is negative and insignificant). However, the regular price 
regression has the same sign and significance as in Table 2-Table 3.  
60 Notably, in the weighted OLS regressions the Medicaid penalty seem closer to the magnitude 
of the other payers. Additionally, sometimes the percent difference between generic NTI drugs 
and generic non-NTI drugs is not negative.  
61 This information is from a conversation with an expert from the CBO, as well as a CBO report 
(CBO 2010). 
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unobserved rebates could affect my results. Rebates could affect my results in three possible 
ways: First, if the NTI market is more segmented, such that different versions of NTI drugs are 
not as interchangeable, then NTI brand-name manufacturers might have less need to offer rebates 
because there is less competition between versions. This would mean that the effective brand-
name price paid by each party for non-NTI drugs is lower than reported, while the price for 
brand-name NTI and all generic drugs would remain the same. Second, brand-name drug 
manufacturers might be more desperate to start consumers on their drug initially, given the 
demonstrated inertia once on a version. This may cause them to offer rebates as much or more 
frequently than non-NTI manufacturers. Third, it is possible that this source of error is random, 
such that brand-name manufacturers of NTI drugs are just as likely to offer rebates as brand-
name manufacturers of non-NTI drugs.  
In the latter two scenarios, my results are unaffected or, if anything, understated. If 
instead the first scenario is true, the price penalty might be overstated by unobserved rebates. As 
a robustness check, I lower per unit payments to brand-name, non-NTI drugs by 20%. I do this to 
be safe, since the mean rebate for brand-name drugs is approximately 15–16%.62 The results are 
robust to this change and are reported in Table 3.63 This suggests that the NTI price penalty and 
the smaller gap between NTI brand-name and generic drugs are not solely an artifact of 
unobserved rebates.  
																																																								
62 This information is from a conversation with an expert from the CBO. A CBO report also 
estimates that manufacturer rebates to plans averaged about 14 percent of brand-name 
prescription drug spending (CBO 2010). 
63 Rebates are also included in Table A-2,Table A-4, and Table A-6. 
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Table 3. Price Sensitivity by Payer, Fixed Effects, Adjustment for Rebates. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Total Payment  Private Contribution Medicare Contribution Self Contribution Self Only Contribution Medicaid Contribution 
Panel A: Price Regressions 
NTI Status = 1 -4.369*** -2.902*** -2.596*** -0.470*** -2.462*** -1.948 
 
(0.766) (0.856) (0.539) (0.120) (0.546) (1.597) 
Generic Status = 1 -2.467*** -1.120*** -2.228*** -0.326*** -2.067*** -1.746*** 
 
(0.237) (0.268) (0.303) (0.050) (0.375) (0.384) 
NTI*Generic 2.636*** 1.362*** 2.307*** 0.229*** 1.959*** 1.677** 
 
(0.328) (0.350) (0.343) (0.062) (0.414) (0.697) 
Drug Age -0.058*** -0.039*** -0.027*** -0.005** -0.014 -0.055** 
 
(0.012) (0.014) (0.009) (0.002) (0.011) (0.023) 
Competition -0.037*** -0.031*** -0.017** -0.003** -0.031*** -0.030*** 
 
(0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.001) (0.007) (0.009) 
Drug Strength/1000 -0.004 0.593*** 0.012*** 0.009 0.049*** -0.006 
 
(0.013) (0.007) (0.003) (0.011) (0.014) (0.019) 
0.676 0.470 0.572 0.101 0.764 0.353 
Panel B: ln(p+1) Regressions 
NTI Status = 1 -0.650*** -0.454*** -0.567*** -0.101*** -0.578*** -0.137 
 
(0.049) (0.083) (0.111) (0.021) (0.066) (0.114) 
Generic Status = 1 -0.549*** -0.309*** -0.563*** -0.112*** -0.524*** -0.336*** 
 
(0.031) (0.052) (0.070) (0.013) (0.062) (0.058) 
NTI*Generic 0.441*** 0.290*** 0.504*** 0.036** 0.416*** 0.269*** 
 
(0.036) (0.061) (0.078) (0.016) (0.066) (0.079) 
Drug Age -0.009*** -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.001** -0.003** -0.009*** 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
Competition -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.004** -0.001*** -0.010*** -0.006*** 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) 
Drug Strength/1000 0.003 0.061*** 0.003*** 0.001 0.011*** 0.002 
 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Observations 93,007 23,496 15,704 93,007 27,798 16,603 
R-squared 0.698 0.377 0.575 0.134 0.677 0.313 
Number of id 9,209 3,072 1,636 9,209 4,487 1,760 
Additional variables included but not reported are substance age, and indicators for Multum therapeutic classes, diagnosis code, mail pharmacies, missing 
strength, dosage form names, and year . Robust standard errors are reported. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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The focus of this Chapter is on the existence of a penalty; different specifications produce 
various penalty magnitudes. In any specification, however, the magnitudes of these estimates 
seem economically significant. From Table A-6, the percentage difference between the total price 
of a brand-name NTI drug and a brand-name non-NTI drug is roughly –58%. This high 
percentage difference for brand-name drugs may be driven by outlier brand-name, non-NTI 
drugs. The percentage difference in total price between a generic NTI drug and a generic non-
NTI drug is –31%. The corresponding results for total payment in Table A-2 suggest a –51% 
percentage difference between brand-name NTI drug and a brand-name non-NTI drug and a –
12% difference between a generic NTI drug and a generic non-NTI drug.64 
These results are distinguishable from those found in Nabin et al. (2012), which suggest 
that lower therapeutic equivalence drug classes have higher post-patent prices than classes with 
higher therapeutic equivalence. There may be several reasons for this. First, my data is from the 
US, as opposed to Canada, which has a very different medical care system. Second, while I do 
control for competition, my study does not concentrate on price changes in the period around 
patent expiration, as theirs does. Additionally, instead of classifying entire classes as having low 
therapeutic equivalence, this Chapter singles out drugs within classes that have been considered 
as having a narrow therapeutic index and compares them to other drugs within the same class. 
My results are similarly distinct from those found by Chao et al. (2002), who suggest that NTI 
generic drugs have similar discounts as generic non-NTI drugs. This difference might be due to 
the use of newer data, as Chao et al. look at data from 1996–1998. With the continuing emphasis 
on NTI drugs, the awareness of the risks might have increased over time. Additionally, Chao et 																																																								
64 I compute the percent difference for ln(p+1) as follows: ! ! !!! !! ![!! !!][!! !!]   for the brand-name 
NTI penalty and ! ! !!!!!!!!! !! ![!!!!!  !!][!!!!!  !!]   for the generic NTI penalty. 
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al. (2002) consider 23 NTI drugs, and it is unclear which these were. This study uses the North 
Carolina Board of Pharmacy definition, as following previous work (Gagne et al. 2013); 
expanding the definition might produce different results, especially as the perception of NTI risk 
becomes more attenuated.    
Finally, this analysis does not take into account any differences in marginal costs of 
production. However, Berndt (2002) notes that drug pricing reflects marginal value, not marginal 
production cost. Thus, it is unlikely that differences in marginal costs are driving the result.  
C. Substitutability Amongst Versions 
In order to claim that the consumers are sensitive to costly switching, it is helpful to look 
at consumer behavior in addition to price. This section examines whether consumers are loyal to 
their particular version of NTI drug, whether it be a generic or brand-name version.  
In this analysis, each observation is an individual–substance–purchase round combination 
indicating the mixture of versions of a substance consumed by an individual in a given purchase 
round. Each unique product code65 is treated as a different version of each drug. For example, 
each unique product code associated with the drug digoxin is treated as a separate “version.” If a 
consumer buys multiple different versions of the drug within a given purchase round, he will be 
considered to have consumed a “mixed” bundle of that drug. Only patients with multiple 
purchases in a round are included in this analysis, since it would be infeasible to consume a 
“mixed” bundle with only one purchase.  
While MEPS provides therapeutic class categories, there might be a concern that this 
classification may not be stable over a period of time. In order to accommodate such 
fluctuations, I consider drugs considered to be in each of the seven subclasses in 2008 and follow 																																																								
65 Product code is the first two segments of the NDC code, distinguishing based on manufacturer 
and product (but not package).  
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them over time. This ensures that I see a stable group of drugs. Additionally, since each drug can 
be assigned up to three therapeutic classes, this is an overly broad classification and makes sure 
that drugs are compared within each class they possibly belong to.66  
Table 4 shows a linear probability model67 predicting the likelihood with which a 
particular drug is consumed in a mixed bundle. Column (1) only includes NTI status. NTI is 
negative but insignificant, which suggests that if the drug is a NTI drug, it is insignificantly less 
likely to be consumed in a mixed bundle. However, by including the lagged mix variable in 
Column (2), the story becomes more complex. Consumers of NTI drugs are insignificantly less 
likely to consume a mixed bundle (NTI < 0) if the consumer did not mix previously; however, 
there is considerable evidence of path dependence: if a patient consumed the drug in a mixed 
bundle in the prior period, he is more likely to consume it in a mixed bundle in the current period 
(Previous Mixed Period > 0) than if he previously did not mix. However, the interaction term 
NTI*Previous Mixed Period is negative and significant, showing that consumers that previously 
mixed NTI drugs were less likely to currently mix than consumers who previously mixed non-
NTI drugs. This suggests that NTI status undermines some of the path dependence. This implies 
that while consumers may experiment with NTI drugs, they are less likely to continue to 
consume them in a mixed bundle. The predicted probabilities of being in each state, calculated 
from the probit model in  Table A-7 are listed in Table A-8.  
																																																								
66 This does mean that a drug purchase may be considered more than once if it is associated with 
more than one of the chosen therapeutic classes.  
67 The linear probability model should estimate the approximation to the marginal effect of the 
conditional expectation. However, as a robustness check, a probit model is displayed in  Table 
A-7. 
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Table 4. Probability of Mixing in a Given Period, Linear Probability Model. 
 
(1) (2) 
   NTI -8.750e-05 -9.774e-03 
 
(1.037e-02) (1.181e-02) 
Previous Mixed Period 
 
1.695e-01*** 
  
(1.824e-02) 
Mixed Previous Period*NTI 
 
-4.675e-02* 
  
(2.728e-02) 
 Observations 22,467 14,524 
R-squared 0.040 0.065 
Additional variables included but not reported are age, missing age, race, sex, education, 
and the number of drugs consumed in each individual-substance-period combination. 
Also included are indicators for Multum therapeutic class, and insurance coverage. 
Standard errors are clustered by individual. Each observation is an individual-substance-
period combination. Each version is defined as a unique product code. Only periods in 
which more than one drug is consumed are included.  Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
The above analysis only categorizes consumption bundles as mixed or not. In Table 5, this 
analysis is taken further. The consumption of each drug is now separated into 4 states: no 
mixture of versions, mix of both generic and brand-name versions, a mix of brand-name versions 
only, or a mix of generic versions only.68 Linear probability models are run regarding the 
likelihood of being in each stage. For example, Column (1) shows the likelihood of not mixing 
versions, Column (2) the likelihood of mixing brand-name and generic versions, Column (3) the 
likelihood of mixing only within brand-name versions,69 and Column (4) the likelihood of 
mixing only within generic versions.   
																																																								
68 I only consider substances that have more than one version on the market: for Table 4 and 
Column (1) of Table 5, this means requiring more than one version being on the market. For 
Table 5 Column (2), I only exclude substances that have no generic versions or no brand versions 
since this necessarily mixes brand and generic versions. Column (3) only uses substances with 
more than one brand versions and column (4), only substances with more than one generic 
version.  
69 The “mixed brand” category encompasses consuming different brands of the same substance, 
the same brand made by different labelers, or the same brand by the same labeler that is given a 
separate product code. Since this is a large range of differences, this Chapter suggests that the 
chief comparison should be between unmixed bundles and mixing brand and generic versions. 
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Table 5. Version Loyalty: Linear Probability Model. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
No Mix Mixed Brand-Generic Mixed Brand Mixed Generic 
     NTI = 1 0.013 0.001 -0.008* -0.017* 
 
(0.012) (0.009) (0.004) (0.010) 
Lagged Consumption Bundles 
Previous Mixed Brand-Generic -0.243*** 0.236*** -0.020*** -0.003 
 
(0.036) (0.035) (0.003) (0.020) 
Previous Mixed Brand -0.108*** 0.078 0.148*** -0.073*** 
 
(0.035) (0.053) (0.035) (0.009) 
Previous Mixed Generic -0.155*** -0.032*** -0.015*** 0.174*** 
 
(0.025) (0.008) (0.004) (0.024) 
Lagged Consumption Bundles–NTI Interactions 
NTI*Previous Mixed Brand-Generic 0.148*** -0.129*** -0.006 0.013 
 
(0.044) (0.043) (0.004) (0.023) 
NTI*Previous Mixed Brand 0.050 -0.110** -0.042 0.052*** 
 
(0.053) (0.055) (0.049) (0.010) 
NTI*Previous Mixed Generic -0.036 -0.014 -0.005 0.073 
 
(0.048) (0.013) (0.005) (0.049) 
    
Observations 14,524 10,662 12,873 11,868 
R-squared 0.067 0.042 0.042 0.081 
Each column is a separate linear probability model. Additional variables included but not reported are age, race, 
missing age, sex, education, and the number of drugs consumed in each individual-substance-period 
combination. Also included are indicators for Multum therapeutic class, and insurance coverage. Standard errors 
are clustered by individual. Each observation is an individual-substance-period combination. Each version is 
defined as a unique product code.  Only periods in which more than one drug is consumed are included. 
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Each column has different observations: for Column (1) 
only substances more than one version are included. For Column (2), I exclude substances that have no generic 
versions or no brand versions since this necessarily mixes brand and generic versions. Column (3) only uses 
substances with more than one brand versions and column (4), only substances with more than one generic 
version.  
 
It is clear that path-dependence is very important in this context. The omitted stage 
category is Previous Unmixed. Relative to this, the lagged consumption bundles in Column (1) 
are significantly negative (Previous Mixed Brand-Generic, Previous Mixed Brand, Previous 
Mixed Generic < 0), indicating that the likelihood of consuming an unmixed bundle in the 
current period increases if a person previously consumed an unmixed bundle. Similarly, in 
Column (2), Previous Mixed Brand-Generic is significant and positive, indicating that previously 
consuming a mixed brand-generic bundle increases the likelihood of currently consuming a 
mixed brand-generic bundle, relative to previously consuming an unmixed bundle. A similar 
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effect can be seen for Previous Mixed Brand in Column (3) and Previous Mixed Generic in 
Column (4). 
Table 5 confirms the pattern observed in Table 4: learning undermines path dependence 
for NTI drugs. The interactions between lagged consumption bundle and NTI status in Column 
(1) demonstrate that NTI users exhibit learning. Patients who previously consumed NTI drugs in 
mixed brand-generic bundles (NTI*Previous Mixed Brand-Generic>0) are more likely to 
consume unmixed bundles in the current period than those whose consumed non-NTI drugs in 
mixed brand-generic bundles in the prior period. This effect is insignificant for those who 
consumed NTI drugs in mixed brand bundles or in mixed generic bundles. 70 
The interaction terms in Column (2) are similarly informative: if a patient had consumed 
a mixed brand-generic bundle of an NTI drug in the prior period, they are less likely to consume 
a mixed brand-generic bundle in the current period (NTI*Previous Mixed Brand-Generic <0) 
than if they previously consumed a non-NTI drug in a mixed brand-generic bundle. The same is 
true for those who consume previous mixed brand bundles (NTI*Previous Mixed Brand<0). For 
both Columns (3) and (4), NTI is negative and significant, indicating that patients who previously 
consumed unmixed NTI bundles were significantly less likely to consume mixed brand or mixed 
generics bundles than those who previously consumed non-NTI drugs in unmixed bundles. The 
interaction terms in Column (3) are negative and insignificant, indicating that they are not 
significantly less likely to consume mixed brand bundles than those previously consuming 
unmixed NTI bundles. Since those consuming unmixed NTI bundles are significantly less likely 
to consume a mixed brand bundle, this means that for Column (3), path-dependence is undercut 
for all previous NTI consumption bundles. The interaction terms in Column (4) are a bit more 
																																																								
70 The interaction for NTI*Previous Mixed Generic is negative but insignificant. 
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puzzling; the interaction terms are positive and sometimes significant, indicating that relative to 
previously consuming unmixed bundles of NTI drugs, consumers are significantly more likely to 
consume a mixed bundle of generic NTI drugs if they previously consumed a mixed bundle of 
brand NTI drugs or a mixed bundle of generic NTI drugs. In order to illustrate the differences in 
predicted probabilities of being in each state, Table	A-10 lists the predicted probabilities in each 
stage.71 
In sum, while NTI status does not necessarily reduce the likelihood of mixing versions, 
the results seem largely consistent with the idea of learning. In general, those who mix NTI drugs 
are less likely to continue mixing than those taking non-NTI drugs. One possible explanation for 
this is that NTI users might struggle to find a version that works for them. Once they find one, 
they continue to use it. If this is the case, this supports the idea that each version of an NTI drug 
has a “loyalty” usually only found with brand-name drugs, explaining the positive interaction in 
Section I.B. 
Finally, some might be concerned that consumption bundles per purchase round is not the 
right way to analyze this data. If patients consume an unmixed bundle within each period but 
consume a different unmixed bundle across periods, this might be weaker evidence of loyalty. 
This might not be a problem, since each purchase round spans multiple months, creating a 
relatively long period to capture purchases. However, if this is a concern, I perform the following 
robustness check. I examine all the observations in which both the current and previous 
consumption bundles were unmixed. I run a linear probability model measuring the likelihood 
that the current and previous consumption bundles contain two different versions of the drug. 
																																																								
71 These probabilities are calculated using the probit models displayed in Table A-9.  
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The results are listed in Table 6. Patients consuming NTI drugs were significantly less likely to 
switch to a different version than non-NTI drugs.  
Table 6. Likelihood of Switching Between Bundles, Linear Probability Model. 
 
(1) 
  NTI -0.049*** 
 
(0.013) 
Anticonvulsants 0.000 
 
(0.013) 
Anticoagulants 0.103*** 
 
(0.021) 
Thyroid Drugs 0.071*** 
 
(0.016) 
Immunosuppressive 
Agents -0.127*** 
 
(0.018) 
Bronchodilators -0.096*** 
 
(0.013) 
Antipsychotics -0.031** 
 
(0.015) 
  Observations 11,809 
R-squared 0.022 
Each column is a separate linear probability model. Additional variables 
included but not reported are age, missing age, sex, education, and the number 
of drugs consumed in each individual-substance-period combination. Also 
included are indicators for Multum therapeutic class, and insurance coverage. 
Standard errors are clustered by individual. Each observation is an individual-
substance-period combination in which both the current and previous 
consumption bundle is unmixed. Each version is defined as a unique product 
code.  Only periods in which more than one drug is consumed are included. 
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
There are important limitations of these results. First, as noted above, each participant is 
interviewed for 5 rounds, in which their prescription purchases are monitored. Some participants 
only purchase prescriptions in a particular class in nonconsecutive purchase rounds. For 
example, a participant may purchase drugs in rounds 3 and 5 of their panel. For the purpose of 
this section, I treat purchase round 3 as the “lagged” period for purchase round 5, instead of 
saying that there were no drug purchases in the lagged period. I do this to preserve information 
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about prior purchases and to allow for arbitrariness in the division of purchase rounds. If instead, 
a participant purchases drugs in the same class in rounds 3, 4, and 5 but only consumes a 
particular drug in rounds 3 and 5, the lagged consumption of that drug for round 5 would be 
missing, as it is less likely that a consumer was merely not in the market for drugs. The link 
between the two periods seems too tenuous, as a separate purchase was made in the interim 
period. Additionally, since the panel set is thus not attached to years (purchase rounds span years 
in unpredictable ways), this analysis does not account for any uniform time trend that might shift 
path dependence by consumer.72  
Another possible concern is that some of the lack of mixing and switching might be due 
to PBM deals to keep certain drug versions on the formulary. If this is true, perhaps the most 
informative bundle comparison is the mixture of generic and brand versions: there is usually a 
brand or generic option for any formulary, while the formulary may only cover particular brand 
or generic versions.  
However, even if freedom to mix is constrained by insurance formularies, the results do 
suggest mixing behavior differs between NTI and non-NTI drugs. One concern might be that the 
freedom to mix is more limited for NTI drugs than non-NTI drugs: then the observed difference 
is merely a function of having fewer NTI options on a formulary. I have no reason to believe this 
is true—in fact it might be possible that more versions of NTI drugs are available on a formulary. 
One scholar suggests that formularies might not consider NTI drugs versions as substitutes for 
																																																								
72 Similarly, the mixing status is determined with respect to an FDA classification of 
“substances.” Insofar as this substance classification is too broad, such that multiple drugs within 
the substance must be taken in conjunction with one another, this might introduce error. 
  85 
one another. 73 If this means that they keep more versions of drugs on their formularies, then the 
possible switching for NTI drugs is actually higher than non-NTI drugs, understating this result.  
If the freedom to mix is equally constrained by insurance formularies for NTI and non-
NTI drugs, then the differences in behavior imply that the loyalty effect is merely seen at the 
PBM level, not at the consumer level. If PBMS and third-party payers are aware of the problems 
of switching within NTI versions, they might be less willing to switch versions on the formulary.  
In sum, these results suggest that observed consumption behavior is consistent with 
expected sensitivities to NTI risk. These results support the results from the price model by 
corroborating the predicted loyalty to drug version for NTI drugs.  
VI. Conclusion 
The consumption of pharmaceuticals is characterized by disconnected incentives: 
physicians prescribe drugs, third-party payers bear most of the costs, and patients face all of the 
risk of a given drug. In such a context, does the market reflect a lower willingness to pay for 
riskier drugs? NTI drugs provide a case study of a perceived risky drug that remained 
unregulated by the government. This Chapter examines whether the risks associated with NTI 
drugs result in a price penalty, and if so, which payers were sensitive to this risk.  
This Chapter suggests that there is sensitivity to risk despite lack of government action. 
Although there are slightly different price sensitivities to risk by payer, most were responsive to 
substitution risks. Since the risk involved is triggered when consumers switched between 
versions of the NTI, generic versions of the drug are less likely to be considered substitutes for 
brand-name versions or for other generic versions. When switching is costly, consumers become 
																																																								
73 Fox (2003) describes how PBMs work. Fox notes that PBMs may treat NTI drugs as having no 
generic equivalents, decide on a drug-by-drug basis, or treat NTI drugs similarly to non-NTI 
drugs. 
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loyal to versions of the drug. This story is consistent with the observed smaller gap between 
brand and generic prices for NTI drugs than for non-NTI drugs. Additionally, the analysis of 
consumption bundles by NTI status is consistent with the idea that NTI consumers experiment 
with versions and then remain loyal to a particular version. These findings also reveal that the 
nature of the risk matters. The fact that switching is costly both makes the entire category of 
drugs less preferable and also affects decisions between versions within the category.  
It is unclear how applicable these results are to new products with less publicized risks. 
The FDA Advisory Committee for Pharmaceutical Science and Clinical Pharmacology only 
decided to support more stringent guidelines in 2010, so the majority of purchases were done 
during a time in which there was no regulatory guidance on the risks. However, NTI drugs had 
been around for a long time and had a big body of research discussing its possible risks. Even 
though the verity of the risk was still undecided, it is possible that this time made third-party 
payers more aware of the possible risk; it is unclear whether this would be true for drugs with 
newer, less publicized potential risks, such as generic NCBD products. Alternatively, perhaps the 
ambiguity surrounding the risks of such new generic drugs would be sufficient to trigger the 
same sensitivity. This is best explored by future work.  
The takeaway is relatively optimistic. The response to risk in both the price context and 
in the analysis of consumption bundles is consistent with consumers and third-party payers being 
sensitive to risk. The sensitivity of third-party payers is particularly intriguing: in Section I.B I 
observe a NTI price penalty even for third-party payers’ contributions. Similarly, if the results in 
Section I.C are influenced by formulary decisions, this would imply that third-party payers are 
sensitive to consumers’ preferences. This sensitivity may be for competition reasons: insurance 
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companies want to keep consumers from switching to other insurance companies.74 
Alternatively, PBMS utilize Pharmacy and Therapeutics Committees composed of pharmacists 
and doctors (Cohen 2000). These members are aware of such risks and may take this into 
account while establishing their formularies. Either way, these results seem to suggest that 
despite the agency issues in the pharmaceutical consumption market, the observed outcomes 
seem consistent with consumers’ preferences against risk.    
VII. References 
Al-Jazairi, Abdulrazaq S., Sakra Blhareth, Iyad S. Eqtefan, & Saleh A. Al-Suwayeh. 2008. 
“Brand and Generic Medications: Are They Interchangeable?” Annals of Saudi Medicine, 
28(1), 33. 
Berg, Michel J., Robert A. Gross, Lisa S. Haskins, Wendy M. Zingaro, & Kenneth J. 
Tomaszewski. 2008. “Generic Substitution in the Treatment of Epilepsy: Patient and 
Physician Perceptions." Epilepsy & Behavior, 13(4), 693–699. 
Berndt, Ernst R. 2002. “Pharmaceuticals in US Health Care: Determinants of Quantity and 
Price.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 45–66. 
Bhosle, Monali, Suji S Sansgiry, & Rajesh Balkrishnan. 2005. “Consumer Perspectives 
Regarding Use of Generic Equivalents for Medications with Narrow Therapeutic Index.” 
Poster Session, available at http://www.academyhealth.org/files/2005/studentposters.pdf. 
Blix, Hege S., Kirsten K. Viktil, Tron A. Moger, & Aasmund Reikvam. 2010. “Drugs with 
Narrow Therapeutic Index as Indicators in the Risk Management of Hospitalised 
Patients.” Pharm Pr Granada, 8, 50–55. 
																																																								
74 This might not be true for Medicaid patients, who likely do not have access to other third-party 
payers.  
  88 
Chao, J., S. D. Taylor, P. L. McKercher, & D. M. Kirking. 2002. “Generic Narrow Therapeutic 
Index Drug Use: 1996–1998. “ Value in Health, 5(3), 139. 
Cohen, Joshua P. 2000. “PBMs and the Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit.” Food & Drug Law 
Journal, 55, 311. 
Congressional Budget Office. 2010. Effects of Using Generic Drugs on Medicare’s Prescription 
Drug Spending, available at 
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/118xx/doc11838/09-15-
prescriptiondrugs.pdf. 
Crawford, Pamela, Morgan Feely, Alan Guberman, and Gunter Kramer. 2006. “Are There 
Potential Problems with Generic Substitution of Antiepileptic Drugs?: A Review of 
Issues.” Seizure, 15(3), 165–176.  
Duh, Mei Sheng, Kevin E. Cahill, Pierre Emmanuel Paradis, Pierre Y. Cremieux, and Paul E. 
Greenberg. 2009. “The Economic Implications of Generic Substitution of Antiepileptic 
Drugs: A Review of Recent Evidence.” Expert Opinion on Pharmacotherapy, 10(14), 
2317–2328. 
Dunne, Suzanne S., and Colum P. Dunne. 2015. “What Do People Really Think of Generic 
Medicines? A Systematic Review and Critical Appraisal of Literature on Stakeholder 
Perceptions of Generic Drugs.” BMC Medicine 13(1), 173. 
Fairfax-Columbo, Jaymes V., and David DeMatteo. 2015. “Are Bioequivalents Really Equal: 
Genetic Substitution in the Context of Mental Illness.” Ind. Health L. Rev., 12, 281. 
Fischer, Michael A., and Jerry Avorn. 2003. “Economic Consequences of Underuse of Generic 
Drugs: Evidence from Medicaid and Implications for Prescription Drug Benefit Plans.” 
Health Services Research, 38(4), 1051–1064. 
  89 
Fox, Peter D. 2003. “Prescription Drug Benefits: Cost Management Issues for Medicare.“ Health 
Care Financing Review, 25(2), 7. 
Frank, Richard G., and David S. Salkever. 1997. “Generic Entry and the Pricing of 
Pharmaceuticals.” Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 6(1), 75–90. 
Gagne, Joshua J., Jennifer M. Polinski, Aaron S. Kesselheim, Niteesh K. Choudhry, David 
Hutchins, Olga S. Matlin, Angela Tong, and William H. Shrank. 2013. “Patterns and 
Predictors of Generic Narrow Therapeutic Index Drug Use Among Older Adults.” 
Journal of the American Geriatrics Society, 61(9), 1586–1591. 
Gothe, H., I. Schall, K. Saverno, M. Mitrovic, A. Luzak, D. Brixner, and U. Siebert. 2015. “The 
Impact of Generic Substitution on Health and Economic Outcomes: A Systematic 
Review.” Applied Health Economics and Health Policy, 13(1), 21–33. 
Gottlieb, Scott. 2014. “FDA's Looming Decision on a Generic to Teva's Copaxone Reveals Drug 
Approval Woes.” Forbes, July 2. available at 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/scottgottlieb/2014/07/07/fdas-looming-decision-on-generic- 
copaxone-from-teva-reveals-drug-approval-woes/. 
Haas, Jennifer S., Kathryn A. Phillips, Eric P. Gerstenberger, & Andrew C. Seger. 2005. 
“Potential Savings from Substituting Generic Drugs for Brand-Name Drugs: Medical 
Expenditure Panel Survey, 1997–2000.” Annals of Internal Medicine, 142(11), 891–897. 
Heaney, Dominic C., and Josemir W. Sander. 2007. “Antiepileptic Drugs: Generic Versus 
Branded Treatments.” The Lancet Neurology, 6(5), 465–468. 
Hottinger, Michelle, and Bryan A. Liang. 2012. “Deficiencies of the FDA in Evaluating Generic 
Formulations: Addressing Narrow Therapeutic Index Drugs.” American Journal of Law 
and Medicine, 38(4), 667–689. 
  90 
Huskamp, Haiden A., Patricia A. Deverka, Arnold M. Epstein, Robert S. Epstein, Kimberly A. 
McGuigan, and Richard G. Frank. 2003. “The Effect of Incentive-Based Formularies on 
Prescription-Drug Utilization and Spending.” New England Journal of Medicine, 
349(23), 2224–2232. 
Junod, Suzanne White. 2014. FDA and Clinical Trials: A Short History, FOOD AND DRUG 
ADMINISTRATION, available at 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Overviews/ucm304485.htm#_edn52 
Kesselheim, Aaron S., Alexander S. Misono, Joy L. Lee, Margaret R. Stedman, M. Alan 
Brookhart, Niteesh K. Choudhry, and William H. Shrank. 2008. “Clinical Equivalence of 
Generic and Brand-Name Drugs used in Cardiovascular Disease: A Systematic Review 
and Meta-Analysis.” JAMA, 300(21), 2514–2526. 
Midha, Kamal K., and Gordon McKay. 2009. “Bioequivalence; Its History, Practice, and 
Future.” The AAPS Journal, 11(4), 664–670. 
Nabin, Munirul Haque, Vijay Mohan, Aaron Nicholas, and Pasquale M. Sgro. 2012. 
“Therapeutic Equivalence and the Generic Competition Paradox.” The BE Journal of 
Economic Analysis & Policy 12(1). 
Omojasola, Anthony, Mike Hernandez, Sujit Sansgiry, & Lovell Jones. 2012. “Perception of 
Generic Prescription Drugs and Utilization of Generic Drug Discount Programs.” 
Ethnicity & Disease, 22(4), 479. 
Reiffen, David, and Michael R. Ward. 2005. “Generic Drug Industry Dynamics.” Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 87(1), 37–49. 
Shrank, William H., Niteesh K. Choudhry, Jessica Agnew-Blais, Alex D. Federman, Joshua N. 
Liberman, Jun Liu, Aaron S. Kesselheim, M. Alan Brookhart, and Michael A. Fischer. 
  91 
2010. “State Generic Substitution Laws can Lower Drug Outlays under Medicaid.” 
Health Affairs, 29(7), 1383–1390. 
Shrank, William H., Margaret Stedman, Susan L. Ettner, Dee DeLapp, June Dirstine, M. Alan 
Brookhart, Michael A. Fischer, Jerry Avorn, and Steven M. Asch. 2007. “Patient, 
Physician, Pharmacy, and Pharmacy Benefit Design Factors Related to Generic 
Medication Use.” Journal of General Internal Medicine, 22(9), 1298–1304. 
Singh, Amrita, Nicole M. Maisch, and Maha Saad. 2014. “A Closer Look at Generic 
Interchangeability in Narrow Therapeutic Index Drugs.” U.S. Pharmacist, 39(6), Generic 
suppl. 8–12, available at http://www.uspharmacist.com/content/s/312/c/48990/. 
Yu, L. X., W. Jiang, X. Zhang, R. Lionberger, F. Makhlouf, D. J. Schuirmann, L. Muldowney, 
B. Davit, D. Conner, and J. Woodcock. 2015. “Novel Bioequivalence Approach for 
Narrow Therapeutic Index Drugs.” Clinical Pharmacology & Therapeutics 97(3): 286–
291. 
Yu, Lawrence X. 2011. “Quality and Bioequivalence Standards for Narrow Therapeutic Index 
Drugs.” FDA Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevel 
opedandApproved/ApprovalApplications/AbbreviatedNewDrugApplicationANDAGener 
ics/UCM292676.pdf#sthash.OJmCF9B4.dpuf.
  92 
VIII. Appendix 
Table A-1. Price Sensitivity by Payer, Fixed Effects, Tablets. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Total Payment Private Contribution Medicare Contribution Self Contribution Self Only Contribution Medicaid Contribution 
Panel A: Price Regressions 
NTI Status = 1 -3.013*** -1.847*** -2.409*** -0.369*** -2.885*** -1.048 
 
(0.313) (0.493) (0.574) (0.079) (0.357) (0.849) 
Generic Status = 1 -2.999*** -1.500*** -2.591*** -0.393*** -2.612*** -2.458*** 
 
(0.250) (0.354) (0.455) (0.058) (0.378) (0.465) 
NTI*Generic 2.968*** 1.496*** 2.658*** 0.290*** 2.536*** 2.418*** 
 
(0.272) (0.385) (0.482) (0.063) (0.397) (0.532) 
Drug Age -0.050*** -0.021** -0.016 -0.004* -0.022*** -0.079*** 
 
(0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.002) (0.007) (0.019) 
Competition -0.049*** -0.029** -0.022** -0.004** -0.035*** -0.037** 
 
(0.008) (0.012) (0.010) (0.002) (0.010) (0.015) 
Drug Strength/1000 2.606*** 1.228 2.356*** -0.035 0.142 1.419 
 
(0.525) (0.791) (0.901) (0.144) (0.545) (1.051) 
R-squared 0.554 0.380 0.553 0.051 0.587 0.262 
Panel B: ln(p+1) Regressions 
NTI Status = 1 -0.634*** -0.491*** -0.432*** -0.121*** -0.718*** -0.201 
 
(0.059) (0.106) (0.115) (0.024) (0.073) (0.164) 
Generic Status = 1 -0.661*** -0.421*** -0.539*** -0.143*** -0.650*** -0.486*** 
 
(0.041) (0.075) (0.078) (0.016) (0.073) (0.082) 
NTI*Generic 0.559*** 0.383*** 0.478*** 0.070*** 0.555*** 0.422*** 
 
(0.046) (0.084) (0.085) (0.018) (0.077) (0.100) 
Drug Age -0.009*** -0.005** -0.003 -0.001* -0.006*** -0.011*** 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) 
Competition -0.013*** -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.002*** -0.011*** -0.008*** 
 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) 
Drug Strength/1000 0.595*** 0.435*** 0.626*** -0.039 0.074 0.383** 
 
(0.078) (0.160) (0.172) (0.038) (0.105) (0.176) 
Observations 71,431 17,865 12,666 71,431 25,028 11,888 
R-squared 0.695 0.391 0.593 0.087 0.650 0.300 
Number of id 6,990 2,327 1,422 6,990 3,870 1,212 
Additional variables included but not reported are substance age, and indicators for Multum therapeutic classes, diagnosis code, mail pharmacies, missing 
strength, dosage form names, and year Robust standard errors are reported. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table A-2. Price Sensitivity by Payer, Adjustment for Rebates, (Tablets only), Fixed Effects. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Total Payment  Private Contribution Medicare Contribution Self Contribution Self Only Contribution Medicaid Contribution 
Panel A: Price Regressions 
NTI Status = 1 -2.167*** -1.402*** -1.715*** -0.254*** -2.225*** -0.483 
 
(0.264) (0.395) (0.476) (0.065) (0.288) (0.755) 
Generic Status = 1 -2.182*** -1.107*** -1.918*** -0.283*** -1.986*** -1.740*** 
 
(0.203) (0.283) (0.365) (0.047) (0.304) (0.382) 
NTI*Generic 2.116*** 1.089*** 1.940*** 0.182*** 1.896*** 1.686*** 
 
(0.221) (0.308) (0.386) (0.051) (0.320) (0.434) 
Drug Age -0.041*** -0.017** -0.013 -0.003** -0.018*** -0.063*** 
 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.001) (0.006) (0.016) 
Competition -0.041*** -0.024** -0.018** -0.003** -0.029*** -0.030*** 
 
(0.006) (0.010) (0.008) (0.001) (0.008) (0.012) 
Drug Strength/1000 2.176*** 1.050 2.017*** -0.040 0.181 1.066 
 
(0.426) (0.650) (0.730) (0.116) (0.434) (0.875) 
0.537 0.366 0.546 0.047 0.577 0.254 
Panel B: ln(p+1) Regressions 
NTI Status = 1 -0.505*** -0.417*** -0.337*** -0.082*** -0.605*** -0.119 
 
(0.057) (0.099) (0.111) (0.023) (0.069) (0.157) 
Generic Status = 1 -0.530*** -0.346*** -0.439*** -0.107*** -0.537*** -0.387*** 
 
(0.039) (0.069) (0.073) (0.015) (0.069) (0.077) 
NTI*Generic 0.427*** 0.307*** 0.375*** 0.035** 0.442*** 0.324*** 
 
(0.044) (0.077) (0.080) (0.017) (0.073) (0.094) 
Drug Age -0.009*** -0.005** -0.003 -0.001** -0.005*** -0.010*** 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
Competition -0.012*** -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.002*** -0.011*** -0.007*** 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) 
Drug Strength/1000 0.581*** 0.429*** 0.620*** -0.040 0.092 0.360** 
 
(0.075) (0.152) (0.165) (0.035) (0.101) (0.165) 
Observations 71,431 17,865 12,666 71,431 25,028 11,888 
R-squared 0.663 0.375 0.579 0.073 0.614 0.284 
Number of id 6,990 2,327 1,422 6,990 3,870 1,212 
Additional variables included but not are substance age, and indicators for Multum therapeutic classes, diagnosis code, mail pharmacies, missing strength, 
dosage form names, and year. Robust standard errors are reported.  Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table A-3. Price Sensitivity by Payer, Fixed Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Total Payment  Private Contribution Medicare Contribution Self Contribution Self Only Contribution Medicaid Contribution 
Panel A: Price Regressions 
NTI Status = 1 -5.761*** -7.750*** -3.127*** -0.837*** -3.199*** -10.132** 
 
(0.965) (2.254) (0.532) (0.206) (0.690) (4.072) 
Generic Status = 1 -3.336*** -2.676*** -3.245*** -0.663*** -2.718*** -4.317*** 
 
(0.297) (0.492) (0.382) (0.094) (0.471) (0.711) 
NTI*Generic 3.599*** 2.981*** 3.137*** 0.548*** 2.622*** 5.888*** 
 
(0.412) (0.705) (0.419) (0.114) (0.520) (1.426) 
Drug Age -0.070*** -0.089*** -0.049*** -0.010** -0.017 -0.130*** 
 
(0.015) (0.026) (0.011) (0.004) (0.013) (0.046) 
Competition -0.046*** -0.036*** -0.024** -0.004 -0.039*** -0.066*** 
 
(0.007) (0.013) (0.012) (0.002) (0.009) (0.014) 
Drug Strength/1000 -0.006 -0.543*** 0.002 0.014 0.056*** 0.085*** 
 
(0.016) (0.110) (0.002) (0.016) (0.017) (0.028) 
R-squared 0.681 0.729 0.648 0.156 0.767 0.717 
Panel B: ln(P) Regressions  
NTI Status = 1 -1.427*** -1.460*** -1.496*** -0.776*** -1.555*** -1.114*** 
 
(0.097) (0.291) (0.202) (0.094) (0.167) (0.258) 
Generic Status = 1 -1.298*** -1.179*** -1.474*** -0.871*** -1.370*** -1.273*** 
 
(0.062) (0.132) (0.127) (0.062) (0.143) (0.117) 
NTI*Generic 0.872*** 0.435* 1.078*** 0.504*** 0.944*** 0.926*** 
 
(0.075) (0.223) (0.153) (0.077) (0.161) (0.207) 
Drug Age -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.025*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.024*** 
 
(0.002) (0.007) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.007) 
Competition -0.017*** -0.011*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.024*** -0.018*** 
 
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) 
Drug Strength/1000 0.006 0.002 0.001 -0.000 0.019*** 0.036*** 
 
(0.006) (0.011) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.006) 
Observations 92,958 17,503 24,478 72,305 27,798 15,008 
R-squared 0.661 0.553 0.649 0.268 0.547 0.702 
Number of id 9,207 2,843 2,480 7,905 4,487 1,868 
Additional variables included but not are substance age, and indicators for Multum therapeutic classes, diagnosis code, mail pharmacies, missing strength, 
dosage form names, and year. Robust standard errors are reported. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. For consistency’s sake, Column (4) 
only includes observations with nonzero self-pay contributions (unlike Tables 2-5). 
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Table A-4. Price Sensitivity by Payer, Fixed Effects, Adjustment for Rebates. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Total Payment  Private Contribution Medicare Contribution Self Contribution Self Only Contribution Medicaid Contribution 
Panel A: Price Regressions 
NTI Status = 1 -4.383*** -5.976*** -2.330*** -0.609*** -2.462*** -7.694** 
 
(0.766) (1.803) (0.435) (0.162) (0.546) (3.232) 
Generic Status = 1 -2.474*** -1.959*** -2.428*** -0.487*** -2.067*** -3.198*** 
 
(0.237) (0.393) (0.308) (0.074) (0.375) (0.566) 
NTI*Generic 2.640*** 2.148*** 2.304*** 0.372*** 1.959*** 4.412*** 
 
(0.328) (0.565) (0.338) (0.091) (0.414) (1.128) 
Drug Age -0.058*** -0.073*** -0.042*** -0.009*** -0.014 -0.106*** 
 
(0.012) (0.021) (0.009) (0.003) (0.011) (0.036) 
Competition -0.037*** -0.028*** -0.019** -0.003 -0.031*** -0.053*** 
 
(0.005) (0.010) (0.009) (0.002) (0.007) (0.011) 
Drug Strength/1000 -0.004 -0.434*** 0.001 0.011 0.049*** 0.071*** 
 
(0.013) (0.088) (0.002) (0.013) (0.014) (0.022) 
0.676 0.722 0.641 0.154 0.764 0.714 
Panel B: ln(P) Regressions  
NTI Status = 1 -1.204*** -1.237*** -1.273*** -0.552*** -1.332*** -0.891*** 
 
(0.097) (0.291) (0.202) (0.094) (0.167) (0.258) 
Generic Status = 1 -1.075*** -0.956*** -1.251*** -0.647*** -1.147*** -1.050*** 
 
(0.062) (0.132) (0.127) (0.062) (0.143) (0.117) 
NTI*Generic 0.649*** 0.212 0.854*** 0.281*** 0.721*** 0.703*** 
 
(0.075) (0.223) (0.153) (0.077) (0.161) (0.207) 
Drug Age -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.025*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.024*** 
 
(0.002) (0.007) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.007) 
Competition -0.017*** -0.011*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.024*** -0.018*** 
 
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) 
Drug Strength/1000 0.006 0.002 0.001 -0.000 0.019*** 0.036*** 
 
(0.006) (0.011) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.006) 
Observations 92,958 17,503 24,478 72,305 27,798 15,008 
R-squared 0.630 0.525 0.618 0.232 0.513 0.674 
Number of id 9,207 2,843 2,480 7,905 4,487 1,868 
Additional variables included but not are substance age, and indicators for Multum therapeutic classes, diagnosis code, mail pharmacies, missing strength, 
dosage form names, and year.   Robust standard errors are reported. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. For consistency’s sake, Column (4) 
only includes observations with nonzero self-pay contributions (unlike Tables 2-5).  
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Table A-5. Price Sensitivity by Payer, Fixed Effects, Tablets. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Total Payment  Private Contribution Medicare Contribution Self Contribution Self Only Contribution Medicaid Contribution 
Panel A: Price Regressions 
NTI Status = 1 -3.010*** -1.714** -2.837*** -0.554*** -2.885*** -3.761*** 
 
(0.313) (0.668) (0.555) (0.105) (0.357) (1.069) 
Generic Status = 1 -2.998*** -1.816*** -3.541*** -0.618*** -2.612*** -3.939*** 
 
(0.250) (0.295) (0.518) (0.090) (0.378) (0.546) 
NTI*Generic 2.967*** 1.632*** 3.540*** 0.516*** 2.536*** 4.297*** 
 
(0.272) (0.342) (0.535) (0.099) (0.397) (0.720) 
Drug Age -0.050*** -0.019* -0.078*** -0.009*** -0.022*** -0.121*** 
 
(0.007) (0.012) (0.013) (0.002) (0.007) (0.027) 
Competition -0.049*** -0.027* -0.036** -0.005* -0.035*** -0.063*** 
 
(0.008) (0.014) (0.014) (0.003) (0.010) (0.017) 
Drug Strength/1000 2.613*** 1.695 3.873*** -0.016 0.142 1.777 
 
(0.525) (1.111) (1.179) (0.212) (0.545) (1.307) 
R-squared 0.554 0.557 0.560 0.089 0.587 0.508 
Panel B: ln(P) Regressions  
NTI Status = 1 -1.083*** -0.523 -1.009*** -0.477*** -1.525*** -0.582 
 
(0.127) (0.450) (0.267) (0.115) (0.194) (0.398) 
Generic Status = 1 -1.125*** -0.794*** -1.265*** -0.699*** -1.289*** -0.965*** 
 
(0.077) (0.168) (0.160) (0.072) (0.169) (0.164) 
NTI*Generic 0.713*** -0.005 0.943*** 0.345*** 0.876*** 0.568** 
 
(0.092) (0.258) (0.179) (0.086) (0.189) (0.255) 
Drug Age -0.014*** 0.005 -0.026*** -0.008*** -0.013*** -0.013 
 
(0.003) (0.010) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005) (0.010) 
Competition -0.027*** -0.030*** -0.025*** -0.016*** -0.027*** -0.027*** 
 
(0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) 
Drug Strength/1000 1.337*** 1.523*** 2.182*** -0.423** 0.601** 0.977*** 
 
(0.143) (0.371) (0.319) (0.182) (0.280) (0.300) 
Observations 71,403 11,813 18,180 56,228 25,028 10,497 
R-squared 0.611 0.490 0.617 0.167 0.445 0.665 
Number of id 6,989 1,939 2,050 6,209 3,870 1,148 
Additional variables included but not are substance age, and indicators for Multum therapeutic classes, diagnosis code, mail pharmacies, missing strength, 
dosage form names, and year.   Robust standard errors are reported. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. For consistency’s sake, Column (4) 
only includes observations with nonzero self-pay contributions (unlike Tables 2-5). 
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Table A-6. Price Sensitivity by Payer, Adjustment for Rebates, (Tablets only), Fixed Effects. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Total Payment  Private Contribution Medicare Contribution Self Contribution Self Only Contribution Medicaid Contribution 
Panel A: Price Regressions 
NTI Status = 1 -2.165*** -1.056* -2.076*** -0.390*** -2.225*** -2.455*** 
 
(0.264) (0.563) (0.463) (0.085) (0.288) (0.947) 
Generic Status = 1 -2.181*** -1.208*** -2.647*** -0.449*** -1.986*** -2.795*** 
 
(0.203) (0.243) (0.419) (0.072) (0.304) (0.448) 
NTI*Generic 2.115*** 0.996*** 2.619*** 0.346*** 1.896*** 3.043*** 
 
(0.221) (0.287) (0.433) (0.079) (0.320) (0.595) 
Drug Age -0.041*** -0.014 -0.066*** -0.007*** -0.018*** -0.096*** 
 
(0.006) (0.010) (0.011) (0.002) (0.006) (0.022) 
Competition -0.041*** -0.022** -0.029*** -0.004* -0.029*** -0.051*** 
 
(0.006) (0.011) (0.011) (0.002) (0.008) (0.014) 
Drug Strength/1000 2.183*** 1.474 3.233*** -0.031 0.181 1.324 
 
(0.426) (0.939) (0.939) (0.170) (0.434) (1.079) 
0.537 0.525 0.548 0.083 0.577 0.493 
Panel B: ln(P) Regressions  
NTI Status = 1 -0.860*** -0.300 -0.786*** -0.254** -1.302*** -0.359 
 
(0.127) (0.450) (0.267) (0.115) (0.194) (0.398) 
Generic Status = 1 -0.902*** -0.571*** -1.042*** -0.476*** -1.066*** -0.742*** 
 
(0.077) (0.168) (0.160) (0.072) (0.169) (0.164) 
NTI*Generic 0.489*** -0.229 0.720*** 0.122 0.653*** 0.345 
 
(0.092) (0.258) (0.179) (0.086) (0.189) (0.255) 
Drug Age -0.014*** 0.005 -0.026*** -0.008*** -0.013*** -0.013 
 
(0.003) (0.010) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005) (0.010) 
Competition -0.027*** -0.030*** -0.025*** -0.016*** -0.027*** -0.027*** 
 
(0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) 
Drug Strength/1000 1.337*** 1.523*** 2.182*** -0.423** 0.601** 0.977*** 
 
(0.143) (0.371) (0.319) (0.182) (0.280) (0.300) 
Observations 71,403 11,813 18,180 56,228 25,028 10,497 
R-squared 0.579 0.463 0.587 0.134 0.413 0.635 
Number of id 6,989 1,939 2,050 6,209 3,870 1,148 
Additional variables included but not are substance age, and indicators for Multum therapeutic classes, diagnosis code, mail pharmacies, missing strength, 
dosage form names, and year. Robust standard errors are reported.  Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. For consistency’s sake, Column (4) 
only includes observations with nonzero self-pay contributions (unlike Tables 2-5). 
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 Table A-7. Probability of Mixing in a Given Period, Probit. 
 (1) (2) 
   NTI -0.005 -0.054 
 (0.055) (0.063) 
Previous Mixed Period  0.636*** 
  (0.059) 
Mixed Previous Period*NTI  -0.161* 
  (0.090) 
   Observations 22,467 14,524 
Additional variables included but not reported are age, missing age, race, sex, education, 
and the number of drugs consumed in each individual-substance-period combination. 
Also included are indicators for Multum therapeutic class, and insurance coverage. 
Standard errors are clustered by individual. Each observation is an individual-substance-
period combination. Each version is defined as a unique product code. Only periods in 
which more than one drug is consumed are included.  Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table A-8 Predicted Probabilities of Mixing, from Table A-13 
  (1) (2) 
      
Non-NTI 0.103***  
 (0.00435)  
NTI 0.103***  
 (0.00615)  
Non-NTI, Previous No Mix   0.107*** 
  (0.00546) 
NTI, Previous No Mix   0.0982*** 
  (0.00653) 
Non-NTI, Previous Mix   0.262*** 
  (0.0181) 
NTI, Previous Mix   0.200*** 
  (0.0194) 
   
Observations 22,467 14,524 
The predicted probabilities in this table can be subtracted to approximate the marginal effects 
reported in Table A-13. For example, [(NTI, Previous Mix) – (non-NTI, Previous Mix)] –[(NTI, 
Previous No Mix) – (non-NTI, Previous No Mix)]= -.0532, which is similar to the coefficient on 
Previous Mixed Period*NTI in Table 6, column (2).  
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Table A-9. Version Loyalty: Probit. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
No Mix 
Mixed Brand-
Generic 
Mixed 
Brand Mixed Generic 
     NTI = 1 0.065 0.085 -0.429** -0.129* 
 
(0.063) (0.084) (0.184) (0.077) 
Lagged Consumption Bundles 
Previous Mixed Brand-Generic -0.842*** 1.072*** 
 
-0.014 
 
(0.101) (0.113) 
 
(0.133) 
Previous Mixed Brand -0.486*** 0.553** 0.986*** 
 
 
(0.133) (0.267) (0.146) 
 Previous Mixed Generic -0.571*** -0.472*** -0.606* 0.694*** 
 
(0.078) (0.170) (0.354) (0.080) 
Lagged Consumption Bundles–NTI Interactions 
NTI*Previous Mixed Brand-Generic 0.433*** -0.471*** 
 
0.164 
 
(0.139) (0.153) 
 
(0.202) 
NTI*Previous Mixed Brand 0.227 -0.921*** -0.205 
 
 
(0.205) (0.338) (0.214) 
 NTI*Previous Mixed Generic -0.078 -0.268 
 
0.327** 
 
(0.143) (0.329) 
 
(0.156) 
    
Observations 14,524 10,662 12,131 11,662 
Each column is a separate linear probability model. Additional variables included but not reported are age, 
missing age, sex, education, and the number of drugs consumed in each individual-substance-period 
combination. Also included are indicators for Multum therapeutic class, and insurance coverage. Standard errors 
are clustered by individual. Each observation is an individual-substance-period combination. Each version is 
defined as a unique product code.  Only periods in which more than one drug is consumed are included. 
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Each column has different observations: for Column (1) 
only substances more than one version are included. For Column (2), I exclude substances that have no generic 
versions or no brand versions since this necessarily mixes brand and generic versions. Column (3) only uses 
substances with more than one brand versions and column (4), only substances with more than one generic 
version.  
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Table A-10 Predicted Probabilities from Table 15. 
Predicted Probabilities Unmixed 
Mixed Brand-
Generic 
Mixed 
Brand 
Mixed 
Generic 
Non-NTI # Previous Unmixed 0.892*** 0.0464*** 0.0342*** 0.0642*** 
 
(0.00550) (0.00466) (0.00799) (0.00382) 
Non-NTI # Previous Mixed Brand-
Generic 0.669*** 0.262*** 
 
0.0626*** 
 
(0.0344) (0.0352) 
 
(0.0151) 
Non-NTI # Previous Mixed Brand 0.781*** 0.126** 0.174*** 
 
 
(0.0372) (0.0544) (0.0375) 
 Non-NTI # Previous Mixed Generic 0.757*** 0.0163** 0.00907 0.189*** 
 
(0.0229) (0.00668) (0.00810) (0.0190) 
NTI # Previous Unmixed 0.903*** 0.0550*** 0.0137*** 0.0506*** 
 
(0.00647) (0.00496) (0.00219) (0.00561) 
NTI # Previous Mixed Brand-Generic 0.819*** 0.155*** 
 
0.0667*** 
 
(0.0244) (0.0235) 
 
(0.0183) 
NTI # Previous Mixed Brand 0.854*** 0.0253** 0.0660*** 
 
 
(0.0356) (0.0120) (0.0212) 
 NTI # Previous Mixed Generic 0.753*** 0.0103 
 
0.242*** 
 
(0.0346) (0.00747) 
 
(0.0352) 
The predicted probabilities after the probit regression in Table A-15 correspond to the marginal effects 
listed in the linear probability models. For example, the difference in likelihood of consumed an unmixed 
bundle is 0.011 between NTI#Previous Unmixed and non-NTI#Previous Unmixed (.903-.892). This 
corresponds to the coefficient on NTI in Table 5, Column(1). Similarly, NTI#Previous Mixed Brand-
Generic – non-NTI# Previous Mixed Brand-Generic = 0.15, similar to the sum of the coefficients on 
NTI*Previous Mixed Brand-Generic and NTI (0.148+0. 013) in Table 5, Column (1).  
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CHAPTER 3 
RELINQUISHMENT OF INAPPROPRIATE OFF-LABEL USES: THE EFFECT OF THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT75 
I. Introduction 
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) does not approve every prescription drug use 
currently taken by patients. The FDA does not prohibit physicians from prescribing drugs for 
unapproved uses, a practice called prescribing “off-label.”  Off-label prescriptions are highly 
prevalent: almost 50% of cardiac therapy and anticonvulsant prescriptions, and over 30% of anti-
asthmatic, allergy therapy, and psychiatric therapy prescriptions, are for off-label uses (Radley et 
al. 2006). Physicians have considerable autonomy in prescribing drugs off label, as they are free 
to use their expertise to adopt and relinquish off-label treatments.   
 Since the legal regime governing off-label drug use affords physicians so much freedom, 
it relies on physicians to accurately evaluate new information about off-label innovations, adopt 
beneficial innovations, and relinquish inappropriate ones. For the purposes of this Chapter, an 
off-label use is “inappropriate” if it is ineffective, unsafe, or both. The risk that an off-label use is 
unsafe or ineffective, however, is often ambiguous. Since companies do not submit these uses for 
FDA approval, there is often little published evidence supporting such uses. In a survey of 
nationally representative drug data, Radley et al. (2006) estimate that only 27% of off-label uses 
studied were supported by strong scientific evidence.  
Prescribing drugs with uncertain risks is not inherently bad; restricting access only to 
drugs with precisely known risks can harm patients by depriving them of potentially helpful 
																																																								
75 This Chapter is an extension and revision of a previous working paper under the citation 
Learning About Ineffectiveness: Physicians’ Prescription Decisions Regarding Off-Label Drug 
Uses (October 20, 2014). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2469191 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2469191. Parts of unpublished prior work were also incorporated 
into the draft.   
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treatments (Abbott and Ayres 2014a; Abbott and Ayres 2014b; Viscusi and Zeckhauser 2015). 
Ambiguity is also not insurmountable—physicians can update their beliefs about ambiguously 
risky treatments based on new patient outcomes or scientific information as it becomes available. 
Appropriate updating, however, depends on physicians using reliable information.   
Whether physicians can distinguish between reliable and unreliable information is a real 
concern. First, physicians receive a lot of information daily, making it is difficult to critically 
analyze each new piece of information. Second, physicians’ reliance on one-on-one interactions 
with pharmaceutical representatives may outweigh their reliance on scientific studies. The latter 
point is particularly troubling because pharmaceutical companies have an incentive to encourage 
off-label prescriptions: off-label sales are highly profitable because pharmaceutical companies do 
not incur the cost of supplemental FDA approval and are able to reach a larger market.  
Given the overwhelming amount of information physicians receive, along with their 
receptiveness to information from pharmaceutical representatives, do physicians learn when to 
adopt or relinquish inappropriate off-label treatments? If so, what sources of information are 
physicians most responsive to?  
 The importance of these questions is two-fold. First, insufficient relinquishment of 
inappropriate uses results in monetary waste: insurers end up paying for ineffective treatments 
and passing those costs to their clients. Second, insufficient relinquishment increases the 
likelihood that patients receive suboptimal medical care. If physicians fail to relinquish 
inappropriate treatments, patients lose the opportunity to try more appropriate treatments. 
 The government has tried to penalize pharmaceutical companies for promoting off-label 
uses of their drugs through the use of False Claims Act (FCA) lawsuits. The FCA prohibits 
fraudulent submission of claims to the government for reimbursement (31 U.S.C. §§ 3729, 3730; 
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Eichel 2011). While the FCA was originally passed in 1863 as a way to prevent profiteering 
during the Civil War (Eichel 2011), it has recently been used to curb off-label promotion.  
This Chapter discusses the possibility that the FCA can serve as a source of information 
for physicians and third-party payers regarding the appropriateness of an off-label use. This can 
be done in one of two ways: First, the FCA can bring to attention public, but obscure, scientific 
information on inappropriate off-label uses. Second, the FCA suit can publicize internal 
information regarding a pharmaceutical company’s fraudulent conduct. The FCA has a 
whistleblower provision, which awards whistleblowers a portion of the resulting fine. This 
provides incentives for employees to publicize internal information that might not have 
otherwise come to light. Thus, the False Claims Act process could act as a source of information 
for physicians and third-party payers by advertising the inappropriateness of the use.  
Despite the potential for the FCA to operate as a source of information, the particulars of 
its execution can undermine this role. First, if the FCA is used against both inappropriate and 
appropriate off-label uses, the informational value of the suit might be mitigated. Second, if the 
FCA requirements for recovering against pharmaceutical companies are too easily satisfied, there 
might be heterogeneity in response of payers to news of FCA suit. While private payers might 
incorporate any informational content into their reimbursement decisions, Medicare and 
Medicaid might not be as responsive. This may be because the FCA provides a source of 
reimbursement for their loss. Alternatively, Medicare and Medicaid may be less able to monitor 
or to refuse to reimburse certain uses. While recovery through the FCA addresses the issue of 
monetary waste that the government experiences, it does not alleviate the medical opportunity 
cost that a patient could have received better treatment earlier.  
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This Chapter examines whether the FCA practically functions as a source of information 
about the appropriateness of an off-label use and measures the effect of FCA settlement on 
relinquishment of particular off-label uses.  Part II gives some background on the regulation of 
off-label uses and how the False Claims Act is used in this context, and Part III discusses the 
theoretical model underlying this Chapter’s analysis. Part IV empirically examines the issue by 
studying prescriptions of anticonvulsants and antipsychotics from 2005 to 2010. It finds evidence 
of relinquishment of off-label uses after FCA settlement. Part V supplements this analysis with a 
case study of neurontin, one of the first off-label promotion FCA cases to settle. It studies 
relinquishment in response to scientific and legal information shocks and finds that there is 
considerable heterogeneity by payer in response to these information shocks, although the 
response seems to correspond to the FCA suit more than to scientific studies. Part VI concludes.  
II. The Current Landscape of Off-Label Drug Use 
The regulation of off-label uses of drugs is as important for patient care as it is complex. 
This section defines and discusses the issues surrounding off-label usage and then discusses the 
mechanism the government primarily uses to regulate it, the False Claims Act.  
A. The Importance of Appropriate Off-Label Usage 
The FDA studies the safety and effectiveness of prescription drugs for specific diseases 
(“indications”), dosages, and populations through several phases of controlled study (FDA 
2012). Not all drug uses go through this process. The practice of prescribing a drug for 
indications, dosages, and populations for which it has not undergone FDA approval is called 
prescribing “off label” (Wittich et al. 2012).  Appropriate off-label drug use requires that 
physicians incorporate new scientific evidence about the safety and effectiveness of drugs into 
their prescription decisions. The FDA does not regulate physicians’ off-label drug prescriptions 
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but instead places restrictions on manufacturers’ advertisements of off-label uses (FDA 2009; 
FDA 2014). Pharmaceutical manufacturers that violate these restrictions often face False Claims 
Act suits, which can result in large monetary penalties. Examples of such offenders include 
Warner Lambert, which illegally marketed neurontin for the treatment of bipolar disorder (DOJ 
2004), and Eli Lilly, which marketed zyprexa for the treatment of dementia (Fisk, Lopatto, and 
Feeley 2012).  
Physicians are allowed to prescribe drugs for off label uses. Prescription practices are 
limited by medical malpractice liability: physicians are liable for any deviations from the 
“acceptable and prevailing standard of practice” in prescribing drugs off label, just as they are for 
on-label drugs (Riley & Basilius 2007, p.27).  Physicians prescribing drugs off label are not 
presumed to be negligent; in fact, several off-label drugs uses are so prevalent that they are 
considered the standard of care (for example, aspirin for coronary disease prophylaxis) (Wittich 
et al. 2012).   
Given that off-label drug uses do not go through FDA-mandated systematic scrutiny for 
the off-label use, some are concerned that these uses are not medically appropriate.  As noted 
earlier, Radley et al. (2006) find that only 27% of off-label uses are supported by strong 
scientific evidence.76  The lack of publicly available scientific evidence does not necessarily 
mean that off-label treatments are inappropriate. Suggestive scientific evidence can provide 
support for off-label treatments. If an off-label drug belongs to the same class as a drug already 
approved for the indication, physicians may expect the drug to perform similarly (Stafford 2008).  
																																																								
76 Radley et al. (2006, p.1022) clarify that “An indication was considered to be scientifically 
supported if, according to DRUGDEX, its effectiveness has been shown in controlled trials or 
observed in clinical settings. All other indications that lacked FDA approval or that did not meet 
the criteria for having scientific support were considered to be off-label with little or no scientific 
support.” 
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Similarly, if two indications have similar symptoms, physicians may expect a treatment for one 
indication to relieve symptoms in the other indication. Such evidence is merely suggestive, 
however; without systematic study, physicians do not have any assurance of the appropriateness 
of a drug for an off-label use.  
Even if such systematic studies were available, it is unclear whether physicians would 
find them and whether they would be the predominant information source.  There is a large 
literature on physician information needs and their ability to find relevant information. Covell et 
al. (1985) survey physicians regarding their information needs and find that physicians cited 
insufficient time as the most frequently reported barrier to finding necessary information.  Ely et 
al. (2005) also find that insufficient time was a reason physicians only looked for answers to 
about 55% of the questions that they had. In a survey of physicians regarding their information 
needs, Williamson et al. (1989) find that physicians have difficulty locating appropriate studies 
to resolve questions of treatment choice. Even if physicians locate the study, 87% of the polled 
physicians assess study validity by comparing the results to their own experiences, rather than by 
evaluating the study’s methodology.77 A recent study found more optimistic results. Kesselheim 
et al. (2012) give 503 physicians three journal abstracts each and ask them to evaluate the 
methodological rigor of each. They also asked for the likelihood that, based on the evidence, 
physicians would prescribe a given drug. 269 physicians responded, and most seemed able to 
assess the relative rigor of the studies. Moreover, physicians seemed to discount studies that 
received funding by pharmaceutical companies. There may be some concern that this is not a 
representative finding, however, given the low response rate.  
																																																								
77 Johnson (2007) provides an in-depth discussion of the issues regarding physician learning.  
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“Pharmaceutical detailing,” where pharmaceutical representatives personally promote a 
drug to a physician, is another source of information for physicians’ treatment decisions (Chan et 
al. 2013; Chintagunta, Goettler, and Kim 2012). This line of literature sees pharmaceutical 
detailing as a legitimate avenue of information dissemination, even though legal promotion of 
off-label uses is limited, and fraud is frequent. Pharmaceutical companies are frequently fined for 
distributing false or misleading evidence about off-label uses of their drugs (DOJ 2004; Fisk, 
Lopatto, and Feeley 2012).78 It is unclear whether or not physicians anticipate this difference in 
information value. 
If physicians do encounter reliable information on off-label drug use, the process by 
which they stop prescribing an inappropriate use is called “relinquishment.” Previous literature 
suggests that there is substantial heterogeneity in relinquishment.  In a study of an unsafe drug in 
the British market, Mapes (1977) finds that after journals published news of the drug’s adverse 
effects, physicians did not reduce their prescriptions uniformly. Physicians were less likely to 
relinquish if the physician started practicing while the drug was still considered a good treatment 
or if the physician attended fewer post-graduate medical courses. Additionally, physicians who 
are more likely to consider a patient’s social surroundings and environment continued to 
prescribe the drug. In contrast, Majumdar et al. (2001) finds that relinquishment is not different 
between generalists and specialists.  
This study extends this relinquishment literature to off-label uses. Off-label drugs may 
not experience the same pattern of relinquishment as on-label drugs because the FDA does not 
																																																								
78 While pharmaceutical representatives were originally unable to promote off-label uses legally, 
the FDA has created “safe harbors” of activities that would not be considered illegal off-label 
promotion (FDA 2009; FDA 2014). Given the current First Amendment litigation over off-label 
promotion as protected commercial free speech (Robertson 2014; Greene 2014; Philip 2014), the 
realm of legal off-label promotion is undefined now, but presumably larger.  
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issue industry-wide warnings or notices for off-label uses of drugs. This might suggest that 
another visible, quasi-regulatory notice, such as litigation, is necessary. This Chapter discusses 
whether such a signal seems to be effective and under what circumstances such a signal might 
even be desirable.  
B. Regulating Off-Label Uses through the False Claims Act 
Given the potential for information regarding off-label uses to be unreliable, the 
government has sought to reduce the freedom with which pharmaceutical companies can 
promote off-label uses. The government first tried to make off-label promotion illegal per se 
under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), labeling it a misbranding violation.79 This 
pathway has recently been attacked on First Amendment grounds. In a recent case, United States 
v. Caronia,80 the Second Circuit ruled that truthful off-label promotion was protected as 
commercial free speech. Critics have questioned whether the court was warranted in granting 
such protection without requiring pharmaceutical companies to prove that their speech was not 
false or misleading (Robertson 2014); others acknowledge the potential pitfalls of having a broad 
truthfulness definition but suggest that requiring a significantly narrower definition indirectly 
through speech constraints might be too burdensome, especially subject to criminal sanctions 
(Philip 2014).  Others suggest that the government should specifically allege that off-label 
promotion is false or misleading (Greene 2014). Caronia was not the final word on First 
Amendment protections of off-label promotion; in 2015, the Southern District of New York 
																																																								
79 21 U.S.C. § 331 (a)–(c) (2012) (“(a) The introduction or delivery for introduction into 
interstate commerce of any food, drug, device, tobacco product, or cosmetic that is adulterated or 
misbranded. (b) The adulteration or misbranding of any food, drug, device, tobacco product, or 
cosmetic in interstate commerce. (c) The receipt in interstate commerce of any food, drug, device, 
tobacco product, or cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded, and the delivery or proffered 
delivery thereof for pay or otherwise.”). 
80 United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012). 
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faced a similar case (Gibbons 2015). The FDA tried to distinguish Caronia by saying that “it 
does not read Caronia to preclude a misbranding action where the acts to promote off-label use 
consist solely of truthful and non-misleading speech, provided that the evidence also shows that 
the drug had been introduced into interstate commerce and that the FDA had not approved it as 
safe and effective for the off-label use.”81 The District Court rejected this argument, further 
suggesting that truthful speech alone cannot be used as a predicate action for misbranding. Much 
has been written about the validity of First Amendment challenges in this context; the state of 
this law is still in flux, but the future use of misbranding to limit off-label promotion is uncertain.  
For these reasons, this Chapter will focus on the second, more lucrative way of policing off-label 
uses: the False Claims Act.    
The False Claims Act (FCA) was enacted during the Civil War in order to enable the 
government to recover losses from fraud; recently, however, it has been used to punish 
promotion of off-label uses (31 U.S.C. §§ 3729, 3730; Blair 2010). FCA liability is triggered 
when someone “knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for 
payment or approval.”82 The FCA is particularly unique in its qui tam provision, which allows a 
whistleblower with knowledge of fraud83 to bring suit on behalf of the government (Eichel 
2011). The whistleblower, in turn, receives a percentage of the resulting penalty. The qui tam 
provision results in two benefits: First, it reduces the resources the government has to spend on 
litigation, since the government receives a cut of the award regardless of whether or not it 
																																																								
81 Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., No. 15 CIV. 3588 PAE, 2015 WL 
4720039, at *22 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2015). 
82 31 U.S.C. § 3729.  
83 31 U.S.C. § 3730. 
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chooses to intervene,84 Second, whistleblowers, especially employees or insiders, are able to 
provide internal information about fraud (Eichel 2011).  
Recently, the FCA has been used to sanction pharmaceutical companies for off-label 
promotion. The government seeks to recover for prescriptions submitted to Medicaid and 
Medicare for reimbursement when the pharmaceutical company promotes off-label uses (Blair 
2010). FCA suits are highly lucrative and increasingly prevalent;85 however, the theory of 
liability in the off-label promotion context is not intuitive. There are at least two possible theories 
of liability: First, a pharmaceutical company can be liable for making a false claim about the 
safety and effectiveness of an off-label use, which induces the physician to submit the claim for 
reimbursement from the government (Eichel 2011). Second, the Franklin v. Parke Davis court 
suggested that truthful information about an off-label use can also be the basis for FCA liability 
as long as the off-label promotion induces claims that are ineligible for reimbursement to be 
submitted to the government (Eichel 2011).86    
This second theory is problematic, especially as it possibly triggers the same First 
Amendment issues as misbranding. If restricting truthful off-label promotion violates the First 
Amendment in the misbranding context, does it violate the First Amendment in the context of the 
False Claims Act?87 The government has contended that these two areas are distinct. Rogoff, 
Mayell, and Ramer (2014) note that the government filed a Statement of Interest in U.S. ex rel. 																																																								
84 31 U.S.C. § 3730 b(1), (d). Notably, there may be some difference between cases in which the 
government chooses to intervene or not. The differential effect of such cases might be interesting 
to explore in the future.  
85 From 2004 to 2010, twenty-one off-label marketing cases have allowed the government to 
recover $7.9 billion in criminal fines and civil settlement (Blair 2010).  
86 U.S. ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, Div. of Warner-Lambert Co., No. CIV.A. 96-11651PBS, 
2003 WL 22048255, at *2 (D. Mass. Aug. 22, 2003). 
87 Greene and Noah (2014) also questions whether the Caronia decision will affect FCA 
prosecutions, as “whistleblowers have repeatedly pointed to off-label promotion as a basis for 
triggering prosecution even where the FDA later approved some of these uses.”  
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Cestra v. Cephalon, Inc., distinguishing it based on the fact that the FCA “prohibits any conduct 
that causes the submission of false claims to the government. . .” Rogoff, Mavell, and Ramer 
note that “[a]ccording to the government, even if that conduct is carried out through truthful 
speech — the same speech that Caronia holds may be constitutionally protected under the FDCA 
— FCA liability could still attach.” It is unclear how persuasive this argument actually is.  
Notwithstanding the First Amendment concerns with the FCA, there are other issues with 
using the FCA to curb inappropriate off-label drug use. The FCA is a very broad statute, made 
even broader by the enactment of the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act (FERA) (Eichel 
2011).  After the Supreme Court tried to limit the scope of the FCA through Allison Engine v. 
Sanders,88 Congress passed FERA to expand the scope of the FCA.  In particular, FERA 
removed the requirement that the government “establish a direct link between a false statement 
and the eventual government payment of the claim” (Eichel 2011 p. 428). FERA also clarified 
the materiality element of the FCA, defining materiality as “having a natural tendency to 
influence, or be capable of influencing, the payment or receipt of money or property.” 89  While 
this did establish that materiality is required for an FCA claim, the “natural tendency” standard 
has been criticized for being too vague and too broad (Hoffman 2009).  
Given this background, it is possible that FCA may not actually serve as a source of 
information for physicians and third-party payers. First, given the Franklin v. Parke Davis 
interpretation of FCA requirements, an FCA claim may be able to be brought based on truthful 
																																																								
88 Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662 (2008). 
89 31 U.S.C. § 3729 b(4).   
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statements. If this is true, the FCA can be equally enforced against appropriate and inappropriate 
off-label uses, making the signal value of the FCA suit less informative.90  
Even if the FCA claim was predicated on a false claim, the legal standards for bringing 
the claim are important. Given the expansion of the FCA, the vague definition of materiality, and 
the high stakes for continuing litigation, manufacturers may settle cases in which the off-label 
uses are not actually medically inappropriate. This also would reduce the informational value of 
the suit. Similarly, the legal standards may determine public third-party payers’ incentives to 
prospectively screen out inappropriate off-label uses for reimbursement. Because of the relative 
ease with which an FCA claim can be brought—and generally settled—the government may be 
less sensitive to distributing information on off-label appropriateness because they know they 
can recoup their monetary losses through suit. On the other hand, the legal standards of the FCA 
may be a result of the Medicare’s lack of flexibility to monitor drug usage. Medicaid and 
Medicare may also be statutorily less able to revise their reimbursement policies than private 
payers.  
The rest of the Chapter empirically tests whether settlement of FCA suits actually leads to 
relinquishment of off-label uses. The next Section outlines the theoretical model underlying the 
role of the FCA as a source of information.  
III. Theoretical Model 
The following analyses rely on a very basic drug choice model. In the basic supply side 
treatment choice model (Chandra et al. 2011), physicians make prescription choices based on the 
																																																								
90 Presumably, physicians would catch on to this weakening signal if off-label uses that they 
know are well-established or successful become subject to the FCA. Pharmaceutical companies 
could also build this narrative by focusing on technical violations of the FCA and suggesting that 
the government is simply greedy.  
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patient’s perceived utility and any net benefit to themselves. Assuming that the physician is a 
perfect agent of the patient, utility91 can be formalized as 
(1) !!"# = !!" !! , ! + !! − !! + !! 
for treatment choice k by physician p for patient i.  denotes expected patient benefit and is a 
function of patient characteristics, , and the information the physician receives, I. !!is a 
physician-specific random error.   
 A physician compares (1) for all drugs. She prescribes drug j when  for all k, 
choosing drug j when 
(2)  
Physicians estimate , the patient’s benefit, which is a function of patient 
characteristics, , and available information, .  is the individual’s income and  is the 
price of drug j.  is a function of information shocks and physician learning patterns.  The 
Bayesian learning process, I, can be formalized as  
 where  is the prior belief of the drug’s appropriateness and  is the risk 
implied by new information given by information shock . The weights on the priors and new 
information are denoted by  and , respectively.92  
The Chapter hypothesizes that the FCA functions as a source of information for 
physicians and payers, essentially as . As stated previously, the FCA can provide new 
																																																								
91 Chandra et al. (2011) assume that the physician has perfect knowledge. I add the I element to 
symbolize learning by the physician.  
92 Viscusi (1997) discusses this Bayesian learning process in the context of ambiguity.  
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information in one of two ways: the FCA suit can publicize already-existing but obscure 
scientific information or can uncover new information through the whistleblower provisions. 
Specifically, the Chapter hypothesizes that after settlement of an FCA claim, the number of 
inappropriate off-label uses should decline.  
Second, as noted in Section 0, if different payers are incentivized to be sensitive to such 
sources of information to varying degrees, the Chapter hypothesizes that relative relinquishment 
of inappropriate off-label uses should differ by payer. Payers can influence treatment decisions in 
two ways: 1) they can refuse to reimburse a treatment (or as a less extreme option, can place the 
drug on a more expensive tier in their formulary) or 2) they can influence treatment by making 
“preferred” treatment guidelines. The former can affect the treatment decision by making the 
treatment marginally more expensive and less attractive. The former can also serve as a signal 
from the payer that they do not value a particular use. The latter allows the payer to be another 
source of information for physicians, such that it can persuade physicians that a use is 
inappropriate through research conducted by its PBM.  
The rest of the Chapter tests these hypotheses. Section IV examines the average effect of 
relinquishment over numerous FCA settlements. Section V examines the FCA suit over 
neurontin as a case study to understand the intricacies of the relinquishment process in a 
particular circumstance. 
IV. Average Effect of FCA Suits on Relinquishment 
As discussed in Section 0, the FCA has the potential to be an information source for 
physicians and third-party payers in order to relinquish inappropriate off-label uses. This 
potential signal, however, may be dulled by the broad execution of the statute. This section 
examines the average relinquishment effect caused by FCA settlements over multiple suits. This 
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has the advantage of not overly relying on the timeline of one drug; instead, it estimates the 
average effect of FCA settlement on relinquishment for a particular subset of drugs. This Section 
finds that there is a significant decrease in off-label prescriptions associated with the settlement 
of FCA claims.  
A.  Data 
This section uses data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) 2005–2010.93 
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services publishes MEPS, drawing from a nationally 
representative subsample of households participating in the prior year’s National Health 
Interview Survey (NHIS). MEPS surveys families and individuals, their medical providers, and 
employers about medical expenditures and provides information on demographic characteristics, 
health conditions, insurance, medical expenditures, and sources of payment.  
The MEPS data are linked to FDA data by National Drug Code (NDC), 94 in order to 
incorporate larger “substance” groups that incorporate generic and brand-name versions of the 
same drug. Using data from the Full Year Consolidated File subcomponent of MEPS, I 
determine whether the person buying the drug expects prescription drug coverage from a 
particular source, including Medicare, Medicaid, private insurance, Veteran’s Affairs, state and 
local coverage, other, unknown, or no drug coverage.  
In order to capture years in which no prescriptions were purchased, I merge the year–
coverage–diagnosis code categories with a full-factorial matrix of year–coverage–off-label 
categories for each substance and impute categories with zero prescriptions. I drop observations 
																																																								
93 The years 2005–2010 were chosen because MEPS provides a variable indicating “expected 
payer for prescription drug” during this period.  
94 This data was downloaded in June 2015. The FDA NDC database can be found at 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/InformationOnDrugs/ucm142438.htm. 
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that have no prescriptions in any substance–coverage–off-label status over any years. This leaves 
2,898 substance–year–coverage–off-label status observations.  
This study focuses on two classes of drugs: anticonvulsants and antipsychotics.95 These 
classes were chosen because there were multiple anticonvulsants and antipsychotics subject to 
FCA suit for off-label promotion during the studied time. The following drugs were studied as 
those subject to FCA suit during this period (with the date of settlement in parentheses): abilify 
(2007), gabitril (2008),96 zyprexa (2009), geodon (2009), and lyrica (2009).97 While MEPS 
provides therapeutic class categories, these may not be stable over a long period of time. In order 
to accommodate such fluctuations, I follow a group of drugs considered anticonvulsants or 
antipsychotics in 2008 over time. This ensures that I see a stable group of anticonvulsants and 
antipsychotics agents.  
Finally, relinquishment should spur relinquishment of off-label uses. In order to measure 
this, I have to determine which uses are off-label. I do this by using the drug compendium 
DRUGDEX. DRUGDEX lists the uses of the drug that are approved by the FDA. Each listing 
was then matched to an ICD-9 code.98 Then, the ICD-9 codes provided by MEPS for each 
prescription purchase are linked to the matched ICD-9 code. Any purchase whose ICD-9 codes 
do not match the ones implied by the approved uses is considered an off-label treatment for the 
purposes of the study. 
																																																								
95 These classes were delineated according to Multum Lexicon Class.  
96 Gabatril was not found in my data.  
97 A few drugs experienced a settlement in 2010 (seroquel, topamax, trileptal, and zonegran); 
however, since the data stops at 2010, I cannot estimate a Settlement effect for these. These drugs 
were found by searching the Department of Justice archives under “False Claims Act” and “Off-
label.” I also looked at cases listed in Westlaw to ensure I found all the settled cases.  
98 This mapping is available upon request. 
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Settlement should only spur relinquishment for inappropriate off-label uses. An off-label 
use that is known to be appropriate should not be relinquished following settlement. This 
analysis cannot yet distinguish between appropriate and inappropriate uses. However, the 
analysis uses the current DRUGDEX database to code off-label uses, meaning that some of the 
current on-label uses may have been off-label at the time of prescription. This means that the 
uses coded as off-label are those that still had not received approval several years later, 
suggesting that the flagged off-label uses are marginally more likely to be inappropriate uses 
than if concurrent information was used.   
B. Differences-in-Differences Analysis 
This section measures the effect of an FCA claim settlement on the number of 
prescriptions of a drug. It does this by comparing the number of prescriptions for drugs that are 
subject to an FCA claim to those which are not, before and after settlement, a technique called 
difference-in-differences. Since FCA settlement date varies for each drug, I create an indicator 
variable, Settlement, which takes the value of one in the period after settlement for each drug 
subject to such suit (e.g., after 2007 for abilify; after 2008 for gabatril; and after 2009 for 
zyprexa, geodon, and lyrica). Specifically, for drugs that were subject to FCA settlement during 
the period, Settlement is zero before settlement and is one after settlement. For drugs that were 
not subject to FCA settlement during this period, Settlement is always zero. The following 
equation is estimated: 
(3) #!"#$%"&'(&)*$!"#$ = !!!"##$"!"#$!"#$ +  !!!""#$%&' + !!!"##$"%"&#!"×!""#$%&' + !! +  !! + !. 
The dependent variable is the number of prescriptions, by year y, payer p, off-label status w, and 
drug d. Settlement is defined above and is considered the difference-in-differences estimator. 
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!""#$%&' is an indicator variable for whether the use was considered an off-label use. Year 
indicator variables are included in !!, controlling for periods before and after FCA settlement, 
and drug indicator variables are included in !!.  
The coefficient !!captures the effect of Settlement on on-label prescriptions. I 
hypothesize that this should be zero, as the FCA settlement provides no new information on 
already-approved uses. The coefficient of interest is !!, which should capture the effect of 
Settlement on off-label prescriptions relative to on-label prescriptions. I expect , which 
would indicate that the relinquishment effect from FCA settlement is stronger for off-label 
prescriptions than for on-label prescriptions.  Table	1 reports the results of the average effect of FCA settlement on relinquishment. 
Columns (1) and (2) stratify by drug, year, off-label status, and payer. Column (1) uses the 
number of prescriptions while Column (2) uses the ln(prescription +1).99 The coefficient on 
OffLabel is negative, indicating that as a whole, off-label uses are less prevalent than on-label 
uses. Settlement signifies the drop in on-label prescriptions of drugs subject to FCA suits after 
settlement. This coefficient is positive and significant. This coefficient was originally 
hypothesized to be zero; however the significance might be explained by companies anticipating 
losing revenue on off-label uses and increasing detailing efforts for on-label uses.  
																																																								
99 Ln(Prescription + 1) is used because some periods/observations have zero prescriptions. These 
periods are important to preserve to accurately understand the fluctuations in prescriptions.  
γ3 < 0
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Table 1. Number of Prescriptions by Payer and Year, 2005–2010: OLS Regressions. 
 Differential Treatment Effect Triple Differences 
 Prescriptions ln(Prescriptions+1) Prescriptions ln(Prescriptions+1) 
Settlement 2.471e+05*** 8.893e-01* 2.583e+05*** 1.063e+00** 
 (8.319e+04) (5.096e-01) (8.400e+04) (5.314e-01) 
OffLabel -2.283e+05*** -1.357e+00*** -2.004e+05*** -1.793e+00*** 
 (1.648e+04) (1.715e-01) (3.602e+04) (4.322e-01) 
Settlement* OffLabel -3.391e+05*** -1.173e+00** -3.654e+05*** -1.559e+00*** 
 (8.767e+04) (4.736e-01) (8.941e+04) (5.872e-01) 
Indicators for Substance  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Indicators for Year  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
OffLabel-FCA Interactions   Yes Yes 
OffLabel-Year Interactions   Yes Yes 
     
Observations 2,898 2,898 2,898 2,898 
R-squared 0.406 0.446 0.407 0.447 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Variables included but 
not shown are indicators for off-label status, Multum Therapeutic class, year, and substance. For Columns (3) and (4), 
FCA is an indicator variable that takes a value of one for any drug that was subject to FCA suit during this period. 
Controls for coverage type are also included but not shown.  
 
The interaction term Settlement*OffLabel represents the effect of settlement on off-label 
prescriptions, relative to the effect of settlement on on-label prescriptions. This effect is 
significantly negative, indicating that settlement reduces off-label prescriptions relative to its 
effect on on-label uses. Additionally, the magnitude on Settlement*Off-Label exceeds that of 
Settlement, suggesting that Settlement has a negative effect on off-label prescriptions (for column 
(1), a net effect of around -92,000 prescriptions). The average number of prescriptions per period 
is 252,747 prescriptions, indicating that the magnitude of this net effect is economically 
significant. The results in Column (2) are similar.  
Columns (3) and (4) extend the main model into a triple difference analysis by including 
interactions between OffLabel and substance and between OffLabel and year. To preserve 
degrees of freedom, instead of calculating an interaction between off-label status and each 
substance, I create a dummy variable, FCA, which takes the value of one for any drug that was 
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ever subject to an FCA suit during this period. FCA is then interacted with off-label status. The 
results are robust to these inclusions.  
In sum, the overall results suggest that for anticonvulsants and antipsychotics that 
underwent FCA settlements between 2005–2010, there is a significant average relinquishment of 
off-label uses. Since this analysis estimates the relinquishment effect over multiple drugs, the 
effect is unlikely to be dependent on one idiosyncratic drug experience.  
While these results do lend credence to the idea that FCA claims serve as a source of 
information, a couple of questions remain. As noted earlier, this analysis does not take into 
consideration differences in appropriate and inappropriate off-label uses. If the off-label use is 
medically appropriate and supported by evidence (but just not subjected to FDA approval), FCA 
suits should not lead to relinquishment of that use. It is possible, however, that if a use is 
medically appropriate but there is not a formal scientific study to document safety or efficacy, 
the FCA suit may be sufficient to cast doubt on all ambiguous off-label uses. In this case, the 
uniform relinquishment might be more reasonable. 
This analysis additionally only considers the effect of settlement on relinquishment, not 
any other visible landmarks in the FCA case or any scientific information shocks. It is possible 
that other landmarks, such as press coverage or unsealing of the case could be earlier visible 
information shocks. Similarly, new scientific publications might be expected to spur 
relinquishment. This analysis does not currently take into account differential reactions by payer. 
Additionally, some of the previous literature on relinquishment suggests that relinquishment may 
happen at different times for different actors (Mapes 1977). This analysis does not currently 
allow for this heterogeneity.  
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The next section addresses some of these concerns by choosing a particularly focal FCA 
claim. It attempts to answer some of these questions by studying relinquishment of an ineffective 
use based on both scientific and legal information shocks. It additionally allows for 
heterogeneous responses by different third party payers.  
V. Neurontin: A Case Study 
The previous section estimated an average effect of relinquishment over multiple cases. 
While this does lend more confidence to the idea that the estimated effect is driven by FCA 
settlement, it makes understanding heterogeneity in relinquishment more difficult. This section 
fills that gap by allowing for not only legal information shocks but also scientific sources of 
learning.  It also allows relinquishment behavior to vary based on payer type. This section 
examines a focal off-label promotion case, that of neurontin.  Neurontin was the subject of a 
False Claims Act (FCA) lawsuit, which settled in 2004. Neurontin was marketed for many off-
label uses, one of the most important being for bipolar disorder. Unlike the off-label uses in the 
prior section, in which appropriateness is not measured, neurontin was not found to be effective 
for the treatment of bipolar disorder in a study conducted by its own manufacturer, Warner 
Lambert (Pande et al. 2000). This section studies prescriptions of neurontin for the treatment of 
bipolar disorder to cleanly measure relinquishment of an “inappropriate” off-label treatment. A 
few studies have studied neurontin prescription patterns for publicly-funded programs 
(Kesselheim 2011; Fullerton 2010); this Chapter expands this analysis to allow for heterogeneity 
by payer. 
Using data from the National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (NAMCS), this Section 
measures the responsiveness of physicians to news of neurontin’s ineffectiveness in treating 
bipolar disorder. The results suggest that physicians do not uniformly relinquish the drug after 
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scholarly news of its ineffectiveness. Instead, the Chapter finds that a patient’s payment method 
affects the likelihood of whether the patient is prescribed the disfavored drug, with patients with 
private insurance being less likely to receive neurontin after 2002. These results suggest that 
prescriptions may not be as sensitive to scientific data as society might like and that some payers 
relinquish treatment earlier than others.   
A. Testing the Relinquishment Hypotheses 
 Patient-level records from the National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (NAMCS) 
from 1998–2008 are used to estimate the determinants of bipolar treatment choices. Each year, 
the NAMCS sample includes around 3,000 physicians and samples the eligible physicians’ 
patient records.  The CDC surveys nonfederally employed physician offices engaged in “office-
based, patient care.”  
 Dependent Variable: Choice of Drug. Physicians have several options for bipolar 
disorder treatment. In the 1970s, lithium was discovered to be an effective mood stabilizer 
(NIMH 2013). Anticonvulsant drugs are also generally effective mood stabilizers. In particular, 
depakote was FDA-approved for the treatment of bipolar in 1995. Several other anticonvulsant 
drugs used off label for bipolar were used as mood stabilizers and later approved by the FDA for 
the treatment of bipolar disorder. Lamictal was approved for bipolar disorder on June 20, 2003 
(FDA 2010b), equetro was approved in December 10, 2004 (FDA 2004), and stavzor on July 29, 
2008 (FDA 2008).  
 “Lithium”=1 if lithium is prescribed as one of the medications for the visit. Similarly, 
“approved anticonvulsant”=1 if depakote, tegretol, lamictal, equetro, stavzor, epitol, or 
depakene100 (or their generic versions) are prescribed during the visit, the reason for the visit is 
																																																								
100 Epitol is has the same generic as tegretol and depakene has the same generic as stavzor. 
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not related to convulsions, and none of the diagnoses are for epilepsy. These exclusions ensure 
that these drugs are prescribed for the bipolar disorder, not a concurrent epilepsy problem. The 
“neurontin” variable is constructed similarly.  
The number of prescriptions for each of these drugs are summarized in the upper half of Table	2. 
Since these are simply indicator variables, each mean represents the percent of the sample that 
received each drug. Each patient could be prescribed multiple drugs, and “other” drugs are not 
listed here. Thus, the percentages should not add to 1. Neurontin seems to be one of the least 
prevalent drugs, with the exception of carbamazepine. Lithium is the most prevalent.  
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics, 1998-2008 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Dependent Variables   
Neurontin 0.066 0.249 
Lithium 0.201 0.401 
Lamictal 0.135 0.342 
Valproic 0.212 0.409 
Carbamazepine 0.040 0.195 
Payer:   
Private 0.455 0.498 
Medicare 0.133 0.340 
Medicaid 0.146 0.353 
Self 0.170 0.376 
Other 0.096 0.295 
 
Information Shocks. There are 3 major information shocks in the neurontin scandal, 
some scientific and some legal. These are summarized in Table	3. Figure	1 plots the 
prescriptions of neurontin, lithium, and approved anticonvulsants (as a percent of the total 
neurontin, lithium, and approved anticonvulsant prescriptions per year) over time, with dashed 
lines marking each information shock. The first shock involved a journal article regarding 
neurontin’s ineffectiveness for bipolar disorder, which was published in 2000 by Warner-
Lambert itself. In 1998, Warner-Lambert conducted a study, which revealed that neurontin was 
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not effective for bipolar disorder, but the company did not publish the study until 2000 (Lenzer 
2004; Pande et al. 2000) [hereafter, the “Pande study”]. Since the study was conducted by the 
manufacturer and still reported a negative finding, it should have a large, negative effect on 
physicians’ prescriptions of neurontin. Moreover, this study was more rigorous than previous 
studies—it was one of the first randomized controlled trials (“RCT”) to be conducted (Williams, 
et al. 2009). Another randomized controlled study was published later in 2000 (Frye, M.A. et al. 
2000) [hereafter “the Frye” study]. While several randomized controlled studies were 
subsequently published, one in 2002 (Obrocea et al. 2002) and one in 2006 (Vieta et al 2006), 
this study should be most probative because of its novelty, its authorship, and scientific rigor.  
Table 3. Information Shock Hypothesized to Lead to Relinquishment.  
Information Shock Date 
Warner-Lambert study is published, finding that a placebo 
outperforms neurontin in treatment of bipolar disorder. 
2000 
News of the False Claims Act becomes publicized. 2002 
Pfizer settles False Claims Act. 2004 
 
Litigation provides the next 2 information shocks. The media began to report on the suit 
in 2002.101 Several NPR pieces and other media outlets carried this news (Prakash 2002a, 
Prakash 2002b, Purse 2012). During litigation, various internal documents showed Warner-
Lambert’s efforts at promoting neurontin despite no evidence of effectiveness (DOJ 2004).102  
																																																								
101 The lawsuit was not filed at this time but had been kept under seal until 1999. U.S. ex rel. 
Franklin v. Parke-Davis, Div. of Warner- Lambert Co., 147 F. Supp. 2d 39, 46 (D. Mass. 2001). 
The first opinion did not come out until mid-2001 but the news began reporting on the suit in 
2002. In October 2002, the District of Massachusetts allowed the medial to see nonprivileged 
documents produced in discovery. U.S. ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 210 F.R.D. 257 (D. Mass. 
2002). 
102 This litigation was accompanied by another suit, a class action suit, filed against Pfizer in 
2002 alleging that the company engaged in off-label promotion and sham patent litigation to 
retain market exclusivity (Longstreth 2014). Though this is a separate suit, the allegation of off-
label promotion is the same as the allegation in the False Claims Act suit and the patent litigation 
should not affect physician decisions if price does not actually change.  
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Figure 1. Percent Prescriptions by Year 
Notes: The data were obtained from the NAMCS. The percent is the number of prescriptions for each drug divided 
by the sum of neurontin, lithium, and eventually approved anticonvulsants for the year. The information shocks are 
denoted by dashed lines: the Pfizer article was published in 2000, news of the litigation broke in 2002, and the 
litigation settled in 2004.  
 
The final information shock occurred in 2004, when the litigation settled. Pfizer paid 
$430 million to settle its criminal charges for illegal and fraudulent promotion of off-label uses 
of neurontin.103 This is a very visible landmark, as neurontin was one of the first FCA cases 
based on off-label promotion.  
These information “shocks” are not without complications. Since they are mostly 
identified by year, I list possible concurrent events that might influence relinquishment: One 
																																																								
103 Another information shock regarding neurontin in general occurred in 2005.  On April 22, 
2005, Pfizer and the FDA issued a voluntary recall from the manufacturer for 40,000 bottles of 
capsules distributed in October and November of 2004 because an error in production resulted in 
empty or partially filled capsules (FDA 2005). Since this date is so close to the litigation date and 
since this is a national alert, I cannot disentangle the effect of the litigation and the recall. It is 
possible that physicians prescribing neurontin for bipolar disorder were sensitive to this 
information shock. One could argue that the recall shook physicians’ trust in Warner-Lambert so 
that they decrease their prescriptions. However, physicians are more likely to distrust a 
manufacturer more for its fraudulent promotion than for a mechanical error. The former would 
seem to breed more lasting fears and actually change prescribing behavior long term. 
Additionally, such recalls are fairly prevalent and physicians should not be too sensitive to them. 
In 2005 alone, there were 108 safety alerts of drugs and therapeutic biological products (FDA 
2010a).  
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concurrent event that complicates the analysis is that, as previously noted, a third RCT was also 
published in 2002, which found that a placebo outperformed neurontin in treating bipolar 
disorder. I am unable to control for this, since it also occurred in 2002. It is possible that this was 
the extra information necessary to catch physicians’ attention. However, this seems unlikely for 
several reasons: first, the 2002 RCT does not seem to be cited by review studies – of the seven 
review studies published between 2003–2005 (after the third RCT and before the fourth RCT 
was published), each cited the two RCTs published in 2000, but not the RCT published in 
2002.104 (Williams, et al 2009, Table 1, Figure 2). This suggests that the study was not very 
influential at all and likely did not drive the results. Second, the third study was no more negative 
than the previous two studies. While noting that neurontin performed no better than the placebo, 
the study noted that it was most effective in young people and people with lower baseline 
weight. Second, nothing about its authorship or novelty should have struck physicians as more 
probative than the Pfizer study. Third, this was not the only other study published confirming 
Pfizer’s study (a second RCT was published two months after Pfizer’s study confirming the 
results (Frye et al 2000)).  
The second concurrent event is that the American Psychiatric Association issued a new 
practice guideline for patients with bipolar disorder in 2002 (Hirschfeld et al. 2002), which 
incorporated the 2000 negative study by Warner-Lambert (Fullerton 2010) as well as the Frye 
study. Thus, it is unclear whether a drop in 2002 for psychiatrists would be due to the litigation 
or the revised bulletin. To account for this, only patients seeing psychiatrists (around 80% of the 
sample) are considered, since they are equally likely to have seen the guidelines in 2002.  
																																																								
104 One study lists the second RCT in its citations but only discusses the Pande and Frye studies 
in the paper.  
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Third-Party Payer Behavior. Indicators for payment type included Medicare, Medicaid,105 
private insurance, “other” or no insurance,106 and Medicaid.107 The residual category is self-
payment.  The bottom panel of Table	2 lists the summary statistics for payer type. The first issue 
is that the expected payer for the visit may be different from the person who pays for the 
prescription, which I do not observe. For a couple of these categories, there is a high likelihood 
that these two payers will be the same, particularly private insurance, Medicaid, and self-
payment.108 For Medicare, however, this is different: there may be a difference in the expected 
payment for prescription drugs and the expected payment for the visit. Medicare patients did not 
have Medicare coverage for outpatient drugs until Medicare Part D109 was enacted in 2006. Thus, 
																																																								
105 NAMCS documentation lists this as Medicaid for 1998–2000 and Medicaid/SCHIP from 
2001–2008. I do not think this actually indicates an expanded coverage group, as there is no 
mention of changing the coding in the 2001 documentation and the description of the “other” 
category remains the same between 2000–2001.   
106 This category is included as a control but not discussed.  
107 The process by which expected payer is coded in NAMCS data changes in 2005. Previously, 
they collected “primary” expected source of payment; in 2005 they collected multiple sources 
and imposed the following hierarchy: Medicaid, Medicare, private, worker’s compensation, self 
pay, no charge, other, and unknown. In 2007 they reversed this hierarchy, making Medicare 
dominant over Medicaid. A series of robustness checks group Medicare and Medicaid together 
as one category (the omitted one) in order to account for this change across years. The results are 
qualitatively similar. If there is a concern that the relinquishment in 2002 for private payers was 
driven by the imposition of the hierarchy in general, running the model on 1998-2004 produces 
the same Post2002 results. Additionally, insofar as the change in 2004 categorized Medicare 
above private in contrast to previous coding procedure, an additional robustness check recoded 
the hierarchy with private first. Whenever “paypriv”, a dummy indicating that private insurance 
was expected to pay, the recode indicates that payment was from private insurance, even if the 
hierarchy would have listed Medicare/Medicaid. Additionally, Medicare was recoded as 
Medicaid to preserve the hierarchy established in 2005. The results using this recoding seem 
qualitatively unchanged.  
108 Of course, this will not always be true but I do not have any reason to believe the error will 
vary by payer.  
109 Medicare Part D covers prescription drugs that are approved by one of three compendia in 
order to be reimbursable. The three compendia include American Hospital Formulary Service – 
Drug Information (AHFS-DI), United States Pharmacopeia – National Formulary (USP-NF), and 
DRUGDEX (CMA 2010). DRUGDEX, the most inclusive of the compendia, was approved as an 
official compendium in 1997 (Armstrong 2003). 
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these patients may have paid for their drugs in a number of ways: self-payment, supplemental 
private coverage, or dual coverage under Medicaid. If the drug was administered inpatient, it 
may have been covered by another Medicare Part, though this is less likely. The Medicare 
category is retained in the analysis, but caution should be taken in interpreting these coefficients, 
and the Chapter does not focus on these results. However, this takes into account possible 
treatment differences when the patient’s total visit is characterized predominantly as being 
covered by Medicare.   
The variables of interest are the sensitivities of each payer to these information shocks. 
As discussed in Section III, expected payer can influence treatment in two possible ways: a payer 
can refuse to cover a particular treatment or can use persuasive measures to spread information 
about a use’s appropriateness. Each of these measures are discussed below.  
First, a payer can refuse to cover a particular treatment. . Refusal to reimburse results in 
two effects: First, if a physician maximizes expected patient benefit, changes in reimbursement 
make a treatment relatively more expensive for a patient. This should make physicians 
marginally less likely to prescribe the drug. Private payers seem to cover neurontin’s off-label 
uses to varying degrees. Public payers are more complicated: Franklin v. Parke Davis court 
struggled with whether government programs actually allowed reimbursement of neurontin’s off-
label uses: while neurontin was not supported by a medical compendium, Parke Davis argued 
that a majority of state Medicaid programs allowed coverage of non-compendium off-label uses. 
The government, in turn, argued that Medicaid was confined to uses listed in the designated 
compendia.110  The court did not resolve this issue, but noted that if a state Medicaid program did 
																																																								
110 This arises from an interpretation of the Medicaid statute (Greene 2005), which stated that 
“[a] State may exclude or otherwise restrict coverage of a covered outpatient drug if the 
prescribed use is not for a medically accepted indication (as defined in subsection (k)(6) of this 
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cover neurontin, the state may not have been able to recover under the FCA.111 The second effect 
refusal to reimburse has is that a physician may see the change in reimbursement as a signal of 
whether the use is appropriate.  
The second way a payer can influence treatment decisions is by implementing drug 
utilization reviews to examine how a drug is prescribed and to make suggestions to its 
physicians. Private payers often do this through their Pharmacy Benefit Managers (Fox 2003). 
The Medicaid statute also provides for a drug use review program in order to “educate 
physicians and pharmacists to identify and reduce the frequency of patterns of fraud, abuse, gross 
overuse, or inappropriate or medically unnecessary care . . . ” (42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(g)(1)(A)).  
At least one private insurance company seemed to influence treatment not through 
refusing reimbursement but through the persuasive means. Kaiser campaigned to reduce its 
neurontin prescriptions after it was alerted to Pfizer’s fraudulent conduct; however, Kaiser did 
not reduce its prescriptions by refusing to reimburse neurontin. 112 Instead it retained its open 
formulary, in which it would even reimburse prescriptions not on the formulary. Kaiser issued 
reports about preferred effective drugs through its Drug Information Service (“DIS”). Its 
physicians relied on these reports to such an extent that, although they were permitted to 
prescribe off-formulary, 95% of Kaiser physicians’ prescriptions were on-formulary.  Upon 
receiving news of neurontin’s ineffectiveness, Kaiser’s campaign to against neurontin 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
section.” 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8. Some suggest that this negative framing means that Medicaid can 
reimburse uses not in the designated compendia: American Hospital Formulary Service – Drug 
Information (AHFS-DI), United States Pharmacopeia – National Formulary (USP-NF), and 
DRUGDEX (e.g., CMA 2010; Martin 2004). 
111 U.S. ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, Div. of Warner-Lambert Co., No. CIV.A. 96-11651PBS, 
2003 WL 22048255, at *3-4 (D. Mass. Aug. 22, 2003). 
112 In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 712 F.3d 21, 29 (1st Cir. 2013). 
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prescriptions reduced new prescriptions by thirty-three percent. 113  This demonstrated screening 
process helped Kaiser win its Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim 
against Pfizer, proving that it would not have reimbursed neurontin prescriptions but for the 
fraudulent information.  
Given that payers can theoretically influence treatment in these two ways, an interesting 
comparison would be between third-party payers and self-payers. For this reason, the omitted 
payment category is “self-pay.” Self-pay patients arguably are not influenced by payers through 
either mechanism: they are not subject to reimbursement changes and they presumably do not 
receive any persuasive literature. Treatment for self-pay patients may be influenced by 
persuasive techniques used by payers of patients with the same doctor. The study attempts to 
account for this by clustering errors by physician code and year.114 Examining the other payers 
relative to self-pay patients provides an interesting comparison.    
																																																								
113 The RICO court opinion states the following: 
Neurontin prescriptions written by PMG physicians increased dramatically after September 1999 
(the fraudulent marketing campaign began in 1997). This notable increase led some Kaiser 
regions to “examine their members' use of Neurontin” and make efforts to limit it. By the spring 
of 2002, the Northern California PMG had barred Pfizer drug representatives from detailing its 
physicians regarding Neurontin, and the same PMG's Drug Utilization Group (“DRUG”) began a 
campaign to promote only the appropriate use of Neurontin, which other regional PMGs joined. 
In late 2002, Kaiser learned about Franklin's qui tam action and escalated its efforts to limit 
prescribing of Neurontin for neuropathic pain, bipolar disorder, migraine, and nociceptive pain. 
Kaiser shared materials about Neurontin produced by DRUG and the Southern California PMG's 
Drug Utilization Action Team (“DUAT”) with all regional PMGs. The district court found that 
though Neurontin use continued to increase nationally, Kaiser's efforts to limit its use “result[ed] 
in a 33–34% decrease in new starts of Neurontin.” In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 
712 F.3d 21, 31–32 (1st Cir.) (internal citations omitted).  
114 Physician codes are only available yearly (there is no way to match across years). 
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Figure 2 Percent of Neurontin Prescriptions by Payer and Year 
 Figure	2 plots the percent of neurontin prescriptions in the sample by payer and year.  Figure	2 shows that there is considerable heterogeneity in adoption/relinquishment by payer. 
Self-pay patients seem to increase their prescriptions until 2000, after which they decline until 
2005. Private insurance patients experience a big increase in prescriptions after 2000 and then a 
sharp decline after 2002. Medicaid prescriptions increase after 2001 and gradually decline after 
2002. Medicare patient prescriptions continue increasing until 2004, after which they decline.  
Since state Medicaid claims were the basis for the FCA suit, another important 
comparison is how patients with Medicaid were treated relative to patients with private 
insurance. Medicaid was seeking to be reimbursed using the FCA, while private insurance 
companies had to seek compensation elsewhere. Private insurance companies have had a harder 
time recovering their reimbursements and might apply more pressure on physicians to police 
prescriptions more carefully. Private third-party payers bring suit under the Racketeer Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) to recover for fraudulent off-label promotions.115 RICO 
prohibits anyone associated with an “enterprise” “to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, 																																																								
115 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2012). 
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in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection 
of unlawful debt.”116 Third-party payers have used this statute to allege that pharmaceutical 
companies engaged in an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering (usually mail fraud) that 
caused injury to the third-party payer (Cooney et al. 2010). These attempts are rarely met with 
success. Kaiser’s success can be attributed, at least in part, to its proactive relinquishment of 
neurontin, such as barring pharmaceutical representatives from detailing their physicians, and 
launching their own campaigns for appropriate drug promotion.117 For FCA claims, no such 
proof is necessary as the burden is on pharmaceutical companies to know what uses are 
nonreimbursable.  
This section tests whether there is heterogeneity in relinquishment by payer. Importantly, 
this Chapter looks at relative relinquishment, the comparative change in a payers’ prescriptions 
in response to an information shock relative to the corresponding change for self-pay payers. 
Relative relinquishment does not necessarily mean that nominal prescriptions declined or that the 
total nominal decline is significant. However, I believe this is an informative measure, as 
comparing behavior relative to self-pay patients provides a baseline of consumer behavior in the 
absence of third-party intervention. This section tests for heterogeneity in relinquishment through 
two analyses: a linear probability model for the likelihood of prescribing neurontin and a triple-
difference analysis comparing neurontin prescriptions to prescriptions of lithium and approved 
anticonvulsants.  
																																																								
116 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (c). 
117 In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 712 F.3d 21, 31 (1st Cir. 2013).  
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B. Linear Probability Model 
The likelihood of being prescribed a particular drug is estimated using linear probability 
models.118 Specifically, these linear probability models measure the propensity of physicians to 
prescribe approved anticonvulsants, lithium, or neurontin. The data are not longitudinal, and the 
model treats each observation as a separate draw. All patient records that list bipolar disorder as 
one of the three possible diagnoses for the visit are included. 
 The decision to prescribe each drug might not be independent from one another; drugs 
might be substitutes for one another and the factors associated with choosing one might be 
correlated with another drug choice. To account for this dependence, the linear probability 
models are run together in a seemingly unrelated regression. The seemingly unrelated regression 
calculates the probability of several discrete choices and allows for the errors for all choices to be 
correlated ( ). Since this Chapter focuses on the likelihood of prescribing neurontin, however, 
only that linear probability model is reported. The basic model is in equation (4). 
 (4) , 
where X is a vector of patient characteristics that measure differences in medical benefits based 
on physical differences, J contains information like journal articles on neurontin, I is a vector of 
the aforementioned information-shock time periods, Z is a vector of payment characteristics, and 
Z*I is a series of interaction terms between time shocks and payment characteristics.  
 A number of patient level controls are used, including sex and age. Since the data do not 
have detailed information about patient health, smoking status is used as a proxy for patient 
																																																								
118 To confirm the appropriateness of the linear probability model, I run a probit model and use 
inteff to estimate the marginal effects of Post2002*Private. The effect is similar in magnitude, 
providing support for the linear probability model.  
kiρ
Treatmentk = X 'β1 + J 'β2 + I 'β3 + Z 'β4 + Z * I 'β5 +εi
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health.119 Patient-level controls also include measures of bipolar severity. Diagnosis codes found 
in NAMCS are used as a measure for this.120 Bipolar severity should be positively correlated 
with the prescription of a nontraditional treatment, such as neurontin or other anticonvulsants, 
because people with severe bipolar might not respond to traditional treatment. Similarly, the 
presence of comorbidities such as psychotic behavior presents complexity for which physicians 
might seek innovative treatments. To measure comorbidities, an indicator variable measures a 
patient displays psychotic symptoms. A patient is categorized as having psychotic symptoms if 
the diagnosis code indicates psychotic behavior. 
To capture the information spreading outside of the information shocks, I include a 
cumulative measure of the number of review studies that either made positive or negative 
conclusions about neurontin’s effectiveness for bipolar disorder. This measure is from Williams 
et al. (2009), which documents review studies that evaluated the use of neurontin for the 
treatment of bipolar disorder. 
Finally, previous research emphasizes the role of pharmaceutical detailing on physician 
learning. Unfortunately, NAMCS does not include a measure for detailing patterns. To crudely 
account for pharmaceutical detailing would result in omitted variable bias, so as a crude 
indicator, the four region controls provided by NAMCS are included. These region controls 
attempt to account for different pharmaceutical representative territories, different CME 
programs, and region-specific prescription idiosyncrasies. Table	4 only includes the results for 																																																								
119 Since smoking is correlated with heart disease, stroke, and various cancers (CDC 2012), it can 
be used as a rough measure of patient general health. Current smoking status is indicated for 
years 1994–1996 and 2001–2010 for NAMCS. For the missing years, smoking status is assigned 
if the record indicated that the patient received counseling for smoking cessation. The results are 
robust to the exclusion of this measure.  
120 There are two diagnosis codes designated as severe: one indicating that the diagnosis is severe 
with psychotic behavior and the other indicating that the diagnosis is severe without psychotic 
behavior. I use both diagnosis codes for my severity measure.  
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the likelihood of prescribing neurontin, as this section will focus on these results. Columns (1) 
and (2) display the results for the seemingly unrelated regressions. The correlation between each 
pair of errors is . The null hypothesis is =0 and that the errors are independent of one 
another. A chi-square test tests whether  is statistically different than 0. If the null hypothesis 
is rejected for at least one of the error pairs, the standard errors under the seemingly unrelated 
regression model are more appropriate. The seemingly unrelated regression rejects the null 
hypothesis that ρ=0, and the standard errors under this model are more appropriate than in the 
separate models. In the total prescription model, the error correlations are negative, suggesting 
that these drugs substitute for each other.121 Columns (3) and (4) run weighted linear probability 
models for comparison. These do not account for dependency in the errors of the system of 
equations. However, separate linear probability models allow for weighted regressions and 
robust standard errors. Comparing Columns (1)–(2) to (3)–(4) shows that the results are similar 
and generally robust to either assumption.  
  
																																																								
121 However, neurontin and carbamezapine’s errors are positively correlated. 
hjρ hjρ
hjρ
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Table 4. Likelihood of Prescribing Neurontin, Seemingly Unrelated Regressions and Linear 
Probability Models, 1998-2008.  
  Seemingly Unrelated Regression Separate Linear Probability Models 
        
Patient age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Male patient -0.032*** -0.033*** -0.027** -0.027** 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
Severe bipolar diagnosis 0.073** 0.071** 0.108* 0.105 
  (0.031) (0.031) (0.065) (0.065) 
Use tobacco -0.009 -0.009 0.000 -0.000 
  (0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.019) 
Psychotic behavior 0.005 0.007 -0.009 -0.006 
  (0.044) (0.044) (0.096) (0.095) 
Medicare -0.095** -0.094** -0.116*** -0.113*** 
  (0.044) (0.044) (0.038) (0.038) 
Medicaid -0.106** -0.099* -0.111*** -0.103** 
  (0.053) (0.053) (0.041) (0.043) 
Private Insurance -0.024 -0.023 -0.032 -0.035 
  (0.032) (0.032) (0.047) (0.046) 
Post2000  -0.068* -0.016 -0.066 0.015 
  (0.039) (0.047) (0.040) (0.058) 
Post2000*Payment     
    Medicare 0.129** 0.130** 0.135** 0.135** 
  (0.062) (0.062) (0.056) (0.057) 
    Medicaid 0.187*** 0.181*** 0.166*** 0.158*** 
  (0.067) (0.067) (0.055) (0.056) 
    Private Insurance 0.192*** 0.191*** 0.182*** 0.183*** 
  (0.047) (0.047) (0.060) (0.058) 
Post2002  -0.017 0.078 -0.005 0.108* 
  (0.038) (0.051) (0.038) (0.057) 
Post2002*Payment     
    Medicare 0.092 0.090 0.085 0.083 
  (0.061) (0.061) (0.077) (0.078) 
    Medicaid -0.053 -0.054 -0.018 -0.019 
  (0.055) (0.055) (0.070) (0.069) 
    Private Insurance -0.146*** -0.145*** -0.152*** -0.151*** 
  (0.045) (0.045) (0.051) (0.051) 
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Post2004  0.005 0.078* -0.030 0.036 
  (0.034) (0.040) (0.036) (0.044) 
Post2004*Payment     
    Medicare -0.105** -0.114** -0.089 -0.099 
  (0.053) (0.053) (0.068) (0.068) 
    Medicaid -0.047 -0.050 -0.037 -0.039 
  (0.047) (0.047) (0.062) (0.062) 
    Private Insurance -0.009 -0.015 0.032 0.026 
  (0.039) (0.039) (0.041) (0.041) 
Positive Studies  0.022  0.001 
   (0.014)  (0.020) 
Negative Studies  -0.028***  -0.025*** 
   (0.009)  (0.009) 
     
Constant 0.139*** 0.052 0.125*** 0.149 
  (0.031) (0.079) (0.041) (0.116) 
     
Observations 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 
R-squared 0.065 0.070 0.061 0.066 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Variables included but not shown include 
indicators for region and the main effects/interactions for “other payment”.  Columns (1) and (2) allow errors 
across multiple linear probability models (not shown here) to be dependent. Columns (3) and (4) involve separate 
linear probability models that are weighted by patient weight and include standard errors clustered by physician 
code and year.  
 
Columns (1) and (3) only include information shocks, while Columns (2) and (4) include 
a cumulative measure of positive and negative review articles on neurontin for the treatment of 
bipolar disorder. The patient demographics are significant. Males are less likely to receive 
neurontin. Patients with a “severe” bipolar diagnosis are more likely to receive neurontin than 
those without such designation, suggesting that neurontin might have been more of a “last-resort” 
treatment. The payment indicator variables are also interesting: relative to self-pay patients, 
patients with Medicare and Medicaid were less likely to receive neurontin. As predicted, 
“negative” studies, studies implying that neurontin would be inappropriate for the treatment of 
bipolar disorder, reduce the likelihood that neurontin is prescribed.  
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 The information shock interactions are the main variables of interest. The main effect of 
the information shock can be interpreted as the incremental change from the previous 
information shock for self-pay patients. Post2002 should be interpreted as the change in 
likelihood for self-pay patients after 2002, relative to after 2000. The information shock–
payment interactions should be interpreted as the incremental change from the information shock 
for a particular payer, relative to the corresponding change for self-pay patients. For example, 
Post2002*Private Insurance should be interpreted as the relative change for private insurance 
patients after 2002 (relative to after 2000) compared to the corresponding change for self-pay 
patients.  
  Given that the negative scientific study was published in 2000, Post2000 and its 
subsequent interactions were hypothesized to be negative, as the negative scientific study on 
neurontin should have reduced the number of neurontin prescriptions for bipolar disorder. This 
variable is only negative for self-pay patients (Post2000<0), and even then only significantly in 
Column (1). Post2000*Private Insurance, Post2000*Medicaid, and Post2000*Medicare are 
positive and significant, suggesting that the publication of the article did not correspond to 
decreased likelihood of being prescribed neurontin for private insurance, Medicaid, or Medicare 
patients, relative to the changes in likelihood for self-pay patients.  Instead, relative to self-pay 
patients, the above patients were more likely to receive neurontin after this time. A possible 
reason for this relative increase is found in Kaiser’s RICO lawsuit against Pfizer. Kaiser claims 
that Pfizer’s “misrepresentations and omissions during the development of drug monographs” 
led them to remove any restrictions on the prescription of neurontin in late 1999.122  
																																																								
122 In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 712 F.3d 21, 29 (1st Cir. 2013). 
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Post2002 is largely insignificant. Relative to this, the likelihood that private insurance 
patients are prescribed neurontin drops around 14–15 percentage points.  This is consistent with 
private insurance company Kaiser’s claims that they intensified their campaign to decrease the 
prescriptions of neurontin after hearing about the FCA litigation.123  The likelihood of 
prescription for Medicaid patients also declines, but not significantly. The difference between 
Post2002*Medicaid and Post2002*Private is significant.124 This differential response is 
intriguing and suggests that anticipated payment is a strong influence on a physician’s 
prescription patterns.  
Post2004 main terms and interactions for Medicaid and private insurance are largely 
insignificant. Patients who are classified as Medicare patients tend to have a reduced likelihood 
of receiving neurontin after 2004 (Post2004*Medicare<0). The reason for this finding is unclear: 
Medicare was not paying for prescription drugs during this time. It is possible that this was 
driven by a Medicare-specific treatment plan, if physicians are just prone to treat Medicare 
physicians differently.   
An alternate way of analyzing relinquishment is not to look at incremental changes but to 
examine mutually exclusive period intervals. As a robustness check, I run a specification in 
which the information shocks are considered as intervals in time: before the Warner Lambert 
study (1998-2000), after the Warner Lambert study and before news of the FCA (2001–2002), 
after the news of the FCA and before settlement (2003–2004), and after settlement (2005–2008).  
  																																																								
123 See supra note 113. 
124 For Table 4, Column (4), the difference between Post2002*Medicaid and Post2002*Private 
has an F-statistic of 3.10 (prob >F=0.0786). Similarly, in column (2), the F statistics is 3.96 (prob 
> F = 0.0466).  Unweighted separate, regressions with robust standard errors produce an F of 
2.62 (prob > F =0 .1059) and an F statistic of 2.05 (prob > F =0.1528) with clustered errors. 
Unweighted separate regressions, however, are not my preferred specification.  
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Table 5. The Likelihood of Prescribing Neurontin, Separate OLS regression, Intervals. 
 (1) (2) 
     
Patient age 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Male patient -0.027** -0.027** 
 (0.012) (0.012) 
Severe bipolar diagnosis 0.108* 0.105 
 (0.065) (0.065) 
Use tobacco 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.019) (0.019) 
Psychotic behavior -0.009 -0.006 
 (0.096) (0.095) 
Medicare -0.116*** -0.113*** 
 (0.038) (0.038) 
Medicaid -0.111*** -0.103** 
 (0.041) (0.043) 
Private Insurance -0.032 -0.035 
 (0.047) (0.046) 
2001-2002  -0.066 0.015 
  (0.040) (0.058) 
2001-2002 *Payment   
    Medicare 0.135** 0.135** 
 (0.056) (0.057) 
    Medicaid 0.166*** 0.158*** 
 (0.055) (0.056) 
    Private Insurance 0.182*** 0.183*** 
  (0.060) (0.058) 
2003-2004 -0.071 0.122 
 (0.048) (0.096) 
2003-2004*Payment   
    Medicare 0.220*** 0.218*** 
  (0.074) (0.074) 
    Medicaid 0.148** 0.140* 
  (0.072) (0.073) 
    Private Insurance 0.030 0.032 
 (0.060) (0.059) 
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2005-2008 -0.100*** 0.158 
 (0.038) (0.105) 
2005-2008*Payment   
    Medicare 0.131*** 0.119*** 
 (0.042) (0.043) 
    Medicaid 0.111** 0.100** 
  (0.047) (0.050) 
    Private Insurance 0.062 0.059 
  (0.051) (0.050) 
Positive Studies  0.001 
  (0.020) 
Negative Studies  -0.025*** 
  (0.009) 
Constant 0.125*** 0.149 
 (0.041) (0.116) 
   
Observations 2,142 2,142 
R-squared 0.061 0.066 
Standard errors are clustered by physician code and year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. Variables included but not shown include indicators for region and the main 
effects/interactions for “other payment.” In this table, periods of time are separated 
into intervals. The omitted time interval is 1998-2000.  
 
In the following analysis, 1998-2000 is omitted, along with its interactions with payers. 
Thus, all the coefficients reported in Table	5 are interpreted with respect to 1998-2000 (before 
the Warner Lambert study), such that the effect of the following periods is with respect to the 
omitted category. 2001–2002 should be interpreted as the change in likelihood for self-pay 
patients between 2001 to 2002, relative to the self-pay patients in 1998-2000, and 2003–2004 
should be interpreted as the change in likelihood for self-pay patients between 2003 to 2004, also 
relative to the self-pay patients in 1998-2000. The payment interactions should be interpreted as 
the difference between patients with the given payment method and self-pay patients in the given 
interval, relative to the corresponding difference in 1998-2000.  
 The results in Table	5 reflect similar findings as those in Table	4. From Column (2), 
relative to 1998-2000, the difference in likelihoods of receiving neurontin after 2000 between 
private insurance and self-pay patients increases 18.3 percentage points (2001-2002*Private). 
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For Medicaid, this difference increases by 15.8 percentage points and by 13.5 percentage points 
for Medicare patients. The payment interactions for 2003-2004 and 2005-2008 are positive, 
however, indicating that relative to the difference between self-pay patients and patients with 
private insurance, Medicaid, or Medicare in 1998-2000, the difference in future periods are 
larger. However, comparing the coefficients on the interaction terms between 2001-2002 and 
2003-2004 shows that this relative difference decreases after news of the suit hit. Thus, 
regardless of whether information shocks are studies as incremental changes or mutually 
exclusive intervals, heterogeneity in payer relinquishment is apparent.  
C. Triple-Differences 
The second way to analyze the relinquishment of neurontin is to compare neurontin 
prescriptions to prescriptions of approved anticonvulsants or lithium. A triple difference analysis 
helps to do this by comparing the response of a treated group (neurontin) to that of an untreated 
group (approved anticonvulsants or lithium) before and after treatment (information shocks). The 
triple difference allows the response of the treated group to vary by payer. To construct the triple 
differences analysis, I only keep observations where one of the diagnoses relates to bipolar 
disorder and where one of the prescriptions was lithium, an eventually approved anticonvulsant, 
or neurontin. For the reasons stated earlier, only patients who visited a psychiatrist are retained. 
Each prescription is weighted by the patient weight, to reflect a national estimate of the 
prescription, and the weighted sum of prescriptions is collapsed by month, year, region, and 
payer type.125 The weighted purchases of each drug are described in Table	6.  
																																																								
125 As in the analysis in Section I.B, I merge the month-year–payer–region categories with a full-
factorial matrix of month-year–payer–region categories for each substance and impute categories 
with zero prescriptions. I drop observations that have no prescriptions in any substance–payer–
region category over any time period. This leaves 7,788 substance-month-year–payer–region 
observations.  
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Table 6. Number of Purchasesa, 1998-2008 
 Mean Std. Dev. 
Drug   
Neurontin 1004.15 6729.39 
Lithium 3053.04 10626.54 
Approved Anticonvulsants 5564.75 17307.17 
a These values are determined by multiplying each purchase by the corresponding patient weight.  
 
The following equation is estimated: 5 !"#$%"&'(&)*!"#= !"#!!! + !"#$!!! + !"#$%&'()$" !ℎ!"!!! + !"#$ ∗ !"#$!!! + !"#!∗ !"#$%&'()$" !ℎ!"!!! + !"#$% ∗ !"#$%&'()$" !ℎ!"!!! + !"#$ ∗ !"#$%∗ !"#$%&'()$" !ℎ!"!!!, 
where Drug is a vector of drug choices: neurontin, lithium, or approved anticonvulsants. The 
omitted drug category is lithium in Column (1)–(2) of Table	7 and approved anticonvulsants in 
Column (3)–(4). The omitted category provides a baseline, such that the number of neurontin 
prescriptions is measured relative to the omitted category. Payer is a vector including Medicare, 
Medicaid, private insurance, “other” or no insurance, and self-payment. The residual category is 
self-payment. Information Shock is a vector of the aforementioned events in 2000, 2002, and 
2004.  Table	7 lists the results. These results tell a similar story as the linear probability model 
results. Column (1)–(2) compares neurontin prescriptions to those of approved anticonvulsants, 
evaluating trends in neurontin with the trends of lithium as the baseline. Column (3)–(4) 
compares neurontin prescriptions to lithium prescriptions. Both are provided because it is unclear 
which provides the better comparison group. Lithium is an established treatment while the 
approved anticonvulsants are the same drug class as neurontin.  																																																																																																																																																																																		
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Table 7. Number of Prescriptions, by Month, Year, and Coverage: Difference in differences. 
 
(i)  
 
( (ii)  
Neurontin -1,872.35 -62.42 -2,172.25** -362.31 
  (1,164.42) (2,551.93) (1,036.47) (2,583.10) 
Medicare 
-126.29 -126.29 -1,548.03 -1,548.03 
  (1,297.99) (1,294.11) (1,123.03) (1,122.16) 
Medicaid 
-1,800.81 -1,800.81 -2,973.97*** -2,973.97*** 
  (1,101.85) (1,100.70) (832.26) (831.91) 
Private Insurance 5,427.94*** 5,427.94*** 2,350.24* 2,350.24* 
  (1,775.21) (1,774.84) (1,321.54) (1,321.63) 
Neurontin*Payment 
   Medicare -1,088.48 -1,088.48 333.26 333.26 
  (1,475.57) (1,473.05) (1,317.24) (1,317.52) 
   Medicaid 479.53 479.53 1,652.69 1,652.69 
  (1,298.71) (1,298.52) (1,077.51) (1,078.22) 
   Private Insurance -5,150.93** -5,150.93** -2,073.23 -2,073.23 
  (2,031.33) (2,030.57) (1,646.02) (1,645.54) 
Post2000 1,075.61 835.39 -1,120.50 -1,360.72 
  (2,064.38) (2,180.14) (1,076.40) (1,380.90) 
Neurontin*Post2000 -2,017.63 -387.77 178.47 1,808.33 
  (2,214.34) (2,437.41) (1,341.75) (1,759.21) 
Payment*Post2000 
   Medicare -1,343.51 -1,343.51 1,582.23 1,582.23 
  (2,391.16) (2,389.58) (1,526.67) (1,526.88) 
   Medicaid 773.09 773.09 3,217.35* 3,217.35* 
  (2,372.81) (2,372.72) (1,683.95) (1,685.23) 
   Private Insurance 2,846.93 2,846.93 1,099.83 1,099.83 
  (3,720.05) (3,720.77) (2,133.98) (2,136.29) 
Neurontin*Payment*Post2000 
    Medicare 2,860.35 2,860.35 -65.39 -65.39 
  (2,557.30) (2,556.28) (1,775.62) (1,776.48) 
    Medicaid 1,220.85 1,220.85 -1,223.41 -1,223.41 
  (2,541.19) (2,541.10) (1,913.93) (1,915.04) 
   Private Insurance 2,507.23 2,507.23 4,254.33 4,254.33 
  (4,363.93) (4,363.57) (3,123.93) (3,124.14) 
Post2002 -335.15 -11.52 -645.68 -322.06 
  (2,191.08) (2,546.89) (928.31) (1,500.56) 
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Neurontin*Post2002 383.62 2,112.53 694.15 2,423.06 
  (2,315.78) (2,793.01) (1,193.20) (1,888.38) 
Payment*Post2002 
    Medicare -396.44 -396.44 1,316.39 1,316.39 
  (2,445.65) (2,446.36) (1,730.86) (1,731.90) 
    Medicaid 550.19 550.19 93.16 93.16 
  (2,722.01) (2,722.69) (1,903.46) (1,904.94) 
    Private Insurance 2,766.06 2,766.06 4,771.09* 4,771.09* 
  (4,426.26) (4,427.54) (2,830.76) (2,832.94) 
Neurontin*Payment*Post2002 
    Medicare 1,179.85 1,179.85 -532.97 -532.97 
  (2,707.64) (2,708.33) (2,084.69) (2,085.62) 
    Medicaid -258.90 -258.90 198.13 198.13 
  (3,043.04) (3,043.41) (2,339.63) (2,340.54) 
    Private Insurance -6,810.21 -6,810.21 -8,815.24** -8,815.24** 
  (4,983.84) (4,984.35) (3,641.43) (3,642.28) 
Post2004 -1,002.35 -412.63 75.91 665.64 
  (1,375.59) (1,600.00) (726.78) (1,107.82) 
Neurontin*Post 2004 490.65 1,213.53 -587.62 135.27 
  (1,514.13) (1,829.15) (963.61) (1,418.82) 
Payment*Post2004     
    Medicare 5,864.04*** 5,864.04*** 284.25 284.25 
  (1,976.96) (1,977.94) (1,663.99) (1,663.85) 
    Medicaid 1,941.66 1,941.66 -307.32 -307.32 
  (2,079.86) (2,081.27) (1,422.31) (1,423.11) 
    Private Insurance 4,934.59 4,934.59 -3,447.75 -3,447.75 
  (4,001.71) (4,003.28) (2,593.36) (2,593.56) 
Neurontin*Payment*Post2004 
    Medicare -6,283.01*** -6,283.01*** -703.21 -703.21 
  (2,234.23) (2,234.79) (1,962.72) (1,962.25) 
    Medicaid -2,452.08 -2,452.08 -203.10 -203.10 
  (2,427.91) (2,429.68) (1,895.23) (1,896.55) 
    Private Insurance -4,534.76 -4,534.76 3,847.58 3,847.58 
  (4,187.64) (4,188.81) (2,871.96) (2,871.66) 
 Positive Studies  491.93  491.93 
   (393.35)  (393.35) 
 Neurontin*Positive 
Studies 
 -285.15  -285.15 
   (508.04)  (508.04) 
 Negative Studies  -235.89  -235.89 
   (343.45)  (343.45) 
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 Neurontin* Negative 
Studies 
 -289.15  -289.15 
   (420.50)  (420.50) 
Omitted category Approved 
Anticonvulsants 
Approved 
Anticonvulsants 
Lithium Lithium 
     
     
Observations 7,788 7,788 7,788 7,788 
R-squared 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  Variables included but not listed are 
indicator variables for region, main effects and interactions for “other payment” and all the main effects and 
interactions of the non-baseline category (lithium for Column (1)-(2) and approved anticonvulsants for Column (3)-
(4)). 
 
Consistent with previous results, no decline is apparent after the original publication of 
the negative Pfizer study in 2000. Few of the triple interactions with Post2000 are significant. 
For 2002 interactions, the private payer triple interactions in Columns (3)–(4) are significant. 
Neurontin*Private* Post2002<0 compares the difference in incremental changes126 between 
neurontin prescriptions and lithium prescriptions for private insurance patients, relative to the 
corresponding difference in self-pay patients. It essentially signifies that the change in neurontin 
prescriptions relative to the change in lithium prescriptions after 2002 is significantly more 
negative for private patients than for self-pay patients. This triple interaction is also negative and 
but not significant in Columns (1)–(2), relative to approved anticonvulsants.  
As in the linear probability model, the relinquishment of neurontin for Medicare patients 
seems to only take place after 2004, as Neurontin*Medicare Post2004 <0, although this 
coefficient again should be interpreted with caution. Other triple interactions with 
Neurontin*Post2004 are negative and mostly insignificant, relative to self-pay patients.  
In sum, this model seems to support the results from the linear probability model: no 
relative relinquishment for private, Medicare, and Medicaid is observed after the 2000 study. 
Instead, relative relinquishment happens later. The change in likelihood of receiving neurontin is 																																																								
126 The incremental change is the change in prescriptions relative to 2000-2002.  
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significantly more negative for private insurance patients after 2002, relative to changes in the 
likelihood for self-pay patients.  
Clearly this identification strategy makes causal inference challenging. What can be 
concluded, however, is that any relative decrease in neurontin prescriptions does not occur 
directly after publication of the 2000 study for patients with third-party payers. It is possible that 
relinquishment is caused by the scientific study but takes time to be adopted. However, the trend 
observed seems more consistent with delayed relinquishment than gradual relinquishment, since 
prescriptions seem to increase after 2000. I do not know if reimbursement changed for various 
Medicaid programs during this time, but Kaiser’s story of removing restrictions on neurontin 
suggests that the availability of unrestricted reimbursement might have caused physicians to 
continue prescribing neurontin. For self-pay payers, in contrast, it is possible that the negative 
study was sufficient to cast doubt on the appropriateness of the drug, such that physicians did not 
want to impose an expensive drug on their patients without insurance. This might suggest that 
physicians focus less on medical opportunity cost of a drug if the monetary cost is low.  
For third-party payers, the results suggest that relinquishment is spurred more by 
litigation than the 2000 study. Attributing the decline after 2002 to litigation is not without 
challenges: it is possible that physicians catering to patients with private insurance were more 
likely to pay attention to the APA updated guidelines publishing the previous negative studies 
about neurontin. However, Kaiser does at least claim that the lawsuit caused them to escalate 
their efforts to limit prescriptions of neurontin.127 The relinquishment observed after 2002 occurs 
for private insurance and Medicaid patients, with a significantly stronger effect for private 
insurance patients.  
																																																								
127 See supra note 113. 
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One concern might be that these results are actually driven by the differing costs of 
neurontin over time. Neurontin was set to go off patent around 2001 (Neafsey 2005), which 
might make the drug cheaper for patients.128 The increase in prescriptions after 2000 might be 
caused by physicians simply finding neurontin sufficiently cheap to prescribe, even if they knew 
about the study.  However, this argument is problematic for two reasons. First, this does not 
explain the decline in neurontin prescriptions after 2002. If physicians knew about the drug 
ineffectiveness in 2000 and simply prescribed neurontin because of the lower price, the 2002 
litigation would produce no new information and should not affect the prescription decision 
(since the price would remain at off-patent levels between 2000 and 2002, there should be no 
decline in 2002).  Second, it is unclear whether the price of neurontin actually dropped during 
this period. Before the patent expired, Pfizer obtained a production patent to extend protection 
until 2014; though generic companies contested this patent,129 it was upheld in 2007 (Neafsey 
2005; Cox 2007).   
Another proposed explanation is that the changes in prescriptions were due to underlying 
changes in pharmaceutical detailing effort. Although the data only include a crude measure of 
pharmaceutical detailing, anecdotal evidence suggests that this was not the case. In its 
announcement of settlement, the DOJ notes that the Pfizer settlement included agreeing to a 
corporate compliance program  “which will ensure that the changes Pfizer Inc made after 
acquiring Warner-Lambert in June 2000, are effective in training and supervising its marketing 
and sales staff...” (DOJ 2004). This suggests that Pfizer might have tried to curb some detailing 																																																								
128 It is not clear that prices would have necessarily dropped post-patent. Post-patent price 
changes are dependent on many different variables not discussed in this Chapter.  
129 Some sources suggest that a generic launch was attempted in 2004 (Cox 2007), which would 
have resulted in lower-priced neurontin; however, it is unclear how large or successful this 
launch was.  Additionally, this launch should have increased the number of neurontin 
prescriptions after 2004 if cost is relevant, but there is little evidence of this. 
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after buying the company. Additionally, the DOJ asserts that the “charged conduct” occurred 
before Pfizer bought Warner-Lambert in 2000. Finally, the original FCA claim was unsealed in 
1999, suggesting that Pfizer was under greater federal scrutiny during this period. Arguably then, 
pharmaceutical detailing should have declined around at least 1999 and 2000, which would not 
explain the continued increase through 2000 and the decline after 2002.  
As noted in Section 0, there are two reasons that litigation could have spurred this 
relinquishment. Litigation may have emphasized and publicized already existing information on 
neurontin. Insurance companies have accused pharmaceutical companies of a particular form of 
publication bias in which negative studies are published in lower-circulating journals. Thus, even 
if physicians differentiate between strong and weak studies, they just might not be aware of the 
negative studies because they are in lower-circulating journals. If this is the case, however, 
litigation is an expensive and inefficient flag for negative studies.  
The second potential reason is that litigation brought to light new internal information 
regarding fraud. If physicians were swayed by the new internal documents regarding neurontin’s 
effectiveness, which came to light during the trial, this brings into question whether physicians 
can rely on the public pharmaceutical literature to adequately inform themselves of an off-label 
use’s effectiveness. If internal documents are necessary to ascertain a drug’s effectiveness, the 
assumption underlying off-label uses—that physicians will make appropriate decisions based on 
current public scientific literature—might be flawed.  
The results also suggest that third-party payers exert considerable influence over whether 
physicians prescribe a particular drug. The results indicate that patients with private insurance 
became less likely to be prescribed neurontin after 2002, relative to the change in likelihood for 
self-pay patients. Patients with Medicaid similarly experienced relinquishment after 2002, 
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although this effect is significantly different than the effect for private insurance patients. In its 
suit against Pfizer, Kaiser claimed that after learning about the FCA lawsuit in 2002, it started an 
aggressive campaign to get its physicians to stop prescribing neurontin to treat bipolar disorder.  
This analysis adds to the analysis of the Section IV by taking a more nuanced look at one 
focal FCA case. In accordance with Mapes’s (1977) findings, this Section finds evidence of 
heterogeneity in relinquishment by payer. Moreover, the results imply that some types of 
information are more influential in spurring relinquishment.  
VI. Conclusion: Consequences of the False Claims Act  
This Chapter sought to examine the effect of the FCA on relinquishment with two 
analyses. Part IV provides a measure of average relinquishment over multiple FCA settlements. 
It cannot, however, measure the effect of alternate information sources or distinguish between 
inappropriate and appropriate off-label uses. If all off-label uses are relinquished, the FCA 
settlement might instead function more like a stigma than an information source. To fill this gap, 
Part V studies one inappropriate off-label use of one drug, and examines important deadlines in 
the drug’s timeline besides FCA settlement; however, attributing the relinquishment in Part V to 
FCA suit is more difficult, given the many different events in one drug’s timeline. Finally, it is 
unclear how generalizable the results of Part V are. Neurontin was the first big FCA case based 
on off-label promotion, after which many such suits were settled.  
Despite these caveats, there are a couple of clear takeaways. First, there seems to be a 
significant effect of FCA settlements on relinquishment of off-label uses. Relinquishment seems 
to only occur for off-label uses of these drugs, which is understandable since these are the only 
uses for which the suit should be at all informative.  
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Second, Part V demonstrates that, at least in the case of neurontin, there are differences in 
relinquishment by expected payer.  The likelihood that patients received neurontin decreased 
more after news of the FCA suit in 2002 for patients with private insurance, and to a lesser extent 
Medicaid, relative to the change for self-pay patients. These two conclusions will discussed 
separately below.  
A.  FCA as a Informational Learning Mechanism 
Part IV finds an average relinquishment of off-label prescriptions after settlement of an 
FCA claim. Part V finds that relative to traditional sources of relinquishment, such as the 
publication of influential articles, the FCA seems to be a visible event that spurs relinquishment. 
Despite the strong evidence of neurontin ineffectiveness published in 2000, relinquishment—at 
least for third-party payers—only occurred afterward seemingly in response to the FCA suit and 
discovery. As previously discussed, there are at least two reasons for this phenomenon: First, the 
FCA can act as an industry-wide signal, bringing to light obscure scientific publications. Second, 
the FCA can bring new knowledge to light by exposing internal documents or suppressed 
studies.   
In the first case, it is important to note that the FCA is not the ideal information source 
for off-label appropriateness. A lawsuit is an expensive signal for what should be purely 
scientific information. Ideally, some government entity would publish a drug digest synthesizing 
all studies done on each use and making a suggestion as to the appropriateness of the use. 130 
However, given the high incidence of publication bias, such a government entity might not be 
sufficient to correct the problem. In the second case, new information is generated from the FCA 
trial through whistleblowers publicizing internal information. If studies are actually falsified or if 																																																								
130 There are private drug digests, but some wonder about whether the publications are truly 
unbiased (Armstrong 2003). 
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publication bias is too difficult to overcome, “smoking gun” evidence revealed through the FCA 
suit becomes particularly important.  
B. Implications of Heterogeneity in Relinquishment by Payment 
Part V finds evidence of different relative relinquishment patterns among patients with 
different payers, in the case of neurontin. This section discusses both the hypothesized reasons 
behind the current findings and possible future effects.  
The presence of a third-party payer seems to make a difference in adoption and 
relinquishment patterns. From the raw data alone, it looks as though self-pay patients were less 
likely to receive neurontin after 2000, while Medicaid patients adopted neurontin and then 
relinquished it after 2002. Private patients were more liberal in their adoption; however, their 
relinquishment effect was also strong. Through the regression analysis, patients with private 
insurance were less likely to receive neurontin after 2002, relative to the change in likelihood 
experienced by self-pay patients. Medicaid patients also experienced a decline after 2002 relative 
to self-pay patients, although significantly different than the decline for private insurance 
patients.  
Although both private and Medicaid patients face a reduced relative likelihood of being 
prescribed neurontin, the relinquishment for Medicaid is significantly different from private 
relinquishment. These results provide some evidence of heterogeneity within third-party payers 
and can have implications for the broader question of heterogeneity between public and private 
third-party payers. There may be two reasons for such heterogeneity: varying ability and 
different incentives131 of each payer to relinquish early.  
																																																								
131 Notably, the neurontin case was among the first off-label promotion cases, in which a lot of 
the FCA jurisprudence was developed; thus, it is unclear whether the differences in legal 
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The first concern may be that there is a significant difference in the ability of 
Medicaid/Medicare to refuse to reimburse a particular use and subsequently to prevent it from 
being prescribed, relative to private payers. The Medicaid statute does seem to allow for 
requiring prior authorization or even exclusion of “a covered outpatient drug if…the prescribed 
use is not for a medically accepted indication.” 132 As soon as a compendium updates its 
recommendation based on the new negative rules (or immediately, if there was no preexisting 
compendia evidence and Medicaid was exercising its discretion in covering the use), Medicaid 
can refuse to reimburse. Moreover, through its drug utilization review,133 it may be able to issue 
recommendations against such uses, as Kaiser did.  
Medicare Part D might pose a different set of challenges. While Medicare Part D was not 
a big player in the neurontin case, going forward, Medicare Part D will play a larger role in FCA 
suits. Medicare Part D likely sets a more uniform reimbursement standard compared to 
Medicaid, relying strongly on uses listed in three compendia (CMA 2010). There are also 
additional requirements to cover all drugs falling within “protected classes,” (Barker and 
Margulies 2014). Finally, depending on the level of communication between private insurance 
companies managing the Part D program and the Parts of Medicare outlining medical care, 
Medicare may not have sufficient tools to monitor appropriate usage. 
The second possibility reason for heterogeneity between public and private payers is that 
the broad standards of the FCA reduce incentives for Medicare/Medicaid to exercise persuasive 
power to relinquish inappropriate treatments. The FCA standards are rather lenient and have 																																																																																																																																																																																		
obligations were fully exploited in this case. Future work might examine whether these effects 
get stronger as more off-label FCA suits are brought. 
132 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8. 
133 While, according to the Parke Davis court, Medicaid does not gather information on 
indication in their reimbursement forms, which would make monitoring usage more difficult, this 
is theoretically something the government could require.  
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become increasingly so after FERA. Thus, to the extent that the federal government both has 
control over setting reimbursement guidelines and is the sole payer, I might expect that the 
government program might invest less time in disseminating information on inappropriate uses 
than a payer who has a harder time recovering through a fraud statute.  
It is important to note that there are agency issues when it comes to Medicaid 
reimbursement.  Although the Parke Davis court side-stepped the question of heterogeneity in 
reimbursement in state Medicaid courts (Greene 2005), this might be a concern for future cases 
(Martin 2004). If a state allows for the reimbursement of off-label non-compendia uses, they may 
not be able to recover for the prescription. They would have to prove that the particular use was 
still nonreimbursable in their state. In the neurontin case, this did not matter as at least eight 
states did not allow reimbursement, providing sufficient basis for the case to go forward; the 
issue only was relevant in terms of damages (and the case subsequently settled).134 Medicaid 
programs, however, might take this uncertainty into account in policing their reimbursements. 
Insofar as state programs do reimburse uses not listed on the compendia, they have greater 
incentive to relinquish inappropriate ones as soon as they can, as recovering for these uses might 
be more difficult.  
These results have interesting implications for future work. The data from Section IV and 
V are largely from the pre-FERA period. With the expansion of the scope of the FCA provided 																																																								
134 U.S. ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, Div. of Warner-Lambert Co., No. CIV.A. 96-11651PBS, 
2003 WL 22048255, at *3 (D. Mass. Aug. 22, 2003). This type of rationale was recently used to 
defend against a motion to dismiss in U.S. ex rel. Booker v. Pfizer, Inc., 9 F. Supp. 3d 34 (D. 
Mass. 2014). See also U.S. ex rel. Banigan v. Organon USA Inc., 883 F. Supp. 2d 277, 294 (D. 
Mass. 2012) (noting that “Organon contends that if a state Medicaid program chooses to 
reimburse a claim for a drug prescribed for off-label use, then that claim is not “false or 
fraudulent,” and liability cannot therefore attach for reimbursement. The court agrees.”).  
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in FERA and Kaiser’s RICO victory in 2013, it would be interesting to see whether the 
differences in payer response is accentuated in the most recent years.  The fact that Kaiser won 
their RICO suit may prompt other private insurance companies to follow the steps that Kaiser 
took to recover. If FERA simultaneously causes public payers to be less likely to preemptively 
relinquish inappropriate off-label uses, the gap in payer response might widen in the future. 
Similarly, it will be interesting to see whether cases based on Medicare Part D reimbursements 
display the relinquishment behavior that this Chapter hypothesizes a purely federal payer would 
exhibit. Alternatively, Medicare patients’ behavior may mimic that of private insurance patients 
given that Medicare Part D is managed by private insurance companies. The results of this 
Chapter indicate that this line of inquiry is important and should be further pursued.  
C. Conclusion 
This Chapter sought to determine whether False Claim Act suits can function as a source 
of information for physicians and third party payers regarding the appropriateness of off-label 
uses. The importance of quick relinquishment of inappropriate off-label uses is two-fold: it 
reduces monetary waste on inappropriate prescriptions, and it allows patients to switch to more 
appropriate treatments. The FCA was not created to act as a signal for inappropriate treatment; 
its purpose was to prevent fraud to the government. A positive externality of FCA suit, however, 
is that it is a visible industry notice in an area that is not directly regulated by the government. 
When used to target inappropriate off-label promotion, a happy consequence of the FCA suit is 
that it provides information to other third-party payers that an off-label use might not be 
appropriate.  
This Chapter finds evidence that off-label prescriptions decline after an FCA suit: Part IV 
studies FCA settlement, and Part V studies other landmarks in the FCA case. While this is a 
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relatively positive result, indicating that the FCA suit can serve as an industry-wide signal, there 
are important caveats. Further legal changes might result in two effects. First, the increasingly 
broad powers of the FCA and a RICO win for one third-party payer may accentuate the observed 
difference in payer response. Second, the FCA’s increasingly expansive powers may dilute the 
signal of the FCA, such that inappropriate and appropriate off-label uses are subjects for 
settlements and settlement is less informative.  
 Additionally, some functions of information spreading that the FCA engages in, 
specifically publicizing obscure scientific findings, might be better done by a government agency 
than by lawsuit. The government does not formally regulate off-label promotion, but if 
government suits function as information-spreading devices, it may be better to regulate 
promotion directly by providing a digest summarizing the scientific information publicly 
available on a particular drug use.  
Other functions, such as punishing fraudulent statements, may require the use of the False 
Claims Act. Attempts to directly regulate off-label promotion through misbranding often 
encounter First Amendment challenges; the FCA has currently avoided such challenges.  Until 
the government develops a clear way to require appropriate off-label promotion through 
misbranding, punishing fraudulent promotion through the FCA remains an important option.  
The False Claims Act is a powerful tool for controlling off-label promotion; although its 
purpose is as a reimbursement tool for the government, this Chapter finds that it may also 
provide a signal to other payers and physicians that the particular off-label use is inappropriate. 
Given the difficulties the government faces in regulating off-label uses, this function is 
important; whether the expansion of the FCA will undermine this function, however, remains to 
be seen.  
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